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Chapter 1: Games, Solutions, Paradoxes and Behavior 
1.1. Introduction 
When two parties with partly coincident and partly opposed 
interests are interacting, one speaks of a social conflict. Each party 
may consist of a single actor or of a group of actors with common 
interests. More generally, the problem of cooperation and competition 
in these situations of conflict has been studied quite extensively by 
many researchers in the behavioral sciences. 
Since the epoch-making book of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
Theory of games and economic behavior, was published in 1944, human 
game playing behavior has been a significant area of research in the 
social sciences. 
The theory of games is a mathematical system of definitions and 
theorems about decision situations, called games, in which there are 
n> 2 "players" who choose from a set of strategies. A strategy is 
essentially a plan chosen by a player in which the player's choice 
among available alternatives is indicated in every situation that can 
arise during a play of the game (Rapoport, 1970). The game is played 
by having each player choose one strategy. The joint strategy choice 
of all players involved determines the outcome of the game. 
The conflict which is embedded in a game, arises from the fact, 
that different players in the game have different preference orders 
for the outcomes. 
If there are in fact only two players (n = 2), and if each player 
has a finite number of strategies, then this situation may be 
represented as in Figure 1.1 by a matrix whose rows are one player's 
strategies, denoted R., ..., R, , and whose columns are the other 
player's strategies, denoted C.., .... С . The cell entries represent 
the outcomes of the game. More specifically, 0.. denotes the outcome 
that results of row player choosing R. and column player choosing C.. 
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Row R. 
1 
Player 
Column Player 
. . . C. . 
0 
ij 
Figure 1.1 Two-person game in normal form. 
In general, payoffs are attached to each outcome, one for each player. 
The payoffs attached to 0.. will be indicated as r.. and с - for row 
player and colomn player respectively. This actually defines what is 
called a game in normal form. 
The structure that underlies the game in normal form is the game 
in extensive form. A game in extensive form (or a game tree) is a 
representation of the scenario of the game in normal form as it is 
actually played. To illustrate this we consider the game called 
Button-Button (see Rapoport, 1966a, p.6S-68). 
Button-Button is played as follows. Hider conceals a button in one 
of his hands, and Guesser tries to guess in which hand the button is 
concealed. The game has four outcomes: (1) button in left hand and 
Guesser says "Left"; (2) button in left hand and Guesser says "Right"; 
(3) button in right hand and Guesser says "Left"; (4) button in right 
hand and Guesser says "Right". 
Suppose aider's choice is known to Guesser and the payoffs are 
different for both players depending on the outcome. Now the game can 
be represented by a tree diagram that describes the available moves to 
each player at each stage of the game. This game tree is shown in 
Figure 1.2. 
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Hide г's 
choice 
Left 
Guesser 's 
choice 
Left 
Right • 
Outcomes 
__-. C-2, 2) 
— ( 4, -4) 
Right 
Left 
Right 
( 2, -2) 
(-1, Ό 
Figure 1.2 Button-Button in extensive form. The payoff to 
Eider is mentioned first, and the payoff to 
Guesser is mentioned second in the braces. 
To reduce this to a game in normal form we must assign four 
strategies to Guesser (to do justice to the asynmetry that exist 
because Hider's choice comes first). Л strategy is now a complete 
plan of action covering all contingencies. 
The strategies of Hider are: bL (left) and FL (right). Guesser's 
strategies are: G1 (guess left regardless of where the button is), G, 
(guess the hand where the button is), G, (guess the hand where the 
button is not), and G« (guess right regardless of where the button is): 
Now we obtain the normal form shown in Fig. 1.3. 
Hider 
-2 
2 
-2 
-1 
4 
2 
4 
-1 
Figure 1.3 Normal form of the extensive form of Figure 1.2. 
The payoff to Guesser equals the payoff to Hider 
with reversed sign {Hider's payoffs are displayed). 
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In the absence of the information as to where the button is, 
Guesser can only guess unconditionally (left or right), and the game 
becomes as is shown in Figure 1.4. 
Guesser 
G\ G2 
-2 
2 
4 
-1 
Hi der 
Figure 1.4 Button-Button in normal form. 
G] and Gì are unconditional strategies. Each player 
chooses without knowledge of the other player's 
choice. (G¡ = "left G'2 = "right"). 
Experimental games may have only a single play or may be played 
a number of times (trails) in succesion by the same set of players. 
In the latter case one speaks of iterated plays of the game. 
Experiments on iterated plays of a game are very conrnon in behavioral 
research. They offer the oppertunity to study the sequential 
characteristics of game playing behavior, that is players will play 
with memory of past iterations and will anticipate future ones. 
1.2. Game theory as a normative theory of rational behavior 
Originally developed as a special branch of the theory of 
decision making game theory is defined as a theory of rational 
behavior. This implies that it is assumed, that each player in a game 
is individually rational, in the sense that his preference ordening of 
the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitude of the associated 
payoffs to him and that he is rational in the sense that he assumes 
that every other player in the game is also individually rational 
(Rapoport, 1974). 
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The aim of game theory is to prescribe decision policies 
appropriate to conflict situations, formalized as games, in such a 
way that the policies are seen as necessary, logical consequences 
derived from the assunptions of rationality and from the constraints 
of the situation (Rapoport and Orwant, 1962). Thus game theory is 
normative rather than descriptive, that is, its conclusions state how 
"rational" people ought to behave rather than how real people do 
behave. 
When applied to different types of games the concept of 
rationality becomes rather vaque. This is demonstrated in this section. 
Some important categories of two-person games and their "solutions" 
are discussed. Examples of games are given for wich different solution 
concepts all based on the principle of rationality yield contradictory 
results. 
Unambiguous priscriptions based on the principle of rationality 
are easily derived as long as two-person zero-sum games are treated. A 
two-person game is said to be zero-sum (or strictly competitive) if, 
for any outcome of the game, the payoff to one player is exactly 
balanced by the payoff to the other player, that is, the algebraic sum 
of the payoffs to each player is always zero. If this sun is always 
constant, not necessarily zero, regardless of the outcome of the game, 
the game is called "two-person constant-sum". Constant-sum games are 
not essentially different from zero-sum games. 
A dominating strategy is a strategy which is preferred by some 
player over all other available strategies. If a two-person zero-sum 
game has a dominating strategy for any player, it is prescribed by the 
criterion of rationality. Otherwise, the minimax criterion leads to a 
choice of strategy which guarantees the greatest possible win under 
the constraints of the game (Rapoport and Orwant, 1962). The minimax 
criterion prescribes a player to choose the strategy for which the 
minimum attainable payoff is maximum. 
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1.2.1. 'I'uo-person zero-sum games vith saddle points 
Zero-sum games are games where the interests of the players are 
diametrically opposed. In such games one player's gain is his 
opponent's loss J J 
A saddle point in the matrix of a two-person zero-sum game is an 
outcome where the payoff is at the same time the smallest in its row 
and the largest in its column. (If the game is zero-sum, only row 
player's payoffs are entered since the other payoff must be the same 
number with the opposite sign.) 
Column player 
Row player 
-7 
10 
3 
-5 
-2 
1 
7 
-S 
4 
Figure 1.5 Two-person zero-sum game with saddle points; entries 
are Row player's pay-offs (gains). 
In Figure 1.5 the saddle point is in row R, and column C,· It is 
the smallest entry in its row and the largest in its column. 
The choice of R_ by the row player is called the тахгтгп strategy, 
because it maximizeF the minimal value that can be obtained in a row. 
The choice of C-, by the column player is called the minimax strategy, 
because it minimizes the maximum value that he may lose in a column. 
The strategies R, and C- are in equilibrium because it is not 
advantageous to either player to change his strategy as long as his 
opponent does not change his strategy. 
1) The assumption of strict opposition does not necessarily apply to 
the numerical utilities of the payoffs. However, this problem will 
be ignored here. 
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There may be more than one point in a single zero-sum game, that 
are minimum in its row and maximum in its colomn. It can be shown that 
if a game-matrix has several saddle points, the corresponding payoffs 
are all equal; moreover, the coordinates of these saddle points are 
interchangeable. That is, if 0,. and 0,. are both saddle points, then 
0·, and 0, . are also saddle points with equal entries. 
The concept of "best" or "rational" strategy is so straight-
forward and convincing in zero-sum games with saddle points, that 
maximin and minimax strategies are the only plausible choices. There-
fore, the normative aspect of game theory is strongest with respect to 
zero-sum games. At the same time this delimits the use of game theory. 
As Rapoport and Orwant put it (1962, p.4):"...an experiment on a game 
with saddle points will (...) be guided by a hypothesis that the 
saddle-point strategies will in fact be chosen by sufficiently 
intelligent players. If the results confirm the hypothesis, little 
remains to be asked further." 
1.2.2 Two-person zero-sum games without saddle points 
It is easy to show that in zero-sum games a saddle point exists 
if and only if the maximin and the minimax strategies are in 
equilibrium. Many games do not have a saddle point, and hence no pure 
stategies that are in equilibrium. 
If the game matrix has no saddle point, there exists for each 
player an optimal mixed strategy, that is, a probability distribution 
on the available strategies, which has the property that the resulting 
expected values of the gains to each player respectively have minimax 
properties. ' 
In the game matrix of Figure 1.6 there is no saddle point, 
because no entry which is minimum in its row is at the same time maxi-
mum in its column. The maximin and minimax strategies are R. and C. 
respectively. 
1) Strictly speaking one should say "maximin properties", because the 
mixed strategy maximizes the minimum expectation. 
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Column player 
Row player 
-1 
3 
6 
-4 
Figure 1.6 Two-person zero-sum game without saddle points 
However, if Row player expects Column player to choose C.., Row 
player will select R, because that will yield a more preferred payoff. 
If this is anticipated by Column player, Column player is better off 
when selecting Qj. But now, if Row player expects Column player to 
select C-, Row player should choose R.. And so on ad infinitum... 
The game theoretical prescription in this case is for Row player 
to select RH and R2 with equal probabilities (.5), and for Column 
player to select C 1 with probablility 5/7 and C2 with probability 2/7. 
If p, and g, are the probabilities of selecting R, and C, 
respectively, the optimal mixed strategies can be easily found (see, 
e.g. Coombs, Dawes and Tversky (1970)) as 
r22 " r21 
11 + r22 " r 1 2 - r21 
r22 " r12 
r11 + r22 " r12 " r21 
The expected value of the gains that each player can secure, 
regardless of the strategy of his opponent, indicated as υ, is obtained 
as 
r11* r22 " r12* r21 
r11 + r22 " r12 " r21 
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The value of the gane in Figure 1.6 equals 1. 
The ra t iona l behind the optimal mixed s t rategy (or minimax 
mixed strategy) i s appealing, when the gane i s played repeatedly and 
payoffs can be cummulated. Then the expected payoff wi l l be real ized 
as the long-run average payoff. 
I t may be c lear , t h a t in two-person zero-sum games without saddle 
points , departures from solutions prescribed by the normative theory 
wi l l be found тэге frequently than in two-person zero-sum games with 
saddle p o i n t s . 
F i r s t , even i f the pr incip le of minimax mixed s t r a t e g i e s i s known 
to the player of the game, the calculat ion of such a strategy i s a 
complex computational task. Players ignorant of game theory cannot be 
expected to accomplish such a task. 
Second, knowledge about the u t i l i t y functions on the payoffs i s 
required to conpute or to evaluate mixed s t r a t e g i e s . In the case of 
games with a saddle point only a preference order among the outcomes 
needs to be determined, because the saddle point i s invariant with 
respect t o any monotone tranformation of the payoffs. 
Tranformations more general than the l i n e a r transformation may affect 
the r e s u l t of the averaging procedure involved in ca lculat ing a mixed 
s trategy. 
1.2.3. Two-person nonzero-sum games 
Minimax i s a c lear-cut c r i t e r i o n for zero-sum games. That i s , i t 
can be defended on logical and r a t i o n a l grounds and accepted as 
"optimal behavior"^ for th i s class of games. Problems ar i se when 
nonzero-sum games are considered. Here the r a t i o n a l i t y c r i t e r i o n 
breaks down. 
In a nonzero-sum game for at l eas t one outcome the algebraic 
sum of the payoffs to each player i s not zero. A different name for 
nonzero-sum games i s partly competitive games, because the i n t e r e s t s 
of the players are not diametrical ly opposed. In these games 
anbivalence about the ^ e s t " decision i s introduced, because 
different c r i t e r i a based on the pr inc ip le of r a t i o n a l i t y lead t o 
I) "optimal behavior" in the sense of maximizing expected payoff. 
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a) 
Row 
player 
Column player 
C2 
R, 3,3 1,4 
R, 4,1 2,2 
b) 
ij 
1,4 
2,2V 
^3,3 
4,1 
i-J 
c) d) 
4
_ ^
 Rl 
2 -^ 2 
'1 
Figure 1.7 Prisoner's Dilemma Game. In part (a) the game matrix is given. 
Part (b) is a graphical representation of the payoff structure; 
Row's payoffs are indicated on the absciss and Column's payoffs 
are indicated on the ordinate. In part (c) Row's expected 
payoffs are displayed as a function of his probability of selec-
ting R. for both pure strategies of Column. Part (d) is equiva-
lent to (c) except that the roles of Row and Column are reversed. 
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different p r e s c r i p t i o n s . 
Xonzcro-sum games arc cal led ^jcpau: .'ce or rcjj'Jab.c vhen the 
outcome can be negotiated by the players (Coontos et al., 1970J. 
Otherwise, the games are cal led noncooperative or nonnegotiabLe. 
This i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the conditions under which the games 
are played. In t h i s section we shal l discuss some nonzero-sum games, 
which are a l l noncooperative. 
A prominent example i s the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), which 
is a two-person nonzero-sum game where, i f both players choose t h e i r 
dominating ( i . e . ra t iona l ) s trategy, each gets less than i f e i t h e r 
one had chosen h i s dominated strategy (see I'lgurc 1.7). 
Ihe pr incipal feature of PDG i s that for both players the second 
strategy i s a dominating strategy, t h a t i s , FL dominates R. for Row 
player and C. dominates C. for Column player . However, the choice of 
(R», C )^ re su l t s in a non-optimal outcome. The outcome (R , C.) 
i s preferred to (R., CL) by both p layers . This is also i l l u s t r a t e d 
in the graphical representat ion of the game in Figure 1.7 (b, c, d ) . 
The outcome (R., C„) i s an equilibrium (because no player can inprove 
h i s payoff by u n i l a t e r a l l y changing his s t rategy) and s a t i s f i e s the 
minimax p r i n c i p l e . 
Another example of a two-person nonzero-sum game i s the game 
cal led "The inspector and the thieP' (Figure 1.8). 
In "The inspector and the thie."" R and C. are pure minimax 
s t r a t e g i e s , but although R i s also optimal for Row player, the 
optimal s trategy for Column player i s a mixed s trategy, a = (q.,:-c ) , 
with q. = 3/4. This value i s found as : 
q\*c\\ + -Ч^п = q\*c'2\ + <·1-<11
)
*
σ22> 
which yields in the present case 
3c, + U-q,) = 2q, + Ml-q,) ==>q, = 3/4 
This derivat ion i s simular on the one given for the conputation of 
optimal mixed s t r a t e g i e s for zero-sum games without saddle points 
(cfr. page 16). 
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a) 
Row 
player 
1 
Column player 
3,3 2,1 
4,2 1,4 
b) 
c. . 
1J 1,4 
R
^ 
C 2 » 
3,3 
ХЧс, 
'
 ч
 \ ι 
\ / R1 ^ 2 
2,1 
r. . 
c) d) 
1J 
1 P, 
1J 
Figure 1 .8 The inspector and the thief 
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(R ,0.) is not an equilibrium, because if Row player expects C., 
he will select R-. But if this is foreseen by Column player, he will 
choose C-, etcetera. 
Similarly, it is easy to see that the optimal strategies are not 
in equilibrium. If Row player chooses R. with probability 1, the best 
thing for Column player to do is to select C. with probability 1. 
This brings us back to the circular reasoning of the last paragraph. 
If a game does not have a dominating strategy for each player, 
mixed strategics can be computed, which yield an equilibrium. That is 
these mixed equilibrium strategies yield expected gains such that any 
player cannot improve his expected gains by playing a different 
(mixed) strategy as long as the other players stick to these mixed 
equilibrium strategies. 
Let У be the expected gain for Row player regardless of his own 
(mixed) strategy and let υ be the expected gain for Column player 
regardless of his own (mixed) strategy. (Note the difference with the 
definition of υ in the case of zero-sum games without a saddle point 
on page 161). Now we derive : 
W
r
 = Pl (ί?!*Γ11 + (,"q1)*rl2) + (,-Рі>*(<?і*г2і + (|-<?і>*г22) 
»ρ, ((r12-r22) - с?, О^-Ги+г^-г,,)) + ( Γ ^ , · ^ , - ! ^ ) ) , 
which is independent of ρ , for a , equal to 
rl2 " r22 
r12 " r22 + Γ21 " rll 
¡7, (Ρ,'ο,, + (l-p1)«c21) + (1-Яі)*(р^сі2 + (l-p1)*c22) 
-,, ((c21-c22) -P^-c^+c^-c,,)) • (c^+P,»^-^)), 
which is independent of ,¡ for p. equal to 
*
 c21 c22 
Pi = 
1 г — г + c ~ с 
21 22 12 11 
«1 
and и 
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a) 
Row 
player 
Column player 
R i 
R 2 
C
. 
3,4 
1,2 
C 2 
2,1 
4,3 
b) 
c. . 
3,4 
,1 
С ' ' 
1/ / 
J'S 
>2 ' 
1,2" R 
1 , 
г/ 
Г. . 
IJ 
с) 
г.. 
IJ 
1 Ρ! 
Figure 1.9 Lucas and Mattheus 
These strategies, г and а , are equilibrium strategies, because if 
any player's opponent follows the equilibrium strrategy, this player 
cannot improve his expected payoff. The values of ν and у can be 
readily found by substituding the expressions of ρ * and q* for 
p. and q. respectively. 
This yields 
Γ12 * r21 " rl! * r22 
ν = 
and 
Γ r12 - r22 + r21 - rll 
c12 * C21 - C1l * C22 
ν = 
c C21 " c22 C12 " Cll 
In this case of "The inspector and the thief" the equilibrium 
strategies are: p.* = 4 and q =4· The corresponding equilibrium 
values are: ν =2.5 and ν =2.5. 
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In this game the pure minimax strategy, (R^C.), yields a payoff 
which is preferred to the (expected! payoff of the equilibrium 
strategy, but the minimax strategy is not equilibrium. 
Consider the game in Figure 1.9. This game is called "Luoas and 
Mattheus". The pure minimax strategies are R and Cj, which yield an 
equilibrium. There is also a second equilibrium, namely (R-, CL). 
Each equilibriun is optimal for one player and nonoptimal for 
the other one. If both players select their strategy so as to obtain 
the equilibrium with the optimal payoff for the opponent (altruistic 
choice), they arrive ar (R., С ), which is worst or next to worst. 
Similarly, if both players select their strategy so as to obtain the 
equilibriun with the optimal payoff for oneself (individualistic 
choice), they arrive at (R , С ), which is also worst or next to 
worst. 
Again the pure minimax strategy, (R., C.), yields a payoff which 
is preferred to the expected payoff of the mixed equilibrium strategy. 
A nonzer-sum game which very much looks like the PDG is "Game 
of Chicken" (Figure 1.10). There is not a dominating strategy for any 
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player in this game. R. and C, are pure minimax (and optimal mixed) 
strategies, although not in equilibrium. (R., C.) and (R., C.) are 
both equilibrium. If either player can bluff the other that he will 
select his second strategy, the other will do best to select his 
first strategy, and the player who bluffs will obtain his best payoff. 
a) 
Row 
player 
R
. 
R 2 
Column player 
c, c 2 
3,3 2,4 
4,2 1,1 
b) 
с . 
ij 
2,4 
Л 
,' \ 
/ 4s3,3 
Г ' 
...\ 4,2 
.--к; 
1,1 
r i j 
c) d) 
Figure 1.10 The Game of Chicken 
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But if both bluff each other, and carry out their bluffs, each player 
gets his worst payoff. 
The mixed equilibrium strategies for the "Game of Chicken" tum 
out to be: p. = \ and q. = J, with expected gains υ = υ =2.5. 
A slight modification of the game matrix of Figure 1.10 yields 
the game known as "The Battle of the Sexes" (or sometimes called 
"Mild Chicken"). This game is shown in Figure 1.11. 
In "The Battle of Sexes", like in "The Game of Chicken", there is 
no dominating strategy. R and С are the pure minimax strategies, but 
not optimal. The optimal mixed strategies are found to be: 
p. = 3/4 and q. = 3/4, but these optimal strategies are not in 
equilibrium. 
a) 
Rl Row 
player 
R2 
Column player 
c, c 2 
2,2 3,4 
4,3 1,1 
b) 
с . 
ij 
3,4 
Л 
У/ Я ,^-'4,3 
in 
r i j 
Figure 1.11 Battle of the sexes 
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(R-, С.) and (R., C9) arc both equilibrium. The difference with 
The Game of the Скгакеп is, that in the latter game the non-optimal 
payoff (2) of these equilibria is less favourable than the non-optimal 
payoff in the equilibria of The Battle o" the Sexes (3) . This 
explains where the name "tteld Chicken" comes from. 
Also lor The Battle of the Sexes mixed equilibrium strategics can 
be computed. They are: p. = J and q = \. The expected gains for 
these strategics are: v^ = ν = 2.5. It appears that for both 
equilibria, (R,, Cj) and (R-, C.), the payoff for one player is larger 
than his expected gams for the mixed equilibrium strategies, while 
the payoff for the other player is smaller than his expected gains 
for the mixed equilibrium strategies. 
The last example of a two-person nonzero-sum game that will be 
discussed here, is the game called "Tne Hero" or "Let George ao гі". 
There is just a subtle difference with The Battle of the Sexes: in 
Hero there are the same equilibria, (R , CL) and (R„, С ) as in The 
Battle of the Sexes, but the payoffs are interchanged. The effect of 
this is, that in The Hero an altruistic choice by both players yields 
(R., CL) and an individualistic choice by both players yields (R , С ), 
while in The Battle of the Sexes the altruistic choice results in 
(R , С ) and the individualistic choice results in (R , С ) (ьес Figure 1.12) 
In The Hero R. and C. are the pure minimax strategies. The 
optimal mixed strategies are: p. = à and q = J. However, neither 
is (R , C.) an equilibrium, nor is an equilibrium yielded by the 
optimal mixed strategies. 
The mixed equilibrium strategies are: p.* = 3/4 and q * = 3/4, 
with expected gains: υ = о = 2.5. 
1.3. Ganes and the study of interpersonal conflicts 
For the game theorist analytical complexities arise in nonzero-
sum games, since no unambiguous "solutions" are derived by the 
normative theory. However, nonzero-sum games are the most interesting 
games for behavioral researchers to investigate the decision processes 
in interpersonal conflicts. 
26 
a) 
Row 
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Figure 1.12 The Hero 
Psychologists are concerned with determining and interpreting 
regularities in actual game playing behavior, that is their approach 
is descriptive rather than prescriptive. 
There is a relation between the normative and descriptive theory. 
The derivations of optima] choices, which are provided by the 
normative theory, are excellent standards or norms to assess the 
"rationality" of subjects' choices in experimental games. Comparing 
actual choices in experimental ganes with those prescribed by 
the mathematical normative theory shows that human subjects not 
always behave in conformity with the normative theory (Krivohlavy, 
1974; Lieberman, 1960). For the class of zero-sum games this was 
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demonstrated by, for example, studies of Flood (1952), Vinacke and 
Arkoff (1957), Atkinson and Suppes (1958, 1959) and Istes (1462). 
bven more studies are known on nonzero-sum games, which show 
great discrepancies between observed behavior and the prescriptions 
of the normative theory. An excellent overview of the literature can 
be found in Krivohlavy (1974). In particular, paradigms of games have 
been studied which leave the normative theory with puzzles and 
paradoxes, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Remember that in the 
PDG if both players choose their dominated strategy, the resulting 
outcome is jointly better than if both players choose their dominating 
strategy. For this reason the first strategy of the game matrix in 
Figure 1.7, R and С respectively, is usually labeled " (for 
cooperation). If a player in the PDG selects his second strategy, 
while his opponent selects his first strategy (a), the former player 
gets his best (most preferred) payoff at the cost of the latter 
player's payoff. Therefore, the second strategy m the PDG is often 
labeled d (for defection). In what follows this terminology will be 
used. Thus, the game matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game іь given 
as 
с d 
3,3 
M 
1,4 
2,2 
Research on the Prisoner's Dilemma Gane has shown that there 
are large individual differences in performance which are related 
to personality characteristics of the players, the payoff matrix, 
the strategy of the other player, the presence or absence of 
communication between the players etcetera. See for example krivolilavy 
(1974) and Ncmcth (1974) for an ovorviei. o^ the jelevant literature. 
The most frequently used index of behavior (the dependent 
variable) in studies on the PDG is the relative frequency of choosing 
a. This frequency is sometimes calculated over a sequence of repeated 
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plays of the game by the same pair of players, and sometimes over 
several players in a "one shot" experiment or in a grand average over 
both plays and players (Rapoport and Orwant, 1962). But, as Rapoport 
and Orwant argue properly, averaging over repeated plays throws away 
information about the effects of experience; averages over players 
throw away individual propensities to "cooperate" or to "defect". 
It is commonly agreed upon that the choice of an alternative, 
say d, in the PDG on the first play of a sequence of a (great) 
number of successive plays might have a completely different meaning, 
in a psychological sense, than the choice of d on the last play. Yet 
choice percentages arc utilized quite often as indices of behavior. 
In studies on PDG the percentage of c-choices was used by Scodcl, 
Minas, Ratoosh and Lipetz (1959), Radlow and Weidner (1966), Miller 
(1967) and Krivohlavy (1974), to mention a few. 
McClintock and McNeel (1966, 1967) used the percentage of 
d-choices as main criterion. However, this related to studies on the 
Maximizing Difference Game (MDG). In the MDG there is no conflict in 
a game-theoretical sense. For each player there is a dominating 
strategy, which yields an optimal equilibrium, i.e. optimal for all 
players, when all players choose their dominating strategy (Figure 
1.13). 
Row player 
с 
d 
Column player 
a d 
4,4 2,3 
3,2 1,1 
Figure 1.13 The Maximizing Difference Game 
The psychological conflict involved in WG is that, although 
the first strategy is dominating in the sense of maximizing 
individual and joint gain, the second alternative maximizes the 
relative gain, i.e. the difference between a player's payoff and that 
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of his opponent. The conflict cdn be summarized as "give up some 
gain in order to increase the ditference with the opponent's payoff". 
The nsk involved is in [d d) · when both players choose so as to 
maximize the relative gain, they get the least preferred payoff. 
In PDG there is a confounding of the motivation to maximize 
own gain (individualism) and to maximize the relative gain 
(competitiveness). In MDG these motivations arc separated (but now 
coopérâtneness and individualism are confounded). For this reason 
McClintock and McNeel argue, that in the MDG the perccntjge of 
¿-choices is a more appropriate index, since the choice of d is less 
ambiguous in terms of motivation than the choice of с 
ive already mentioned that a choice of a (or d ) in the PDG may 
have a different meaning at the beginning of a sequence of successive 
plays than a c-choice (or d-choice) on the last play. Rapoport (1966b) 
abSigncd psychological interpretations to the following outcome 
sequences : 
-(cc)-(ed)-(dd) unilateral decision to be competitive resulting m 
suspicion from the other player, 
-(_dd)-Cad)-(cc) unilateral offer to cooperate, which is accepted, 
-[dd)-(ad)-(dd) non-accepted offer to cooperate. 
A great number of observable and descriptive characteristics of 
choice sequences arc used in the analysis of game playing behavior. 
Guyer (1968) and Knvohlavy (1967) used the following sequence-
dependent parameters. 
-I(ce)H .trialnumber of the first occurrence of a choice of (ec), 
-Г(ес) trialnumber of the first occurrence of η successive choices 
of (ее), 
-Τ(da) ¡similar criterion as Τ(ее) for (dd), 
-I(ce) ¡length of maximum run of successive (ec)-choices, 
-L(dd) ¡similar as I (ее) for (dd)-choices, 
-L(cd) ¡similar as I (ce) for (ed)-choices. 
Other criteria concern observable behavior on the last trials of 
a number of successive plays (Terhune, 1968, Rapoport and Chammah, 
1965, McClintock and McNcel, 1966, 1967), the variancc of cooperative 
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choices (Knox and Douglas, 1968), and the skewness of the distribution 
of e-choices (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). 
To detect interaction effects product-moment correlations related 
to two players in the same game playing the PDG for η times in 
succession (n > 200) where computed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965, 
p. 60) according to the formula 
¥ co + od) (cc + de) (âd + cd) (dd + de) 
•where (cc) = the frequency of outcomes m the PDG which result when 
both players choose r, 
(dd) = the frequency of outcomes in the PDG which result when 
both players choose d, 
(cd) = the frequency of outcomes m the PDG which result when 
the first player chooses с and the second player chooses 
à, 
(de) = the frequency of outcomes in the PDG which result when 
the first player chooses d and the second player chooses 
Obviously, this is an ordinary phi-correlation for 2*2-contingency 
tables : 
η = -1 when all outcomes are (cd) or (dc), 
r = +1 when all outcomes are (ce) or (dd). 
Several correlation coefficients were computed: 
о : the product-moment correlation between both players' choices on 
the same play; 
Ρ : the same as P 0 except that one player's choice is matched with 
the other player's immediately preceding choice; 
Ρ (i= 2,4,4,5,6) : the same as p. except that one player's choice is 
matched with the choice made by the other player 
ι plays previously. 
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According to Rapoport and Chammah с is a measure of the type and 
strength of influence one player has on the other in repeated plays. 
Rapoport and Charmiah report strong positive correlations in repeated 
plays of the PDG. In their experiments with the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game they had different experimental conditions depending on the way 
seven different payoff matrices of the PDG-type were administered. 
In the Pure Matrix Condition ten pairs of players played the same 
game (that is the same payoff matrix) for three hundred plays, seventy 
pairs in all or twenty-one thousand outcomes. In this condition the 
game matrix was displayed to the players throughout the experiment. 
In the Block Matrix Condition each pair of players played all 
seven games. A Latin Square Design (Winer, 1971) was used in order to 
distinguish the effects of the payoff matrix from the effects of 
learning. There were two Latin squares with each square containing 
seven orders of the seven games, seven orders of blocks of fifty 
plays of each game of the seven. There were five pairs of players 
playing the seven games in a given order, seventy pairs in all. 
Each pair gave 350 outcomes. 
In the Mixed Mavrix Condition the seven games were presented in 
random order to each of ten pairs of players, who played seven 
hundred times or one hunderd plays per game. Here the game matrices 
were displayed as well. 
The Pure Ho Matrix Condition was similar to the Pure Matrix 
Condition, except that the game matrices were not displayed but the 
payoffs to both players were announced. 
The Mixed No Matrix Condition related to the Mixed Matrix 
Condition in the same manner as the Pure No Matrix Condition did to 
the Pure Matrix Condition. 
The average values of ρ were computed for the five conditions. 
As Table 1.1 shows, the average correlation was highest in the Block 
Matrix Condition (.56), where each pair of players played all seven 
games in the Latin square design. 
The average values of p. were smallest in both No Matrix Conditions: 
apparently the interactions are weaker in the absence of the payoff 
matrices. 
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Table 1. 1 
Table of p-values from Rapoport and Chamah (1965, p. 62) 
Condition 
Pure flatrix 
Block Matrix 
Mixed Matrix 
'0 
.46 
.56 
.47 
Pl 
.51 
.59 
.34 
p2 
.46 
.56 
.31 
p3 
.42 
.52 
.30 
p4 
.40 
.51 
.31 
p5 
.38 
.49 
.30 
p6 
.36 
.46 
.29 
Pure No Matrix 
Mixed No Matrix 
.37 .47 .40 .33 .32 .32 .32 
.34 .22 .22 .23 .21 .21 .20 
The correlation p. is not a proper measure for the play to play 
interaction between players in the same pair. Λη interaction effect of 
this sort is reflected in ρ . Similarly, p. (i = 2, ..., 6) will 
measure the degree of interaction of a player's choice with the 
choices of the other 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 plays ago. The values of these 
coefficients for all the conditions are also shown in Table 1.1. 
If the behavior of a player is biased by the behavior of the 
other player in the sane pair, this should be reflected in ρ more 
strongly than in p.. One can also expect that this bias will wear 
off, when the number of steps (plays) between a player's choice and 
the choice under consideration of the other in the same pair is 
increased. Both expectations were realized in the experiments of 
Rapoport and Chammah as Table 1.1 shows. The expections in both mixed 
conditions were explained by Rapoport and Chammah as due to the fact 
that in the mixed conditions the next play generally involved a 
different game (randomized order of the games!). The payoff matrices 
could have played a part in influencing the choice of the game, that 
is there could have been a confounding between a "payoff-effect" and 
an interaction effect. 
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Because the foregoing correlation p. (i = 0,1, , 6) were 
based on frequencies of "cooperative" and "defecting" choices, 
Rapoport and Chanmah concluded that these coefficients are not very 
suitable as indicators of personal propensities. Instead they 
proposed two sets of so called contingent propensities: the response-
conditioned propensities and the state-conditioned propensities. 
The Response-Conditioned Propensities 
ς. : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses о following 
the other's choice of о on the preceding play, 
η. : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses a following 
his own choice of a on the preceding play, 
ς. : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses a following 
his own choice of d on the preceding play, 
ω- : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses о following 
the other's choice of d on the preceding play. 
The following interpretations were given by Rapoport and Chanmah to 
these probabilities: 
1. ç is the propensity to respond cooperatively to the other's 
cooperative response, 
2. η is the propensity to "respond" cooperatively to one's own 
cooperative choice, 
3. l-ς is a measure of the persistence in the d-choice, 
4. l-ω is the propensity to respond noncooperatively to the other's 
defecting response. 
The State-Conditioned Propensities 
x· : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses σ following 
а (ее)-outcome on the preceding play, 
y- : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses о following 
a (cd)-outcome if i = 1 or following a (de)-outcome if i = 2 
on the preceding play, 
z. : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses о following 
a (de)-outcome if i = 1 or following a (ed)-outcome if i = 2 
on the preceding play, 
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w. : the probability that player i (i =1,2) chooses a following 
a (di)-outcome on the preceding play. 
Other stochrstic criterions can be derived from the state-
conditioned propensities, which appear to be meaningful indices. 
M is defined by Rapoport and Chanmah (1965) as 
(ΐ-χ,Κΐ-ζ^ (i-y^Ci-z,) 
M = or 
У\гг ^2 ζι 
and is related to the "martyr" runs of unilateral states. M is the 
ratio of the probability that a unilateral state passes to (¿И) to the 
probability that the "defector" starts to cooperate while the "martyr" 
continues to cooperate. 
There is an essential difference between games as decision models 
and games as they are used in social psychological research. In the 
former approach games are used to devise and study formal models of 
rational behavior. In the second approach the game matrix is used as 
a payoff device in situations of interdependence. This latter 
orientntion has generated a myriad of studies on cooperation and 
competition in experimental games. In these studies the research 
methodology consists usually of establishing a relationship between 
an independent and a dependent variable, the latter being commonly 
some index of (cooperative) behavior. 
Recently, the apparent popularity of gaining research in 
psychology has been criticized in some reviewing articles (Apfelbaum, 
1974; Nemeth, 1974; Pruitt and Kiimiel, 1977). 
Apfelbaum (1974) pointed out the great diversity of theorizing in 
gaming studies and the lack of an integrative theoretical framework. 
Another criticism concerned the inconsistent experimental results. As 
she put it (p. 103-104): "... most of the investigations have explored 
different variables, but there has been little systematic attempt to 
relate the different dimension to one another, and there has been 
little effort to reconcile the often contradictory experimental 
evidence." 
The lack of theory in experimental gaming was also recognized by 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977). In an effort to integrate experimental 
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results in the domain of the Prisoner's Dileirana Came and 
Prisoner's Dilemma type situations they presented a "goal/expectation" 
theory for behavior in repeated interaction in Prisoner's Dileima 
situations. In this theory continuous cooperation is viewed as the 
result from long-range thinking in which a goal of establishing and/or 
maintaining continued mutual cooperation is achieved, and at the same 
time the expectation that the other will cooperate, is formed. 
Unfortunately, the experimental findings which were interpreted 
by Pruitt and Kinmel in the framework of their goal/expectation 
theory, entailed only measures of the level of cooperation (such as 
choice percentages) rather than measures of goals and/or expectations. 
Sequential characteristics of the behavior were not taken into 
account. 
1.4. In Search of a Parameterization 
The basic form of the pay-off-matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemna 
Game is 
o d 
R I ' R 2 
T 1 ' S 2 
S 1 ' T 2 
P
. .
P 2 
with T. > R. > P. > S. and S. + T. < 2R. (i = 1,2) (Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1965, p. 34). R stands for "reward", Τ for "temptation", 
S for "sucker's payoff" and Ρ for "punishment". 
This parameterization of the PDG was used by Rapoport and 
Chanmah to derive some indices from the payoffs to relate the 
observed behavior to. 
Starting from the assumption that the behavior of players in the 
PDG remains invariant if the payoff matrix of the PDG is subjected 
to a linear transformation Rapoport and Chammah propose the following 
ratios (1965, p. 41): 
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R - Ρ , R - S 
Γ
ι
 =
 τ^τ ^
 Γ 2 = τ^τ 
О < г, < 1 О < r 2 < 1 
In a later study Rapoport (1967) called г the "Index of Cooperation", 
K. Komorita (1967) interpreted К as "the гпаепіг е to make the a-
choice relative vo the d-choice." (p. 360). 
The parameters R, Τ, Ρ and S are not linked to any psychological 
theory of game playing behavior. Therefore, this parameterization is 
not useful to study the effect of variations in the payoff matrix on 
the psychological structure of behavior. For instance, changes in the 
frequency of ^ -choices can be conceived of as a function of eight (!) 
variables. Apart from the fact that this is far too complex to render 
in a simple model about the conflict in the game, whether and how 
variations in the payoffs change the player's conception of the game 
cannot be concluded. 
A special subset of games, devised to investigate the relation 
between game playing behavior and motives of behavior is formed by the 
separable games (Hamburger, 1969). Pruitt (1967) speaks of decomposed 
games. 
In a dtr.comp'^id or seçarable game each subject (in the dyad) is 
given a choice between two options, с and d, such that each option is 
an ordered pair of numbers, (a;,i/), where χ denotes the payoff to the 
subject making the choice, and у denotes the payoff to the other 
person (Mcssick and McClintock, 1968, p. 7). In Table 1.2 a PDG with 
a decomposition is shown. As can be seen in part (b), each player 
receives two payoffs, one from the column he has chosen and one from 
the column the other has chosen. 
A player's final payoff is calculated as the sum of the payoff he has 
given himself and the payoff the other player has given him. 
In fact any game has an infinite number of decompositions, while 
to each decomposed game there corresponds precisely one game in 
normal form. Pruitt (1970) showed that different decompositions of 
the PDG produced different motives which led to differing patterns of 
behavior. 
Table 1.2. Decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
a) game matrix b) decomposition 
e 
Row player 
d 
Column player 
о d 
6,6 0,9 
9,0 3,3 
Own 
s 
Other's 
Choices 
о 
3 
3 
d 
6 
-3 
For the subset of separable PDG's Coombs (1973) has proposed a 
reparameterization of the PDG, which analyzes the payoffs of the game 
into components with a clearer psychological interpretation than 
merely the monetary payoffs in terms as "reward", punishment" etcetera. 
In Coombs' reparameterization the dilemna of the PDG is 
reformulated as an instance of an approach-avoidance conflict. The 
dilemma is interpreted as a choice paradigm having a risk inducement 
structure. The choice between с and d is conceptualized as a problem 
of risk decision making and risk preference (Coombs and Huang, 1970). 
A player in the PDG is in conflict between an (added) inducement to 
defect and his vulnerability to retaliation by his opponent. It is a 
conflict between greet and fear in the context of the level of the 
game, (see also Coombs, 1975 and Coombs and Avrunin, 1977). 
According to Coombs (1973) the strenght of preference for 
defecting over cooperation would be a distributive model (Krantz and 
Tversky, 1971): 
S(d> β) = [Ф^ДЬ) + Ф2(2а)] Ф 3 ( Ь ) , 
where > is a binary preference relation and S, Φ , Φ , Φ are real valued 
functions defined on (d > c), Ab, 2a, and b respectively. 
Ab = added inducement to defect, 
a = vulnerability to retaliation by the other, 
b = the "level" of the game. 
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The payoffs in the game can be written in terms of a, b, and ДЬ, 
which makes Coombs' parameterization suitable to simple and direct 
experimentation. Of course, Coombs' parameterization cannot claim 
exclusiveness. It is attractive because the interpretation of the 
parameters links psychological variables with experimental variables, 
which can be easily manipulated. Experimental results from this 
manipulation can be easily interpreted, whereas, as we noted before, 
experimental manipulation of separate payoffs is very complex and 
cannot be traced back to psychological effects. In chapter 2 of this 
thesis a detailed exposition of Coombs' reparameterization of the 
PDG is given. 
1.5. Dyriamia deaisior. такікд and laten* behavior 
In real life decisions occur in sequences, and information 
available for future decisions is likely to be contingent on the 
nature and consequences of earlier ones. The study of decision 
processes in such changing situations is called the study of dynamic 
decisionmaking (Edwards, 1961). 
Attempts have been made to explain individual behavior in 
experimental games as a learning process (Atkinson and Suppes, 1958, 
1959; Burke, 1959; Suppes and Atkinson, 1960). These studies were all 
directed towards the manifest behavior over a number of successive 
plays and the course of behavior was analyzed to fit a Markov chain 
model. Although some discrepancies between the normative theory and 
actual behavior could be accounted for, this approach has been 
critized on the ground that the application of learning models to 
social interaction did not start from any psychological theory 
about social interaction but rather from the apparent usefulness 
of these models in other areas (Rosenberg, 1968). 
One exception must be mentioned here. Foa and Zacks (1959) have 
developed a stochastic model of social interaction in a dyad, which 
was based on an earlier paper by Foa (1958). Based on some concepts 
from Heider's balance theory, Foa developed a classification of 
behavior in the dyad as to whether a given perceived behavior does 
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or does not conform to the corresponding norm of d subject and/or 
the other person. However, this classification was concerned vath 
the behavioral effects of social regards on compliance \vith learned 
norms rather than with experimental games or decision making imder 
uncertainty. The stochastic model of Foa and Zacks i\as based on two 
basic assumptions, the classification of beha\ior and learning 
processes. In their model 2S6 ['.) different states for the two-
actor system were identified, which posed serious measurement 
problems. This was too umieldy to suggest an estimation 
procedure for the parameters of the model or to make possible an 
experimental test. 
In a most interesting study by Ofshe and Ofshe (1970) choice 
behavior in coalition games (three person) uas interpreted as 
resulting from two weighted (and non-observable) utilities utility 
for money and utility for equit) . Лрріісаіюпз to non-cooperative 
games were discussed as well. 
The significance of the Ofshe-and-Ofshe study is that decision 
making in experimental games is not described as choosing an optimal 
strategy but rather as a stochastic process with non-observable states 
representing moral or motivational principles. The specific nature of 
their model did not provide for the analysis of sequences of behavior. 
Instead choice proportions were analyzed. 
In the studies cited in this section the analysis was directed 
to the manifest behavior of subjects, such as deriving learning curves, 
determining asymptotic behavior, comparing choice proportions between 
different experimental groups or treatments. A major objection to 
this approach is that characteristics of the players cannot be 
deduced, unless a posteriori from the course of the manifest behavior. 
An original and nicer conceptualization of a two person conflict 
in the PDG was proposed by Meeker (1971), who started from some 
hypotheses about the relation between a subject's orientation towards 
the conflict and his manifest behavior, and provided for changes in 
this orientation depending on own behavior, other's behavior and the 
structure of the situation. 
In Meeker's theory a distinction is made explicitly between a 
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subject's "value state" or social orientation, and his manifest 
(observable) behavior. Vaiue states can be thought of as attitudinal 
states or dimensions representing a subject's (wittingly or 
unwittingly) utilized principles of justice. Some behaviors are 
consistent with subject's orientation, others are not. Changes of 
subject's orientation are described by a Markov chain model as a 
function of the consistency of manifest behavior and orientation 
(value svate). To this end use is made of some concepts from 
consistency theory. 
In the mathematical model which was derived from the theory, the 
probabilities of consistent behavior in С and Ό are represented by π 
and ρ respectively. Also, transitions from one state to another after 
inconsistent behavior are described probabilistically by θ 
(transition from С to D) and by ψ (transition from D to 6'). 
Meeker's model is shown in the following diagram and matrices, 
where С and D are two states (C = coopcrativeness, altruism and D = 
rationalism, individualism, competitiveness) and a and d are two 
behaviors consistent with С and ΰ respectively. Arrows (or loops) 
indicate state-transitions determined by behavior. The process is 
assumed to be stochastic. 
Probabilities are given in brackets. 
[ (1-ψ)(ΐ-ρ)] 
[ψ(ΐ-ρ) ] 
[θα-*) ] 
-> 
[ (1- )(1-я)] 
The matrices of transition probabilities and response probabilities 
are: 
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с 
D 
Ι-θ(Ι-π) (1-7Г) 
Ψ(1-ρ) Ι-Ψ(Ι-Ρ) 
С 
D 
a 
π 
I-P 
Ρ 
( i - ^ ) 
Ρ 
Meeker's approach is not aimed primarily at finding a psychological 
explanation for subjects' behaving irrationally, but rather to 
analyze behavior as a function of non-observable "value states". 
In the next chapter Meeker's model is discussed in detail. 
1.6. Rationality and the theory of tuo-person justice 
We have already seen that contradictory recommendations arise 
when the principle of rationality is applied to nonzero-sum games. A 
different conceptual framework must be designed to reconcile 
individual and collective rationality. Rapoport and Orwant (1962) 
suggest that this can be achieved by shifting from a "rigorously 
developed normative theory to an experimentally conceived descriptive 
one". Unfortunately they (Rapoport and Orwant) did not work out this 
suggestion. 
Two concepts of optimality for two-person, nonzero-sum games 
prescribe both players in the PDG to choose strategy d. One concept 
arises from the sure-thing principle. A strategy or decision satisfies 
the sure-thing principle, if, no matter what your opponent does, you 
are at least as well off, and possibly better off, with this strategy 
in conparison to any other available to you. Thus, according to the 
42 
sure-thing principle one should choose d. 
Although many games do not have dominating strategies (which 
satisfy the sure-fhmg principle), every finite ') two-person, 
nonzero-sum game does have at least one eqmlibri'um рогпЬ, the second 
concept of optunality, which was introduced by Nash (1950). An 
equilibrium point is a set of strategies, one for each player, ivith 
the property that if all players except one (in the η-person case with 
η > 2) choose these strategies, the remaining player cannot obtain an 
outcome preferred to the equilibrium. As is already shown, for the PDG 
the equilibrium point is (аУ), the same result as obtained by 
application of the sure-thing principle. 
As Suppes (1966) points out, the various game-theoretical 
principles of behavior, that is the sure-thing principle and the 
equilibrium principle, are aimed at satisfying intuitive ideas of 
prudentbal rather than moral behavior (that is prudential m the sense 
of acting in one's own best interest without direct concern for 
others). 
This is illustrated as follows. Let a gradtng рггпсгріе with 
respect to a social decision situation be a strict partial ordering 
of outcomes. This definition permits the introduction of a рггпсгріе 
of justzce in addition to principles as minimax or maximizing expected 
utility. For example, let J (referring to player ι with ι = 1,2) be 
the grading principle called mo/'e just than in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
which yields the following diagram: 
(cc·) (do) (Ы) 
Ψ 
№) 
The anow running from (oo) to (dd) means: "(σσ) is preferred to (dd)". 
Clearly, J = J» (and J is asymmetric and transitive). 
Since J relates neither (dc) nor (ed) to any of the other out­
comes, it seems as if this principle is idle. However, it can be shown 
1) A game is called finite if each player has a finite number of 
strategies. 
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that this grading principle may lead to a moral principle by 
introducing some further concepts. 
If outcomes which are not dominated under the relation J by any 
other outcome, are designated as (J )-admissible outnomes, it is seen 
that («s), (de) and {ad) are (J·)-admissible. Then, let a point of 
¿usliae be any set of strategies, one for each player, such that 
choosing these strategies yields an admissible outcome. Now, several 
justice-oriented rules of behavior are suggested by Suppes (1966, p. 
302): 
I. If J7 = J„ (in a tuo-person situation) and there is a unique 
point of justice, the strategy belonging to this point ought 
to be chosen. 
Since there is no unique point of justice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
rule (I) is not applicable. 
Next, let a .;' -ci ' '•-'-saturate I sirj.'.e.yj (with respect to J.) for 
player i be a strategy such that whatever strategies are chosen by 
the other players the resulting set of strategies is a (Ji) point 
of justice. The ethical rule of behavior is then: 
II. If for any player the set of justice-saturated strategies is non-
empty, he ought to choose one. 
In the Prisoner's Dilemma each player has a unique justice-saturated 
strategy, namely o. If both players jointly choose this strategy, 
(ce) is attained. However, as is immediately clear, the "ethical" 
player using rule (II) is at a definite disadvantage against a 
"prudential" player, which renders Suppes' theory of justice of very 
little use. 
The principle weakness of Suppes' theory is, that it does not 
provide for prediction or anticipation of the strategy-choices by the 
other player(s). Because of this shortcoming his ethical rules of 
behavior must be interpreted as unconditional imperatives, and as 
such his theory is just another normative theory. 
Another structural analysis of the PDG is presented by Bums and 
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flecker (1973, 1974). Their üieory is characterized by (i) descriptive 
rather than normative or prescriptive models of social behavior; (11) 
emphasis on multidimensional processes and on structural relationships 
rather than on unidimensional quantities (such as 'utility'), (111) 
the thesis that evaluation, decision making, and interaction processes 
cannot be understood apart from the social context in which they occur. 
Bums and Meeker assume, that the actors (players) in a social 
decision situation (such as the PDG) evaluate and rank a finite set 
of outcomes which can be represented as points (vectors) in some 
n-dimcnsional space "TO?1. It is further assumed that the various 
dimensions describing the outcomes may have different weights 
(importance) for any player and also that these weights may differ 
over players. 
Different order relations on the outcomes may be established by 
different evaluation procedures (e.g. maximization, optimization, 
lexicographic ordering, functional ordering, weak component ordering). 
Choice behavior consists of selecting an alternative or subset 
of alternatives from among a sot of alternatives (Bums and Mocker, 
1973, p. 147). The bases of choice are several: selection of the 
most preferred alternative evaluated by the actor on the basis of 
goals and values, selection prescribed by authority or tradition, 
or random selection. 
Given a preference structure over outcomes different decision 
procedures may be used to construct a preference structure over 
alternatives. 
In Bums and Meeker's view outcome evaluation and choice behavior 
may depend not only on an actor's own personal preferences but on 
those of other actors with whom he interacts or has social relation-
ships as well (1974, p. 38). They assume that actors' social 
attitudes or orientations with respect to self or other actors are 
metaprocesses which act upon preference structures and decision 
procedures of the actors invol\cd. These metaprocesses may yield 
modifications of preference structures. Changes in preference structure 
may affect interaction patterns in game playing behavior. Specifically, 
it is demonstrated by Bums and Meeker that the Prisoner's Dilemma 
is "resolved" as a result of changes in outcome-preferences through 
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actors' shift from self-orientation to other-orientation. 
Although Bums and Meeker have developed a theory of behavior, 
they have not reformulated or revised the concept of rationaHty. 
Rather they say that payoffs in any formally presented game, do not 
represent the players' utilities, and that utilities may change during 
the course of interaction. However, if preferences over outcomes 
are modified so as to change the very nature of the game, a resulting 
resolution of the game should be dismissed for being improper. 
A very original approach to the theory of rational behavior is 
developed by Nigel Howard (1966, 1971) in his theory of meta-games. 
It is a descriptive theory of actual behavior which is based on a 
broadening of the concept of rationality by passing from the space 
of strategies that define a game in normal form to a space of 
metastrategies, defined as the strategies that would be available 
to a player if he knew the strategy choices of the other player(s) 
(Rapoport, 1974, p. 13). The theory of metagames is a formalized 
way of conveying intent as well as inmediate behavior (Shubik, 1970, 
p. 190), which singles out stable outcomes in the game-theoretic 
sense which are no "solutions" of the game in classical game-
theoretic definitions. We feel that in his theory Howard has succeeded 
in formalizing Suppes' principles of prudential and moral behavior. 
There, both principles are principles of (meta)rational behavior in 
the sence of optimizing behavior. 
1.7. General оиъііпр 
Τη this thesis a theory of two person interaction for the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game is employed, which explains the dynamic 
process of decision making between cooperation and competition 
through the concept of value states as unobservable states which 
represent the values or norms the decision maker adheres to. The role 
of these value states and the behavior of the decision makers will 
be described by a latent Markov chain model. 
Chapter 2 treats the value state model as it was formulated 
originally by Meeker (1971). An experiment is described in this 
chapter, which investigates the psychological nature of value states 
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by relating the parameters of a latent Markov chain model to the 
parameters of Coombs' recent parameterization of the PDG in which 
choices in the PDG are interpreted in terms of Coombs' theory of risk 
and risk preference. The model, though, is only applied to the 
restricted condition of a benevolent, that is ΙΟΟΊ cooperative, 
opponent. 
In chapter 3 the model of chapter 2 is reformulated to make 
it applicable to situations of uncertainty. This generalized model 
is applied to data from an experiment with three different patterns 
of behavior of the opponent in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (i.e. three 
levels of cooperativeness). The model applies only to situations 
where the opponent's behavior is unresponsive to subject's own 
behavior. 
A special section in this chapter is devoted to problems relating 
the estimability of models with non-observable states. It is found 
that the usual techniques, such as the method of moments, maximum 
likelihood and least squares estimation, cannot be applied to the 
value state model. Instead, an iterative procedure is employed. 
Expanding the empirical adequacy of the model to the situation 
where the other can reciprocate and retaliate in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, that is unrestricted game playing by two real players, 
requires expanding the theoretical adequacy of the value state model. 
This is inspired by Nigel Howard's theory of metagames, which is 
described in chapter 4. Also in chapter 4 the usefulness of some 
assertions of the theory of metagames, which might be adopted for 
a general model of dynamic decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game, is investigated in an experiment. 
In chapter 5 the empirical and theoretical results of the 
preceding chapters are put together in a reformulation of the value 
state theory for the Prisoner's Dileima Game, which is formalized 
in a dual latent Markov chain model. 
An estimation procedure is proposed which has some characteristics 
of maximum likelihood estimation and which is labeled (tentatively) as 
Quasi Maximum likelihood or Incomplete Maximum likelihood 
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Chapter 2: Latent Markov chain analysis of a value conflict in 
Prisoner's Dilemma Games 
A.L. van der Sanden, 'Latent Markov chain analysis of a value 
conflict in Prisoner's Dilemma Games', Br. J. math. 
statist. Psychol., 1978, ¿1, 126-143. 
If a subject's opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game is non-responsive and 100 per cent cooperative, the subject is 
in conflict between reciprocating the cooperative acts of the other 
and choosing the 'rational' alternative which maximizes his payoff at 
the cost of the other. 
It is assumed that this is a conflict between opposed values which a 
subject can hold. The process of decision-making in this value 
conflict is described in a Markov model, which relates non-observable 
value states to the observable behaviour. The relationships between 
the parameters of the model and a new parameterization of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game are examined to add more content to the 
constructs of value states and to gain more insight of the dynamics of 
the decision-making process in the game. 
2.1. Introduction 
In the study of human game behaviour it is often assumed, 
implicitly or explicitly, that the rank order of preferences for the 
outcomes is different for different subjects (players). It is said 
then that the interests of the player are in conflict. 
Psychologically, the most interesting games are those in which the 
interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, 
because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players 
but also inner conflicts within the players (Rapoport & Chairanah, 1965). 
In two-person non-zero-sum games some outcomes are jointly better for 
both players than other outcomes. In such games the subject is in 
conflict between pursuing the common interests or striving after his 
own individual interests. 
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Discussing the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), Luce 8. Raiffa 
(1957, p.96) argued that for a single play of the game the only 
rational and completely justified choice for both players is that 
alternative which dominates the other alternative. In the example 
shown in Table 2.1 alternative J is dominant over с for both players. 
Table 2.1 Example of Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Player Y 
о 
2,2 
4,-3 
-3,4 
- 1 , - 1 
Thus each player's rational choice is a, but the resulting outcome, 
(JJ), is less preferrt than (-··)· This constitutes the dilemma. 
With multiple iterations it is possible for each payer to take 
into account the past behaviour of the other when making a new 
decision. A clear demonstration of such an interaction effect is the 
'lock-in' effect found by Rapoport abd Chammah (1965). 
In the past decade several authors have explained human behaviour 
in experimental games by postulating motivational tendencies or 
orientations as determinants of subjects' choices in iterative plays 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pruitt, 1970; Wyer.WI; Griesinger & 
Livingston, 1973; Friedland et al., 1974; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). 
A subject may have different motivational orientations in playing a 
experimental game. An individual may try to maximize his own gain 
(individualism), try to maximize the difference between his own gain 
and his opponent's gain (competition), or try to maximize the joint 
gain (cooperation). When a subject is motivated by more than one 
value simultaneously and these values give him incompatible prescrip­
tions, he may find himself in a conflict, a value conflict. 
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2.2. Meeker's conflict model 
Meeker (1971) has developed a Markov model to describe the 
process of decision-making by a subject who must make a series of 
choices between reciprocating the cooperative acts of another person 
and maximizing his own pay-off in a situation in which the other 
cannot retaliate. The model is based on the following hypothetical 
situation: S (the subject) and 0 (the other) are engaged in a social 
exchange of the PDG type. 0 has been cooperative in the past and O's 
future behaviour is not contingent on S's present behaviour. S, who 
expects 0 to be cooperative on the next play, must choose between 
reciprocating the cooperative acts of 0 and being purely 'rational'. 
Since S need not fear retaliation the conflict is purely intrapersonal. 
The two strategies open to S are each consistent with a different 
set of motivations. These mutually exclusive sets are called 'value 
states'. The value state state which is characterized by altruism and 
reciprocity is referred to as the 'reciprocating state' (C). The 
other value state, which is characterized by individualism, 
competition and rationalism, is called the 'rational state' ("). 
The following axioms about the properties of value states are 
adopted from Meeker (1971). 
ÁÍ-JO"! 2-1: There are two states, reciprocating (') and rational 
P ) . There are two responses, -• (cooperate) and J. (defect). On any 
trial η (η = 1,2,...) S is in exactly one state and gives one 
response; I.e. 
P[ön] = 1 - P[Cri], (2.1) 
Р[<У = 1 - P[¿g . (2.2) 
In each value state one act is defined as the most desirable or 
consistent with the values which are included in that state. It is 
assumed that in each value state the consistent behaviour is chosen 
with probability greater than 0.50 on each trial. 
Axiom 2-2 defines the probabilities for consistent behaviour. 
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Axiom 2-2: 
PI-ni "ni = * ^ 0 · 5 0 ) · (2.3) 
P[ dnPn] = Ρ (P>0.50). (2.4) 
After each response S may change his value state on the next 
trial. Meeker adapted some ideas from Heider's balance theory and 
Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance which are incorporated 
in his theory as transition axioms. It is assumed that as soon as S 
behaves inconsistently, that is, choosing i when occupying state С 
or choosing a when occupying state b, he experiences discomfort and 
will tend to adjust by changing his value state with a certain 
probability. 
There may be a number of reasons why S does not always change 
his value state. According to Meeker there is '... some psychological 
cost involved in changing a value state (admitting he was wrong)'. 
As long as S behaves consistently he will not change his value state. 
Axiom 2-3: 
PKnlCn-l .^n-l) = 1, (2.5) 
РГЯпІСп-іЛ,-,] - e. (2-6) 
Axiom 2-4: 
P P n p n - l A - l J = i . (2-7) 
P l ^ n p n - i ^ n - i l = * · (2-8) 
These axioms define a latent Markov chain with four states. Bach 
state is a combination of a value state and a response. Table 2.2 
gives the transition probabilities for the Markov chain. The latent 
process and the axioms can be rendered in a tree diagram as in Fig.2.1. 
In an experiment Meeker estimated the value of π, ρ, θ and ψ 
in three different conditions of conflict between rationality and 
reciprocity.In two conditions the game played was a real PDC and the 
third game was a 'degenerated' PDG,in that the subject's decision had 
no effect on his own score (see Table 2.3). In the first condition 
56 
Table 2.2 Transition matrix of the latent Markov chain 
\ ^ Trial η 
Trail η - | \ 
<C,L'> 
<C,d> 
<D,c> 
<),<T> 
<С,а> 
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(1-θ)π 
ψπ 
0 
<α,ά> 
(1-π) 
( 1 - θ ) ( 1 - π ) 
ψ(1-π) 
0 
< D , e > 
0 
θ(1-ρ) 
( Ι - Ψ ) ( ] - Ρ ) 
(1-Ρ) 
<D,d> 
0 
θρ 
( 1 - Ψ ) Ρ 
Ρ 
State on trial η - 1 Response on trial η-1 State on trial η 
Figure 2.1. Tree diagram showing transition and response probabilities. 
the choice of о was labelled "For the group" and the choice of d was 
labelled "For myself". In the second condition there was no group 
orientation; otherwise there were no differences between óonditions 
1 and 2. In the third condition S had no influence on his own pay-off 
but he could help 0 or not help 0. 
The experiment was run over 50 trials. One subject, S, was told 
on each trial what the other, 0, had chosen, while О was never infor­
med about S's choices. As a matter of fact, the feedback S received on 
each trial was prearranged, and S was always informed that 0 had 
been cooperative (i.e. had chosen alternative c). 
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Since 0 was never informed about S's behaviour, O's future behaviour 
was not contingent on S's present behaviour. 
Table 2.3 Games from Meeker's experiment; game (a) is a real PDG and 
game (b) is a PDG with no dominating strategy for S. 
2, 2 -3, 3 
3. -3 -2. -2 
2,2 
2,0 
0,2 
0,0 
(a) Conditions 1 and 2 (b) Condition 3 
At each trial the subjects had to choose a course of action and 
guess what the other person's choice was going to be. From these guesses 
one could deduce whether the subjects had learned what the feedback 
pattern was. Meeker found that by trial 10, and usually at an earlier 
trial, all subjects had begun to guess · consistently. Therefore the 
data, consisting of ,· and J choices, from the last 40 trials were 
supposed to fulfil the conditions of the theory and were used for 
the estimation of the four parameters, π, ρ, 0 and ψ. 
The estimates obtained from Meeker's experiment are presented 
in Table 2.4. Because the parameters were not estimated by a least-
squares method or a maximum-likelihood method,but by an iterative 
process, no measure of the goodness of the solution found was 
available. As a partial check Meeker compared some probabilities 
predicted by the estimated parameters with the corresponding 
proportions observed in the data. None of these proportions was 
used in the estimation procedure. The largest difference for all 
conditions was 0.04. 
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Table 2.4 Estimates of the parameters after iteration procedure 
(from Meeker, 1971, p. 398) 
Condi t ion 
1 
2 
3 
17 
0.89 
0.85 
0.91 
Ρ 
0.69 
0.92 
0.74 
θ 
0.67 
0.47 
0.29 
Ψ 
0.38 
0.69 
0.41 
P L 1 
0.62 
0.44 
0.80 
NB. V[C] is the probability that a subject is in value state ,.','. 
In formulating his theory Meeker defined the nature of a 
value state somewhat vaguely. The only assumptions made about its 
properties are that it influences behaviour and that it may change 
after inconsistent behaviour. With the aid of experimental results 
one may give more content to this hypothetical construct. The 
parameters π and ρ (the probabilities of consistent behaviour) 
indicate the extent to which a value state influences behaviour. 
Meeker noted that the value of ρ was highest in condition 2 
in which there was no group orientation; in the other conditions 
there was either a reduction in cost or no cost attached to choosing a. 
The value of τ was similar for all conditions. According to Meeker, 
while the influence of state D on behaviour alters with changes in 
the cost of the behaviour and with the experimental instructions, 
a property of state С is that its influence on behaviour is not 
affected by these changes. He hypothesized that state С is primarily 
oriented to the behaviour of the other person and that since this 
behaviour was the same for all conditions, the value of π did not vary. 
He further argued that π should be more sensitive than ρ to variations 
in the behaviour of the other subject. 
The parameters θ and ψ indicate the extent to which a value state 
is influenced by inconsistent behaviour. Meeker interpreted a high 
value of Θ, the probability of changing from С to D, as an indication 
of high conflict between a d response and state C. From Table 2.1 it 
follows that the J response was most in conflict with state С when 
there was a cost to the other person attached to d and when there is 
a group orientation. 
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The highest value of ψ, the probability of changing from ." to :, 
is found in condition 2 in which there was a cost to the subject 
attached to -? and there was no group orientation. 
With reference to Meeker's interpretation of the parameters ρ 
and ψ, inspection of Table 2.4 suggests that с and ψ could be 
correlated. iNevertheless, Meeker concluded that the total analysis 
of the four parameters indicates that "...perhaps the e f feats of 
values on behaviour and the effect of behaviour on value are 
independent of each other" (1971, p. 400). 
A number of questions about Meeker's theory remain unanswered. 
One may wonder whether the conflicts in all three conditions are 
substantially the same. Meeker assumes inplicitly that they are. Yet 
it is immediately clear that in condition 3 the intrapersonal conflict 
is essentially different from those in the other conditions.In 
condition 3 there is no question of individualism in value state D, 
because S could not profit from choice d. The orientation of the 
situation and the structure of the game being equal, what is the impact 
of varying pay-offs and of varying behaviour of О on the values of 
Meeker's parameters? Answers to these questions may add more 
psychological meaning to the parameters of the mathematical model 
and to the construct of a value state. To vary the pay-offs of a PDG 
in a systematic way we need a useful parameterization of the game. 
By a useful parameterization we mean that there is a simple and 
direct correspondence between the experimental variables and some 
psychological concepts. 
2.3. Coombs' repárameter>izQi.ion of the PDG 
The general properties of the pay-off matrix for a PDG are formulated 
by Scodel et al. (1959). For both players the pay-offs for the 
cooperative choices (alternative .') and the competitive choices (alter-
native (0 must satisfy the rules shown in Table 2.5. An analogous 
formulation can be found by Rapoport and Chamnah (1965, pp. 33-36). 
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Table 2.5 Rules for the pay-off matrix of a PDG 
Player Y 
I. 2X, > X 2 +X 3 >2X 4 
п . x 3 > Xj p l a y e r x 
III. X, > x 0 
3 2 
iv. x 4 > x 2 
X|> X| X 2 ' X3 
X 3 ' X2 X 4 ' X 4 
This rather simple parameterization is confined to those forms of the 
game which are symétrie for the players. However, the nost severe 
restriction of this parameterization is that it is totally devoid of 
psychological meaning;that is, it is not related to some psychological 
theory of game-playing behaviour. 
A special subset of PDG's, which allows for asymmetric games, 
is formed by the so-called "separable games". These are games in which 
each pay-off to each player can be expressed as the sum of two 
contributions, one from each player depending on his choice. It is 
the subset of separable PDGs for which Coombs (1973) has proposed a 
reparameterization, which is inspired by risk theory, and which relates 
the independent variables to some theoretical variables in a simple 
and direct way. Coombs' reparameterization is as follows. Let : 
g = (.y,z) indicate a gamble with two mutually exclusive outcomes, 
y and ζ with y>s; 
g = (0,0) be the basic gamble from which others will be 
constructed, it is interpreted as the status quo; 
^(s) = (a. -a) be a transfoimation in which у = a and s - a and 
where a > 0. 
Ид) = (fo,b) be a transfomation in which an amount Ъ is added 
to both outcomes у and z. 
The two transformations applied together yield the gamble 
j, = (a + b, b - a) 
Let ДЬ be an increment to b. This yields the ganóle 
3- = (α + b +àb, b - a + Ab). 
(2.9a) 
(2.9b) 
The gambles correspond to the two available alternatives in a PDG. 
If we add the subscripts s (for subject) and о (for other) to the 
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parameters, the pay-off structure of PDG can be formulated as is 
indicated in Table 2.6. If the values for the parameters are set to 
a = α = 2.5, b = b = -0.5, and Ы = by = 2, then we get the game s o s o s o 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.6 Coombs' parameterization of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Subject (S) 
d 
In an asymmetric game the values of the parameters are different 
for both players. Although this yields six parameters, three for each 
subject, only three distinct psychological variables are involved, 
because the parameters play symmetric roles for the subjects (Coombs, 
1973, p. 425). The gamble ,¿ is a translation of y ^ by an amount Δ Κ 
This parameter is designated by Coombs as the added inducement to the 
subject to defect. The parameter Ь is an additive constant for all 
outcomes. It sets the 'level' of the game. Suppose the other behaves 
randomly, then b is the expected pay-off if the subject constantly 
chooses the first alternative (plays ¡7.). There may be a specific 
relationship between Ъ and ab in that the effect of Δό decreases as 
the value of b increases in line with the theory of marginal 
decreasing utility. 
The interpretation of the parameter α is a little bit more subtle. 
In the context of individual risky decision making it is a risk 
parameter; in the gambles 3. and g- the value 2a is the difference 
between the possible outcomes of the gambles. The larger the value of 
a, the greater is the risk involved in both gambles. The pay-off, which 
a subject will get after he has chosen an alternative {g or g A , 
depends upon the other's choice. The control that Other has over 
Subject's outcomes is exactly 2a. The larger the value of a the more 
vulnerable a subject is to retaliation by the other, after he (the 
subject) has defected on an earlier trial (made the 1 response). In 
this respect the parameter a represents the risk of the дате. 
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The Other (0) 
r a 
a +b , a +b 
S S 0 0 
a +b + hb , b -a 
s s s' 0 0 
b -a , a +b + Ab 
s s ' 0 0 0 
b -a + hb , b -a + Ao 
s s s 0 0 0 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the parameters for both 
players have identical roles; Subject also has control over Other's 
outcomes. As with b and A¿ there may be an interaction effect between 
b and a such that the effect of a is decreased as b increases. 
2.4. Hypotheses 
Coombs' reparameterization of the PDG enables us to vary the 
pay-off structure of this game in a systematic way such that changes in 
the outcomes can be interpreted psychologically. Is is possible now to 
hypothesize about the effects of varying pay-offs of the PDG on the 
values of the parameters of Meeker's conflict model. In what follows, 
we suppose that b = b . 
Meeker found that unless there was a special orientation towards 
the game then ir and p, the probabilities of consistent behaviour in 
the two value states, remained fairly constant over the conditions he 
used. Therefore, it is assumed that the response probabilities in the 
latent states are invariant to changes in the pay-off matrix. 
The parameters θ and ψ, probabilities of changing value state 
after inconsistent behaviour, are measures of the effect of behaviour 
on the value state. Meeker's theory does not give any specific 
prediction about the relation between the pay-off structure of the game 
and the change of state parameters. 
The reciprocating state is defined as 'directed towards the other'. 
The d response produces a cost to Other. This cost, expressed by a , 
conflicts with the reciprocating state. The variable a , expressing the 
control 0 has over S's outcome, can be taken as a measure of the 
'cooperativeness' of 0, provided 0 is always cooperative. The more 
cooperative 0 is, the more conflicting is a c? response of S in state C. 
Thus, increasing a and/or a raises the perceived cost of the conflict 
thereby increasing the probability (Θ) that S will move into the 
rational state. 
In the rational state S is self-interested. The larger the value of 
Í¿> , the larger the cost to S which is attached to the с response and 
the greater the 'irrationality' of S's behaviour. Thus, it is supposed 
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that increasing Ab will increase the probability (ψ) of going to the 
reciprocal state after inconsistent behaviour in state D. 
Increasing ¿b increases the 'irrationality' of O's cooperative 
behaviour. It is supposed that increasing Δΐ<
ο
 weakens the conflict by a 
" response in state D, i.e. increasing bb will decrease ψ. 
2.5. Experimental procedure 
An experiment was run to test the above-mentioned hypotheses. Two 
levels were used for each of the experimental parameters a , üb , a 
and ЛЬ . The levels are indicated by the superscripts + and -. The 
values DS and bo were held constant and equal throughout the experiment. 
The values for the parameters are listed in Table 2.7. The design was 
Table 2.7 Values of the experimental parameters 
Parameters 
«s 
^ s 
a
o 
Δ Ζ > 0 
b = b = -
s о 
Leve l s 
+ 
2-5 1 
2-0 1 
2-5 1 
2-0 1 
0-5. 
-
•5 
•0 
•5 
•0 
Table 2.8 Factorial scheme showing the eight treatment combinations 
selected; the numbers in the cells index the experimental 
conditions used in the present study. 
a+ 
s 
a-
s 
дг>+ 
Lb-
s 
t\b+ 
s 
àb-
s 
a+ a-
o о 
ДЬ+ òb- bb+ Δ£+ 
0 о о о 1 
7 
3 
5 
4 
6 
2 
8 
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Table 2.9 The resulting PDGs for the eight treatment combinationst 
2, 2 -3, 4 
4. -3 -1. -
(a) Condition 1 
2, 1 -3, 2 
4. -2 -1. -
(b) Condition 2 
2, 2 -3, 3 
3. -3 -2. -2 
(c) Condition 3 
2, 1 -3, 3 
3. -2 -2. 0 
(d) Condition 4 
1, 2 -2, 3 
3. -3 0. -2 
(e) Condition 5 
1, I -2, 3 
3, -2 0, 0 
(f) Condition 6 
1, 2 -2, 4 
2. -3 -1. -
(g) Condition 7 
1, 1 -2, 2 
2, -2 -1, -
(h) Condition θ 
t The figures in the matrices indicate monetary pay-offs in Dutch 
cents. 
a one-half replication of a 2 4 factorial design (fractional factorial 
design") with the fourth-order interaction of α .db , a and Δί as 
" s s о о 
the defining relation (Winer, 1971, p. 676). This yielded eight 
conditions according to the scheme of Table 2.8. Table 2.9 gives the 
eight resulting pay-off matrices, when the proper values for the 
experimental parameters are substituted in Table 2.6. 
The subjects were 32 male high school students, ranging in age 
from 15 to 17 years. They were randomly assigned to the eight 
experimental conditions, four in each condition. Subjects were run in 
pairs. At the beginning of the experiment a written instruction was 
given. The subjects were told that they had to make a number of 
decisions in a situation in which it was impossible to conmmicate 
with each other, but in which the effect of their choice would be 
partly dependent on their own decision and partly on the other person's 
decision. Subjects were also told that after each trial one member of 
each pair would be informed as to which choice the other had made, 
whereas the other would never get this information. Actually, both 
subjects were told that they would be informed about each other's 
choice and that the other would not. The feedback the subjects received 
about Other's choice was prearranged and always showed that the other 
had made the cooperative response. 
The subjects were seated one on each side of a screen, which 
exhibited the pay-off matrix to both subjects throughout the experiment. 
At each side of the screen there was a smal box carrying four 
switches and two lights. At the beginning of each trial, each subject 
had to indicate both his choice among the alternatives and a guess 
about the other's choice by turning on two of the switches. By this 
guess we could check whether the subjects had learned to expect a 
cooperative response from the other. The false feedback about Other's 
choice was indicated by the lights. 
2.6 Estimating the parameters 
The parameters of the Markov model where estimated through an 
iterative procedure which was basically the same as the one used by 
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Meeker (1971). However, estimation of the transition parameters is 
perfonned slightly differently. Further a method was developed to 
handle inconsistencies in the data. 
As a starting assumption for the iterative procedure it is 
assumed that if a subject has given two successive с responses, he is 
in state С on the next trial, and if he has given two successive d 
responses, he is in state Ό on the next trial. Obviously, some 
subjects will be included wrongly in the value states, but it is 
assumed that this number will be relatively small and will be 
reduced in successive iterations. Thus, 
and 
P [ C
n K - l V 2 ] = 1 С 2 ' 1 0 ) 
Р[Я \c .d , ] = 1 (2.11) 
η ' η-1 η - 2 ч J 
With these assumptions we can estimate π and ρ directly by 
and 
V[c I- .<·· ,] (2.12) 
η I n-1 n-2 v 
^ ^ п И п - Л - г
1
· С
2
·
13) 
By applying some theorems from Baycsian probabi l i ty theory we find 
that 
P K (1 '· " 1 
ПС '4 .а .с- ] l n-1 n-1 n - 2 ' ' n - 3 J 
n-1 n-1 n- ¿ η - s = _ 
n-1 n-¿ η-J 
P [ V , i V 2 W " 
Similarly, 
п п I J г ι ( I - P ) * P [ Ö ,\d ~d , ] VID . \c ,d .d , ] n-1 ' n-2 n-3 ' с ·, r·. 
n-1 ' n-1 n-2 n-3 = гтт ,-= -, -,— (2.15) 
Ρ h .a ,/i
 Q ] n-1 n-Z n-3 
Using (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), equations (2.14) and (2.ÍS) 
become for the f i r s t i t e r a t ion : 
^ п - . К - . г зІ =
1
 (2·16) 
and 
ПО , с .d -d . ] = 1 (2.17) 
n-1 n-1 n-2 n-3 
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Now, 9 and Ψ can be estimated (Meeker, 1971, p . 397) as 
η n
_
 I n — 2 V n-3 /-л
 1 0 ч 
1 _
 n
 - -π 1·Ζ· \°) 
and 
т
 Р
^
П
! ап-Л-2Ч,-3^ 
5
 1 - Ρ - π (2.19) 
As the model decribes a Markov process with stationary transition 
probabilities, an equilibrium will be reached (e.g. Snell, 1965). If 
the process is in equilibrium then p[^ ] = P[C _• ] and, as is shown by 
Meeker, 
Ρ1Γ 1 = (I-p)!» 
F |
n
J
 (1-ρ)^+(1-π)θ (2.20) 
The first estimates of ν , p, and ψ are certainly inaccurate 
since they are based on the arbitrary assumptions of equations (2.10) 
and (2.11). With the first estimates of the parameters and P[ " ] we can 
correct the starting assumptions from equations (2.10) and (2.11). 
The corrected probabilities, V[C le с ] and Ρ Ρ le d . ] , will r
 ' η
1
 n-1 n-2 n1 n-1 n-2 
enable us to inprove our estimates of the parameters. We can replace 
(2.10) and (2.11) with 
^ ' ' J V l ' n ^ 1 -_ΡΡ]*
π
2
+
ρ[ΰ].(ΐ-ρ)*{^;(1-ψ)4(1-ρ)) ν·^> 
and 
Р П Μ r¡ 1 - Ρ[^]*(1-π)»{6ρ + (1-6)(1-π)6}+Ρ[01»Ρ2
 Г 9 „-, 1
 η'"n-1 n-2J РІС1»(і-7г)«{ р + (1- )(1-я)}+Р[£і]»р2 l^ -^ J^ 
Let α = Ρ [С le· .a . ] and β = Ρ Ρ I d ,d , 1, then π and ρ arc 
η' n-1 η— ¿ η1 n-1 n-z 
estimated as 
8 » P [ o J ö . c , ]_( l -a)»P[c |dn , a '_„ ] 
η n~ I n- ¿ η ' η-1 η - ¿ 
and 
ff ^ ^ (2.23) 
* Π Π- Ι Π- ¿ η Tl— I I I — I /") о л ^ 
ρ
 ίΤβΤ] (2-24) 
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To re-estimate θ we use 
Pic Ι α .с с .]-]?№ 'ä в a ]»{ (1-р) + ( 1 - )7Г} 
η η-1 η-2 η-3 η-1 η-1 η-2 η-3 
+Ρ[ΰ J á , ' _<? , ] » ( 1 - ρ ) . 
η - Ι ' η-1 η-2 η-3 
Note that, in general, P[ с '^ j^.j^.g] ?" P'"n-l'i'n-2c'n-3' ' h o w e v e r > 
№eker (1971 , p.401) used P[C , Іе
п
_26,п-з' • ^ 1 0 " 1 ^ t h a t 
Ρ [с U .a ,j -l»P[á ,Ιΰ _e ,] = Ρ [σ a JÍ- ,C ,] 
η η-1 η-2 η-3 η-1 η-2 η-3 η η-1 η-2 η-3 » 
using (2.14") we obtain 
Ρ[ο· d J с- ,c· ,]-a(l-ir)ír-(l-a)(l-p)p 
3 η η-1 ' n-¿ η-3 (η -)г\ 
tì
 α α - ο ο - ρ - ο
 L J 
Similarly, 
Pt^Vn ilá„ ^ п J-ß(l-p)p-(l-ß)(l-p)p 
7 Π Π- 1 ' Π- ¿Γ Π— J ß(l-p)(l-p-ir) (2.26) 
This procedure can be repeated until no further improvement follows 
A detailed description of this iterative process is given in >feeker 
(1971). 
As can be seen from equations (2.12), (2.13), (2.18) and (2,19) 
the whole estimation procedure is based on the three-step dependencies, 
Vic If .j .] and Pld \d ,d -I, and the four-step dependencies, 
n' n-1 η-2 η n-1 n-2 г- г > 
Ρ h \d ,c ^з .] and Vid \c ,d ~d Λ These quantities can be 
n' n-I n-2 n-3 L n1 n-1 n-2 n-3 . ' 
conputed directly from the data. While in practice Pic |a _.c „a _,] 
and Ρ [d L' .d .d _] can take values between 0 and 1, the interval 
η' η-1 n-2 n-3 ' 
for these probabilities within the model is smaller. From (2.28) and 
(2.19) one can derive that the following inequalities must hold: 
and 
' - ^ ^ . г з' <" ( 2· 2 7 ) 
1 - π< Vid |e Μ -á ,] < ρ (2.28) 
η n-1 n-2 n-3 
If these requirements are not fulfilled, the change of state parame­
ters would be smaller than zero or greater than one. Meeker did not 
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point to these requirements, probably because his data dit not give 
him any problem in this respect. In analysing the data for the 
separate treatment combinations of our experiment we found that for 
tvvo such combinations one of these requirements "has not fulfilled. 
The following solution uas used by us for this problem. 
Notice that the four-step dependencies are computed as follows: 
and 
n' n-l n-2 n-3 = —; A-- ; — τ- (2.29) 
Ρ [a 'c ,'i 'j. .1 rt(a-j:-'-d) ,„ ~
пл 
1
 η
1
 n-l n-2 n-3 - —-f-,—;—*—r тт-^ г-, [2.30J 
where n(.) is the number of the specified sequence of responses. 
It is assumed that in the population of all behaviour sequences 
(of all subjects) the four-step dependencies do not exceed the limits 
as indicated in (2.27) and (2.28). Our observation are based on just 
a sample. Hence it may be possible that, due to sampling error, some 
empirical four-step dependencies become too snail or too great. If the 
number of the four-step sequences, which constitute the ratio for a 
four-step dependency, is relatively small (say smaller than 10), then 
that empirical probability gives only a crude estimate of the popula­
tion value. Specifically, the value of the dependency will change 
considerably, if one point is added to the numerator and/or the 
denominator of the ratio. For example, suppose we find /-.(e-c— •i-c') = 2 
and п(?-г-і-і) = 6. 
This yields, by equation (2.29), P[e |a jC _2o 3 ] = 2/(2+6) = 0.25. 
If we raise n^-c-d-") by one point, the four-step dependency becomes 
3/9 = 0.33, but if we raise n(a-c-d-d) by one point, the dependency 
becomes 2/9 = 0.22. 
The following procedure was applied by us in those cases for 
which the four-step dependencies exceeded the limits in (2.27) and 
(2.28): 
(i) If Ρ [f Id ,c ~e
 n
] was greater than if, the denominator of 
n' n-l n-2 n-3 J ь 
(2.29) was raised by one point. This was repeated until the 
dependency was smaller then π. 
(ii) If Ρ [с |d _.e _.c , ] was smaller than (1-p), both numerator 
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and denominator of (2.29) were raised by one point. This was repeated 
until the dependency was greater than (1-p). 
The same "correction procedure" was applied to Ρ[d le .d ,α , ] . r r r
 n' n-1 n-2 n-3 
No more than one cycle was needed in any of our cases. 
2.7. Experimental results 
The experiment was run over 50 trials. Data consisted of 
sequences of ¿ and d responses, one sequence for each subject. First, 
for each subject the proportion of a responses was computed. Some of 
the results are given in Table 2.10. Hartley's test for homogeneity 
of variance (e.g. Winer, 1971, p. 206) applied to the eight simple 
conditions yielded an F m a x of 2.93, which is not significant. 
Table 2.10 Means and variances for number of с responses 
(50 trials per subject) 
Condition Mean Variance Number of 
subjects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1+2+3+402+) 
5+6+7+8(a-) 
1+2+5+6(ДЬ+) 
3+4+7+8(ЛЬ-) 
l+4+6+7(uií>5) 
2+3+5+8(ab-) 
l+3+5+7(aJ) 
2.4.6.8(Í!-) 
16.50 
19.50 
32.00 
26.00 
27.25 
23.25 
19.75 
30.00 
23.50 
25.06 
21.63 
26.94 
21.38 
27.19 
23.88 
24.69 
103.25 
283.25 
266.50 
159.00 
180.00 
168.19 
224.19 
302.50 
239.00 
234.06 
200.11 
160.06 
176.61 
280.78 
230.86 
243.09 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
Each level of the four variables from Coombs' parameterization of 
the PDG was represented by four experimental treatment combinations. 
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To compare the effects of different levels of each variable, data for 
several quartets of treatment combinations were pooled as shown in 
Table 2.10. 
As can be seen from Table 2.8, all pairs of quartets are matched^ 
with respect to main effects (except the one under consideration) and 
second-order interactions. There is no matching with respect to third-
order interactions, but it is assumed that they are zero or at least 
very small compared to the main effects. In addition, the observable 
second-order interaction are completely confounded (aliased) with 
the interaction effect of the complementary pair of variables (Winer, 
1971, p. 676). 
The numbers of с responses were analysed by means of an analysis 
of variance which is the usual way which PDG studies have been 
analysed. 
The results of the analysis of variance, shown in Table 2.11, 
were striking. Not only did we find no significant effects, but all F-
ratios turned out to be smaller than 1. 
Taking the reciprocals of the F-ratios and interchanging the degrees 
of freedom also did not yield any significant value. A possible 
explanation for these results may be that a systematic source of 
Table 2.11 Analysis of variance table for number of с responses 
Source and a l i a s 
а 3 ( Д Ь 3 х а 0 х Д Ь 0 ) 
Д Ь 3 ( а 3 х а 0 х Л Ь 0 ) 
а 0 ( а Б х Д Ь 8 х Д Ь 0 ) 
Abo(as*Abs xao) 
а 3 х д Ь 3 ( а о х д Ь 0 ) 
а 5 х а о ( Л Ь в х д Ь 0 ) 
A¿s> <ao(asx¿¿o) 
Within c e l l s 
T o t a l 
SS 
19.53 
225.78 
5.28 
270.28 
258.78 
42.78 
13.78 
6752.23 
7588.45 
d.f . 
24 
31 
MS 
19.53 
225.78 
5.28 
270.28 
258.78 
42 .78 
13.78 
281.34 
Ft 
0.07 
0.80 
0.02 
0.96 
0.92 
0 .15 
0.05 
t All values are far from significant. MS {within cells} is used as 
the denominator of F in all cases. 
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Variation is hidden in the within-cells sura of squares. Fourth-order 
interactions could be the answer, but seems very unlikely. If Keeker's 
theory holds true, the great within-cells variability might be caused 
by the different initial value states of the subjects. For the 
probability of a certain number of a responses is highly dependent on 
the value state. This is intuitively clear, if one considers that the 
probability of a a response is greater when a subject is in state С 
than when he is in state D. Moreover before equilibrium is reached, 
the probability of a subject being in state С is greatest if on the 
preceding trial he was also in state С. 
Next, the whole response sequences were analysed following the 
model of Meeker as outlined in the preceding section. Even if no 
differences are found in the manifest behaviour, this does not imply 
that the latent structure of the behaviour in the different experi­
mental conditions is invariant. To ensure that the subjects had an 
opportunity to learn what the response of the other was going to be on 
the next trial only responses of the last 40 trials were included in 
the analysis. 
Table 2.12 shows the three-step and four-step dependencies which form 
the input for the estimation procedure. The numbers in parentheses for 
conditions 7 and 8 are the four-step dependencies after application 
of the "correction procedure" described in Section 2.6. In these 
instances the requirement given in (2.28) was violated. 
Provisional estimates of the parameters were obtained by 
equations (2.12), (2.13), (2.18) and (2.19). The estimates were based 
on the following two assumptions: (i) that after two successive a 
responses the subject is in С ; and (ii) that after two successive d 
responses the subject is in D. Using these first estimates of the 
parameters and Ρ [£•'], the error in the starting assumptions was 
estimated by the iteration procedure as described in Section 2.6. 
The estimates of the parameters rapidly converged, the process 
of iteration being terminated on 0.001 change for each individual 
parameter. In fact, for 13 out of the 16 conditions the process 
converged after only two cycles, and in condition 6, 7 and 8 after 
three, four and five cycles respectively. The final solutions, which 
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Table 2.12 Observed t h r e e - s t e p and f o u r - s t e p dependencies over 40 t r i a l s 
C o n d i t i o n s P[c \r .о Λ P[d | d ,d Λ Ρ [с \d .a
 n
e , ] Ρ \d \c A
 n
d , ] 
n
1
 n-1 n-2 n 1 n-l n-2 n1 n-I n-2 n-3 n ' n-l n-2 n-3 
1 
2 
3 
A 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1+2+3+4 
5+6+7+8 
1+2+5+6 
3+4+7+8 
1+4+6+7 
2+3+5+8 
1+3+5+7 
2+4+6+8 
0.769 
0.900 
0.919 
0.855 
0.882 
0.855 
0.854 
0.886 
0.873 
0.873 
0.857 
0.885 
0.837 
0.897 
0.872 
0.873 
0.867 
0.944 
0.838 
0.831 
0.846 
0.863 
0.915 
0.951 
0.875 
0.894 
0.883 
0.884 
0.872 
0.900 
0.874 
0.895 
0.222 
0.750 
0.286 
0.250 
0 . 3 3 3 
0 . 6 2 5 
0 . 8 3 3 
0 . 7 7 8 
0.321 
0.625 
0.433 
0.533 
0.452 
0.517 
0.387 
0.586 
0 . 3 6 4 
0.750 
0.333 
0 . 4 5 4 
0 . 2 5 0 
0.429 
1.000 ( 0 . 8 7 5 ) 
0.000 ( 0 . 3 3 3 ) 
0.438 
0.500 
0.400 
0.538 
0.528 
0.350 
0.469 
0.458 
Table 2.13 Estimates of parameters after iteration procedure 
Condition Ρ [C \c ,a .,] Ρ[ΰ \d ,d ,] » ρ § $ ft 1 
n
1
 n-1 n-2 n' n-I n-2 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
l+2+3+4(a+) 
5+6+7+8(a-) 
1 +2+5+6 (Δί>+) 
3+4+7+8(ДЬ-) 
1+4+6+7(ДЬ+) 
о 
2+3+5+8(ДЬ-) 
1+3+5+7(α+) 
о 
2+4+6+8(a-) 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.98 
0.98 
0.98 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.99 
0.77 
0.90 
0.92 
0.86 
0.88 
0.86 
0.86 
0.89 
0.88 
0.87 
0.86 
0.89 
0.84 
0.90 
0.88 
0.88 
0.87 
0.95 
0.84 
0.83 
0.85 
0.88 
0.93 
0.97 
0.88 
0.90 
0.89 
0.89 
0.88 
0.90 
0.88 
0.90 
0.86 
0.18 
0.84 
0.88 
0.75 
0.31 
0.03 
0.13 
0.74 
0.32 
0.57 
0.46 
0.54 
0.47 
0.65 
0.37 
0.79 
0.23 
0.67 
0.54 
0.82 
0.60 
0.05 
0.74 
0.58 
0.51 
0.65 
0.45 
0.48 
0.69 
0.54 
0.57 
0.35 
0.41 
0.62 
0.43 
0.58 
0.62 
0.49 
0.63 
0.44 
0.56 
0.48 
0.50 
0.41 
0.58 
0.45 
0.55 
^І 
resulted from the process of iteration, are listed in Table 2.13, and 
in only two cases in the whole table were the initial and final 
estimates discrepant by more than 0.02. 
As can be seen from Table 2.13, the estimated probability that a 
wrong subject is included in a certain value state due to one of the 
starting assumption (2.10) and (2.11) is zero or almost zero. To check 
how well the estimated parameters fitted to the data, comparisons were 
made between some theoretical probabilities predicted by the estimated 
parameters and the corresponding proportions observed in the data. 
None of these proportions were used in the estimation procedure. The 
theoretical probabilities are the expected proportions (at equilibrium) 
of ί·, с following c, and d following d. The equations for deriving 
these probabilities are given in Meeker (1971). 
The results of the comparisons are displayed in Table 2.14. 
Except for conditions 6, 7 and 8, the absolute differences between 
the observed and predicted probabilities of с are very small (0.03 or 
less). For the former conditions these discrepancies are 0.08, 0.10 
and 0.06 respectively. The discrepancies between the observed and 
predicted conditional probabilities are larger on the average and show 
a greater variance than do the discrepancies for P[„']. In particular, 
the results for condition 2 are unfavourable. Our results for the 
conditional probabilities are somewhat disappointing when compared to 
the experimental results obtained by Meeker (1971, p. 398). One 
explanation for the poor fit of the first-order conditional 
probabilities might be that the observed statistics are unreliable, 
since they are generally based on fewer observations than the PI.·] 
statistics. The estimates of the parameters in the single conditions 
are based on a relatively small number of observations (four 
sequences of 40 trials only). In particular, the data provide only a 
crude estimate of the four-step dependencies. 
In the Appendix a proof is given showing that Ρ[с ] increases as 
76 
Table 2.14 Comparisons between predicted and observed response 
probabilities 
Condition 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
1+2+3+4 
5+6+7+8 
1+2+5+6 
3+4+7+8 
1+4+6+7 
2+3+5+8 
1+3+5+7 
2+4+6+8 
PL·] 
Predicted 
0.35 
0.40 
0.63 
0.47 
0.58 
0.58 
0.46 
0.57 
0.46 
0.53 
0.47 
0.50 
0.42 
0.56 
0.47 
0.52 
Observed 
0.35 
0.40 
0.66 
0.48 
0.58 
0.50 
0.36 
0.63 
0.47 
0.52 
0.46 
0.53 
0.42 
0.57 
0.49 
0.50 
PL·· le , 
η' n-1 
Predicted 
0.74 
0.85 
0.89 
0.80 
0.87 
0.83 
0.80 
0.88 
0.83 
0.84 
0.83 
0.84 
0.78 
0.88 
0.82 
0.85 
] 
Observed 
0.73 
0.65 
0.85 
0.77 
0.86 
0.71 
0.74 
0.84 
0.77 
0.79 
0.75 
0.81 
0.74 
0.81 
0.81 
0.75 
η η-1 
Predicted 
0.86 
0.90 
0.82 
0.82 
0.82 
0.77 
0.83 
0.84 
0.86 
0.82 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.81 
0.85 
0.83 
] 
Observed 
0.85 
0.78 
0.74 
0.82 
0.82 
0.70 
0.86 
0.72 
0.81 
0.78 
0.79 
0.80 
0.81 
0.77 
0.83 
0.76 
Pfd Iс ,d „d „] decreases and also as P[e d ,a _e .] increases. 
n' n-l n-2 n-3 n' n-1 n-Z n-3 
It can also be shown that changing the four-step dependencies in such 
a way as to yield parameters which predict a greater P[c] will also 
cause an increase in P[c |e _ ] and a decrease in Ptdjd^j ]. However 
the change in the conditional probabilities will be smaller than in 
V[e]. This means that this procedure only makes sence, if its main 
purpose is to improve the estimate of P[e]. 
Both four-step dependencies in conditions 6, 7 and 8 were changed 
in the stepwise maimer described earlier. After these "corrections" 
new estimates of the parameters were computed as shown in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.16 shows the new predicted probabilities. Clearly the new 
predictions show less discrepancy with the observed statistics than 
did the earlier ones. 
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Table 2.15 Estimates of parameters after adjustment of the four-step 
dependencies 
Condi­
t i o n 
6 
7 
8 
P l C J e n 1 
η ' η - 1 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
W Ρ [л I 
η 
і^п-г
1
 ff 
0.99 0.86 
0.99 0.86 
0.98 0.89 
Ρ 
0.87 
0.92 
0.97 
θ 
0.41 
0.13 
0.10 
î 
0.50 
0.15 
0.84 
Ρ[6 ] 
0.52 
0.38 
0.68 
Table 2.16 Comparisons between predicted and observed probabilities 
for revised estimates of parameters 
Condi t ion 
6 
7 
8 
Р Ы 
P r e d i c t e d Observed 
0.51 0.50 
0.38 0.36 
0.62 0.63 
"KK-^ 
P r e d i c t e d Observed 
0.81 0.71 
0.78 0.74 
0.88 0.84 
P[dJ*n-.] 
P r e d i c t e d Observed 
0.80 0.70 
0.87 0.86 
0.81 0.72 
In light of the fact that the procedure of estimating the para­
meters on which the predictions arc based, was not derived in such a 
way as to maximize the fit of the model to the data (e.g. least 
squares, maximum likelihood, or minimum chi-squared procedures), at 
least for the joint conditions the predictions seem satisfactory. As a 
starting point in our iteration procedure we used the assumptions from 
(2.10) and (2.11). In most cases the assumptions turned out to be 
right, but one may wonder wether the solutions found for the 
parameters are unique. Would not we have found other estimates for the 
parameters, if the starting assumptions had been different? 
To examine this possibility we changed the probabilities in 
(2.10) and (2.11) to 0.90, 0.80 and 0.70 successively. This implied 
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that the first estimates of the four parameters had to be computed 
using equations (2.23), 2.24), 2.25) and (2.26) instead of (2.12), 
(2.13), (2.18) and (2.19). Next the iterative process was entered with 
these (new) first estimates for the four parameters. In all conditions 
and for all values of the probabilities in (2.10) and (2.11) the 
iterative process yielded exactly the same solutions as in the 
orginal calculation. This indicates that the assumptions in (2.10) and 
(2.11) are a good starting point for the estimation procedure. More­
over, in some cases, when the probabilities in (2.10) and (2.11) were 
set a 0.80 or 0.70, the first estimates for ir and or ρ became even 
larger than 1.0. 
2.8. Discussion 
Analysis of variance on the proportion of a choices did not 
reveal any significant effect. However, the estimates of the four 
parameters do vary over the conditions. This means that different 
reward structures which, in the average number of с choices showed no 
effect, in fact cause different intrapersonal conflicts. 
The first hypothesis said that π and ρ, the probabilities of 
consistent behaviour in the value states, are not affected by varia­
tions in the pay-off structure. In our experiment τ and ρ remained 
fairly constant over the joint conditions, but were less obviously 
constant in the single conditions (see Table 2.13). As noted earlier, 
however, we may assume that the estimates for the four parameters are 
more reliable in the joint conditions than in the single conditions, 
where we have fewer observations. For the time being we suspend 
judgement about the tenability of this hypothesis until more data are 
available. 
The results with respect to θ and ψ, the change of state parame­
ters, agree with the relevant hypotheses rather well. From Table 2.13, 
it follows that 0, the probability to change from С to β after an 
inconsistent choice, is very sensitive to changes in a
s
 and a 0. Both 
these variables indicate how much influence the players have on the 
outcome of the other. The fact that they influence mainly Θ, which is 
a measure of the effect behaviour has on state C, supports the 
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theoretical assunption that a subject in state С is directed towards 
the other. There is also a slight effect of Ab
s
 on Θ. This can be 
explained as follows: as the inducement to defect (Ab
s
) increases, the 
psychological cost for subject to change his value state from С to D 
becomes smaller. 
Wit respect to ψ, the probability of changing from D to С after 
inconsistent behaviour, we can say that the results are in favour of 
the hypotheses. First, the data show no effect (or a negligible effect) 
of a
s
 and a0 on ψ. This is in agreement with the definition of state D, 
the rational state: the subject is directed towards his own outcome 
solely, and not towards possible costs to others caused by his 
behaviour. Since a is positively present in the outcome of either 
choice l(a +b ) for the с choice and («
s
+b
s
+Ab
s
) for the d choice], it 
is not surprising that it does not affect the rational state. 
Secondly, there is a considerable increase in ψ, as ¿As increases. 
This result was expected from the model, which states that in state D 
the subject is purely rational and therefore the larger the cost 
attached to a " choice for subject, the more conflicting cooperative 
behaviour is when the subject occupies state D. When the subject is in 
value state D he will not only judge his own alternatives rationally, 
but the whole outcome structure, including the possible outcomes for 
the other. The transition from D to С will come about easier (ψ will 
become larger) when дЬ0 becomes smaller. This can be interpreted as 
follows: when the other has less opportunity to benefit himself (as 
expressed by monetary amounts), the tendency to cooperate will 
increase in the subject. Probably, Δσ0 has the same function in the 
transition from ϋ to С as àbs has in the transition from С to D, let 
alone that the effects are in opposite directions. 
In the estimation procedure response sequences were pooled to get 
more reliable estimates of the three- and four-step dependencies. 
Besides, not all dependencies could be estimated from some single 
response sequences (e.g. in condition 2 one subject never cooperated). 
One may object that there is no evidence that the individual chains 
are homogeneous. However, if they are not, this would be indicated by 
the results of the analysis, since addition of heterogeneous chains 
does not, in general, result in a new chain. 
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Although a test for the significance of the results is lacking, 
we feel that the results clearly demonstrate the effects which we 
expected to appear. At least this is true with respect to θ and ψ. 
The results provide new support for Meeker's theory which makes 
his approach to the analysis of sequential behaviour promising. The 
most important feature of the Markov chain model, as constructed by 
Meeker, is that it makes transition from the one (latent) state to the 
other contingent upon the subject's behaviour. Meeker constructed his 
theory for a very specific hypothetical situation. In our view, 
research on his theory has to direct itself to expanding the 
applicability of the theory. One could start with those cases, in 
which Other is not always cooperative. It would be interesting to 
study the effect of different probabilities with which Other chooses 
the cooperative act on the four parameters. It is our hypothesis that 
this will affect the values of IT and ρ. We leave this possibility for 
future experiments. 
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Appendix 
From (2.20) and axiom 2-2 it follows that 
рг ι - (1-Ρ)Ή +('- 1 Γ)*6»(1-Ρ) e, ,!-. 
^
l c J
 (1-ρ)«ψ+(1-π)*ψ U*'ÍIJ 
Now, t h e p a r t i a l d e r i v a t i v e s of Ρ [ с ] f o r θ and ψ a r e 
ЭР[о] _ (1-π)(1-ρ){(1-ρ)»·Κΐ-ΐΓ)θ}-(1-π){(1-ρ)ψΐΓ + ( 1 - π ) ( 1 - ρ ) θ } 
Э
 {(1-ρ)ψ+(1-π)θ}2 
_ ( 1 - π ) ( 1 - ρ ) ( 1 - ρ - π ) ψ „ _ „ 
" { ( ι - ρ ) ψ + ( ΐ - Ό θ } 2 < 0 ( Z - 3 Z J 
ЭР[о] (1-ρ)π{(1-ρ)ψ+(1-π)θ}-(1-ρ){(1-ρ)ψϊΓ + (1-7Γ)(1-ρ)8} 
3ψ {(1-ρ)ψ+(1-π)θ}2 
( f f + p - H ) ( l - p ) ( l 4 r ) e
 < η ,,-. 
{ ( 1 - ρ ) Ψ + ( 1 - π ) θ } 2 < 0 ί 2 · 3 3 ^ 
So Р [ с ] i n c r e a s e s when ψ i n c r e a s e s and d e c r e a s e s when θ i n c r e a s e s . 
Holding я and ρ c o n s t a n t , ψ w i l l i n c r e a s e i f Ρ[d le .d -d , ] 
η' η—ι τι— Δ η-J 
decreases. This can be seen easily in equation (2.19). 
From equation (2.18) it follows that π and ρ again being equal, 
о will increase if Ρ[с Id ,c .c ,] decreases. Now it is clear that 
n! n-i n-2 n-3 
an increase in Ρ [d le .d Λ Λ is accompanied by a decrease in P[e]. 
n' n-l n— ¿ n-J 
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Raising the value of Ρ [с \d _.c .^  , ] will cause the opposite effect 
in P[c] . 
Note: The derivations in this appendix are presented with (2.18) 
and (2.19) as references for the equations for θ and ψ. The 
derivations are, however, also valid for the exact equations (2.25) 
and (2.26) for θ and ψ. Moreover, the data in the first two columns of 
Table 2.13 are an extra justification for the use of the simplified 
formulas. 
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Chapter 3. Value Conflict in Uncertainty and Dissonance 
an Outcome-Contingent Markov ftodel with Latent States 
3.1. Introduction 
ІЪе latent Markov model developed by Meeker (1971) -was designed 
to describe the process of decision making by an individual who must 
make α senes of choices between lecnxrouiting the cooperative acts of 
another individual, or maximizing his own payoff in a situation where 
the other does not retaliate (i.e. is unresponsive to the subject's 
behavior). 
Meeker as well as Van der Sanden (1978, see also chapter 2) in 
their experiments used the highly restrictive condition that the 
other player (0) in the experimental game was always cooperative 
towards the subject (S), that is 0 always chose the cooperative 
alternative in a PDG-type situation (see Table 2.1). 
Since the original model was succesful in describing the actual 
behavior in experiments under the above mentioned restricted 
conditions it seems worthwhile to investigate whether the model can be 
extended to more complex situations. In this chapter a generalization 
will be presented to situations where 
1. both actors (S and 0) m the social exchange situation have к 
choice alternatives (k > 2), and 
2. О chooses each alternative with a fixed (constant) probability, 
non-contingent with subject's behavior, and 0 is no longer always 
cooperative. 
In Meeker's theory (which applies to situations where a subject 
can only choose between two acts a cooperative act and a non-
cooperative act) it is assumed that during the decision making process 
the subject is in one of two, so called, value states. A value state 
is defined as the set of values m the social exchange situation which 
give the same prescriptions as to what is the most appropriate 
behavior. Lach value state has its own probability distribution over 
the choice alternatives open to the subject. The behavior which is 
"the most appropriate" in a particular value state, also has the 
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greatest probability in that value state and is called "consistent 
behavior" for that value state. 
When a subject must make a series of choices between cooperating and 
non-cooperating, it is assumed that he may change his value state 
during the process as a result of his own behavior and his opponent's 
behavior according to some (probabilistic) transition rules. 
Value states influence behavior, but the actual behavior (of all 
actors involved in the interaction) also has its effect on the value 
states. An outcome, defined as a pair of responses by S and 0, which 
agrees with Subject's value state, gives him (S) no reason to change 
his value state. Such an outcome is called a "consistent outcome" for 
that value state. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game the outcome (cc),in 
which both players choose the cooperative alternative, is a consistent 
outcome for a subject in the Reciprocating State. The outcome (ac) in 
which S chooses the "rational" alternative and 0 the "cooperative" 
alternative, is a consistent outcome for S, if he occupies the 
rational State. For in (do) S maximizes his own payoff (at O's 
expense indeed). 
Now the following axioms about value states can be formulated: 
Axiom 3-1: If a person S is engaged in interaction with another person 
0, he (S) occupies on any trial η a value state 
characterized by the values consistent with one choice 
alternative. 
Axiom 3-2: On any trial n, S chooses one alternative. The alternative 
with which the value state of S on trial η is consistent, 
is given with the greatest probability relative to the 
other available alternatives. 0 
Axiom 3-3: Outcomes in the interaction between S and 0 are defined as 
pairs of responses, one response by S and one by 0. Some 
outcomes are defined as consistent with a value state. If 
the outcome on any trial η is consistent with the value 
state which S occupies on trial n, S will continue to be 
1) In other words, the conditional response distribution for each 
value state is unimodal. 
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in that value state on the next trial. Otherwise, S may 
change to another value state on the next trial. 
3.2. Formulating the mathematical model 
Definition 1. Let Y be the set of choice alternatives (responses) 
open to the Subject. On each trial exactly one of the elements of Y 
is observed. The set Y consists of к distinct elements: 
Y = cy,, y2, . · . , y k) (3.1) 
Υ is called the set of observable states. 
Note: A set of choice alternatives is likewise defined for the Other. 
Although it is assumed here that 0 has the same nunber of 
choice alternatives (k), this is not essential for the theory. 
0 may as well have more or less choice alternatives than S. 
Definition 2. U is the set of latent states (value states). On each 
trial the subject is in exactly one of these states. The set U also 
has к distinct elements: 
U = (u,, u 2 ) .... i^) (3.2) 
The model is limited to an equal number of latent and 
observable states. However, if on theoretical grounds these numbers 
are assumed to be different, it can still be applied by combining 
either underlying (latent) states or observable states. 
Definition 3. Q is the (kxk)-matrix of response probabilities with 
entries : 
q.. = Prob [y.|u. ] (3.3) 
According to Axiom 3-2 
Prob [ y j u j > Prob t / j l ^ ] for i , j = 1, . . . . к and i ^ j 
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Definition 4. The (manifest) outcome on each trial is determined by 
Subject's response and Other's response. Let Ω bc the set of outcomes. 
Then л is the Cartesian nroduct of Y and Y . (U'c assure Y = Y .) 
s o so 
nach element ω is an outcome resulting from S choosing y. and 0 
choosing y.,, (j , j ' = 1 k) with 
m = (j-l) » к + j', m = 1, .... k 2 (3.4) 
Definition 5. When a subject is in state u on trial η and chooses 
alternative y. on trial n, and the other chooses alternative y'., the 
subject will change his latent state from u to UL on trial n+1 with 
probability t ^ . 
This yields as many transition matrices as there are outcomes 
2 2 
(k ). Each transition matrix, Τ , m=1, ..., к , has entries 
t ^ = Prob [α lu ω ] (3.5) 
Let В be the relation "гя consistent vrith" defined on U χ Ω, that is 
fl(u ,ω ) if and only if ω i gm' ' m 
Then according to Axiom 3-2 
s consistent \vith u 
'
Prob [ u, lu ω 1 = 0 if 3(u ,ω ) and g f h 
η _.,' g m J v g ' m ' ь 
and 
"n+1 8n ""n 
0 < Prob [ UL U ω 1 < 1 if not Bfu ,ω ) 
V i gn mn g m 
Definition 6. The latent Markov process is assumed to be irreducible 
and aperiodic (that is, it is possible to get from any state to any 
other state in a finite number of trials). Thus, for η ->• », the 
process will eventually reach an equilibrium. When the process is in 
equilibriun Prob (u. ) = Prob (u. ). 
1 1
 J.1 
η n+l 
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The vector ν has elements v., (i = 1, ..., k), according to 
v. = Prob [ u. ] for η ->• » (3.6) 
l i ' 
η ^ 
Since the initial or a priori state distribution is urtoiown, 
(k-1)(k + к + 1) latent variables have to be identified: 
(k-1) variables of the type Prob fu. ] 
η 
к (k-1) variables of the type Prob [y. lu. ] 
•Ίι
 1
η 
•3 
к (k-1) variables of the type Prob [ u. |u. ω ] 
n+1 η η 
These v a r i a b l e s a r e summarized i n t h e e q u a t i o n s f o r t h e 
o b s e r v a b l e s e c o n d - o r d e r p r o b a b i l i t i e s : 
Prob [ y ω ] = 
g
n + 1
 m
n 
ξ , * Σ {Prob [ і ^ ] * Prob [ у . І ^ ] 
•^  Tl Ί = 1 Π - Ί - Ι Τ Ι 
•Ίι ί=1 
Σ (Prob [ ι ι | u . ω ] » P r o b [ y |u . ] ) } , 
h=l n+1 η η g n + l n+1 
where ra = ( i - 1 ) * k + i ' 
η
 J
n
 J
n 
311(1
 Κ' Κ· V i = 1 ' •· · · k · 
IVhen the process is in equilibrium, we can write 
Prob [у ω ] = ξ., * Σ {v. *q.. » Σ (t^· q, )} 
g
n+l % J i-l 1 1J h-1 l h h g 
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Clearly, this yields к equations in (k-1)(k +k+1) unknowns. For 
к > 2 this system is underdetermined. Therefore, to solve for all 
the unknowns of the model one has to make use of third-order or 
higher-order probabilities. 
3.3. Problems relating estimability 
The model presented in the last section is a special case of the 
class of models in which a set of observable behaviors is dependent 
upon a number of underlying organismic states. It is assumed that the 
distribution of responses (choices) changes over time due to (outcome-
contingent) transitions among hypothesized motivational states. 
The model is in the form of a latent Markov chain model. Markov 
chain models with latent states are not new (Atkinson, Bower and 
Crothcrs, 1965; Greeno, 1974; Greeno and Steiner, 1964; Lazarsfeld and 
Henry, 1968; Nahinsky, 1973), although specific models quite often 
generate specific problems with respect to the estimation procedures. 
In the (general) value state model of the last section the latent 
states neither can be made directly observable (through a one-to-one 
correspondence witli observable responses for example) nor can be 
inferred a posteriori from the data (for example, in most learning 
models the hypothetical states of the subject are identified retro­
spectively through the assumption of learning as an absorbing event 
and through the use of learning criteria for the responses). Estimation 
in our latent Markov chain model was accomplished through a similar 
process as the one proposed by Meeker (1971) and applied by Van der 
Sanden (1978) (sec chapter 2). 
Alternative estimation methods, frequently applied in the context 
of Markovian models, were also considered but they were discarded due 
to the special characteristics of our model. In the next sections this 
will be explained in more detail. 
3.3.1 Markov models with obnervablu states 
Early mathematical models of social interaction have as the central 
variables not indices of "psychological states", but rather whatever 
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happens to be easily and obviously quantifiable, such as easily 
identifiable acts, which can be quantified in terms of temporal relative 
frequency (Rapoport, 19f>3, p.567). This approach has been proved to be 
especially fruitful in the application of mathematical models to simple 
learning processes, where the "state" of the subject at any time is 
defined by the response to which a single stimulus is conditioned at 
the same time. That response is given on the next trial, and so the 
state of the subject is made observable. An application of this type 
of model to two-person interaction can be found in Burke (1959). 
Revenstorff, Kcgschneider, Fitting and Mai (1974) have described 
how Markov models can be applied to nonzero-sum games and what make 
them (that is Markov models) so attractive. Markov models require only 
simple assumptions about the decision making organism (small number of 
parameters, .simple temporal dependencies and constancy of the process). 
Мэгео ег, Markov models are mathematically tractable. Very frequently 
simple maximum likelihood estimators for the parameters are derived 
and, if the solution for a Markov model is known, several descriptive 
quantities can be derived, which are very informative of the behavior 
of the system represented by the Markov model (Kemeny and Snell, 1960; 
see also chapter 5). 
A Markov chain is a Markovian system (that is transition from one 
state to another is dependent only upon the last state) with 
stationary transition probabilities (that is transition probabilities 
are independent of trial number). Suppes and Atkinson (1960) applied 
Markov chains as models of social interaction to experimental games. 
Starting from axioms about behavior mechanisms based on stimulus-
sampling theory they applied Markov chain models to the conditioned 
states of the players to describe their (i.e. the players') joint game 
playing behavior as learning events. 
Other applications of Markov chain models to experimental games, 
particularly the Prisoner's Dileima Game, are known from Rapoport and 
Chairaiah (1965) and Rapoport and Dale (1966). In these models the 
manifest outcomes of the game were taken as the states of the Markov 
process. 
Estimation procedures for Markov chain models of manifest 
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behavior are rather straightforward (see for example Anderson and 
Goodman, 1957; Madansky, 1959; Billingsley, 1961) since all statistics 
such as the vector of initial state probabilities and the transition 
probabilities, are computed readily from the c.-^ erimental data. Many 
learning models arc of the Markovian type (Greeno, 1974). The major 
estimation methods for these models are the method of moments, 
(including the modified method of moments), maximum likelihood 
estimation, minimum chi-square techniques and the method of least 
squares. Detailed reviews of these methods and .леіг applications to 
Markov chains are found, for example, in Atkinson eì al. (1965), Bush 
(1963) and Restie and Greeno (1970). 
Simple as observable Markov models may be, they frequently 
suffer from a number of drawbacks: for instance they lac1 theoretical 
foundation, that is they are pragmatic, and conclusions about the 
psychological processes governing subjects' behavior (such as 
motivations, expectations) can be derived only a posteriori. 
3.3.2. Mav<o'J "¡расle кгіК пскоЬярг іЫе stau a 
Mien a model relates observable behavior to a set of hypothetical 
states, which are not directly observable, things are not so easy. In 
this section we shall demonstrate which complications arise, when the 
above mentioned estimation methods are to be applied to a latent 
Markov chain. 
The latent Markov chain model of Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968, ch. 
9) is representative for a class of models which apply to sociological 
phenomena and sociometrie experiments, such as attitude change and 
changes in voting behavior in large populations (Coleman, 1964; 
U'iggins, 1955) and changes over time in the configuration of 
interpersonal relationships (Katz and Proctor, 1959). 
An essential feature of Lazarsfeld and Henry's model is, that 
transitions from one (latent) state to another are not contingent upon 
the (observable) outcomes of the process on the last trial, that is the 
transition matrix of the latent Markov chain is fixed over trials. 
Another difference between the latent Markov chain model of Lazarsfeld 
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and Henry and our value state model is, that in the former model the 
initial state distribution in known. 
A solution of their latent Markov chain was set forth by 
Lazarsfeld and Henry, which was based on (simple) matrix operations 
on second order and third-order manifest probabilities. Only a small 
number of trials is required to estimate the model's parameters. On 
the other hand, since a reasonable number of observations is required, 
the number of sample subjects must be sizable. This is an argument, 
which reduces the model's usefulness for experimental research. 
Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968, p. 253) demonstrated, that if a 
subject behaves according to a latent Markov chain, the observable 
behavior (responses) is not a Markov chain. 
Let Ρ bc the matrix of joint probabilities fore time s and 
s, с 
time t, then in Lazarsfeld and Henry's model this matrix can be written 
as 
PS)t = Q'vX"
5
, t>s, 
where Q = the matrix of response probabilities for the latent 
states (this matrix is similar to matrix Q in 
Definition 3 of Section 3.2), 
V = the diagonal matrix of the latent distribution at 
time s, 
R = Q Щ (M is the transition matrix of the latent Markov 
chain) 
A similar equation for an ordinary Markov chain would be: 
P
s,t = P S
R t
"
S
' 
where Ρ is the diagonal matrix of the manifest probabilities at 
time s. 
Since in general Q'V Q will not be a diagonal matrix, this shows 
that the manifest behavior is not a Markov chain. 
Lazarsfeld and Henry gave the following interpretation to the 
entries of Q'V Q : the i.j-th entry represents the probability of 
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giving response i and response j at time s simultaneously, if one 
could or had to give two responses to the same question or to the same 
stimulus, under the assumption of local independence. 
If a theory links a number of observable states to a set of 
underlying states, the problem is how to identify underlying 
structural characteristics through the use of observed distributions. 
This problem is known as the identiflability problem. 
The problem lias been considered in relation to Markovian learning 
models by Greeno and Steiner (1964). According to Greeno and Steiner 
a state specified in a theory is identifiable in the outcome-space of 
an experiment, if and only if for each response sequence in this 
outcome-space every occurrence of the state can be identified. If all 
of the states specified in the theory arc identifiable in the outcome-
space, the theory is an identifiable theory in that space. 
Greeno and Steiner showed that for theories, which are not 
completely identifiable, a second equivalent theory may be constructed 
which is a Markov process with identifiable states and stationary 
transition probabilities. It was demonstrated by Greeno and Steiner 
(1964) that a three-state Markov chain with a single absorbing state 
is equivalent to several formalizations of all-or-none learning 
theories (Bower, 1961; Estes, 1960; Restie, 1962). 
In general the development of the identifiable theory is only 
useful for simple and very small experiments (two states, three or 
four trials), since the states of the equivalent theory are defined in 
terms of possible sequences of trial-outcomes in the experiments 
(Greeno and Steiner, 1964). Otherwise the model becomes unwieldy. The 
theory can be reduced towards a simpler form by lumping a number of 
states (for a definition of lumpability see for example Kemeny and 
Snell, 1960). A necessary and sufficient condition for lumpability is 
the occurence of reccurent events. In many learning theories errors 
are reccurent events. It appears that the existence of reccurent 
events depends upon the presence of one or more absorbing states in 
the original theory. 
Our theory under discussion clearly is unidentifiable in the 
sense of Greeno and Steiner, and since no reccurent events can be 
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specified, an identifiable theory in the sense of Greeno and Steiner 
cannot be constructed. When an identifiable theory could be 
constructed, which is equivalent to the original unidentifiable theory, 
a number of techniques are available to estimate the parameters of the 
resulting models. Frequently, moment estimates are easily derived 
(Poison, 1970; Greeno, 1974). 
A very attractive method of estimation is the method of maximum 
likelihood, which was introduced by R.A. Fisher in 1921. 
For a general discription of this method see, for example, Bush (1963) 
and Wani (1971). The method consists of expressing the probability of 
a random variable (the observations) as a function of the paraineter(s) 
to be estimated (the likelihood function), maximizing this function 
and then solving for the parameter(s). Provided maximimum likelihood 
estimators exist, the determination of ML estimators is relatively 
simple if the likelihood function is twice diffcrcntiable in the 
entire domain of the possible values of the parameters to be estimated 
(the regular case). Special techniques are required if the range of 
the random variable involved depends upon the parameters to be 
estimated (irregular case; see also Wani, 1971, p. 178-182). In the 
case of a Markovian process it would be straightforward to write out 
all possible outcome sequences of an experiment in terms of the 
parameter(s) to be estimated, construct the likelihood function and 
maximize this function (by numerical methods). 
For instance, for our value state model maximum likelihood 
estimation could be applied to all 4-tuples (remember that at least 
к equations are needed), but even this would present enormous 
computational problems, unless restrictions on the unknown parameters 
are imposed, every 4-tuple could be generated by к sequences of 
latent states, thus making the equations for these 4-tuples very 
complicated. Besides, the number of subjects needed to yield enough 
data for parameter estimation would be very large (a multiple of к ). 
If only a small number of subjects is available, the problem could be 
circumvented by running these subjects for a great number of trials, 
then cutting up the total outcomes sequences in 4-tuples, pooling 
these 4-tuples and apply maximum likelihood estimation. Even if this 
method could be justified by proper assumptions in the model, it still 
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leaves the problem of yielding bizarre equations. 
The same arguments as those mentioned against the appropriateness 
of maximum likelihood estimation apply when ье consider the nminim 
chi-square method of parameter estimation for the 4-tuples (for a 
discussion of this technique for simple Markov chains see Atkinson 
et al., 1965). 
Finally, че v,ant to mention a study by Nahmsky (107Ì), who 
treated the identifiability problem in a somewhat different context. 
lie discussed the problem of identifying probabilities for sequences 
involving К underlying states for experiments in which their are К 
observable states, uith the conditional distributions of observable 
behaviors for tne underlying states specified (known or hypothezised). 
Nahinsky investigated the conditions under vvhich the underlying 
distribution can be estimated without postulating an a priori 
restriction upon the underlying state distributions and an a priori 
restriction upon the transition rules that govern the changes from one 
state to another. Strictly speaking 'lOcntiflability' for Nahinsky is 
equivalent to 'estimability'. 
Solutions, in the form of iterative matrix methods, were 
suggested by Nahinsky for both outcome-noncontingent and outcome-
contingent models, chicli require that starting vectors and conditional 
response probabilities are known. This leaves Nahmsky's study of no 
use for our model. 
3.4. Estmattng the parameters 
Traditional methods of cstmation for Markov chains are based 
on frequency counts (Billingsley, 1961) for the state transitions. 
In the Markov model under consideration, however, these transitions 
cannot be observed. 
The parameters of the model (the latent probabilities) are 
estimated by an iterative process. Since nothing in known about the 
latent states, the method starts with making the unobservable states 
observable through an (erroneous) starting assumption. This idea is 
adopted from Meeker (1971). With this starting assumption cstinates 
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for the parameters are computed. Next the starting assumption is 
adjusted and estimating reiterated. 
Let D be a (k χ k) matrix of observable three-step dependencies with 
cell entries 
d., = Probt y |yi yj ] (3.7) 
xx 1
п Vi Vz 
Matrices R , (m = 1, ..., k 2 ) , arc defined containing observable four-
step dependencies with entries 
.On) 
r 
Ь.' -""""ЧЧч г з' ^ 
A matrix Ζ is defined with elements ζ.. such that 
z., = Prob [u, |y, y, ] (3.9) 
J 1 ^ ^n-l Jn-Z 
The estimation process is started with choosing initial values for 
the elements of Z. 
From (3.3), (3.7) and (3.9)- follows 
D = Z Q = > Q = Z" 1D (3.10) 
If the process is started with the identity matrix as a first estimate 
of Z, Q (the matrix of response probabilities) is estimated as 
Q = D 
The estimation of the transition matrices Τ is a little bit more 
m 
complicated. We can analyze (3.8) as 
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г ^ = [Σ{Σ(ΡΓ(Λ [ U . |ω„ y„ y„ J i P r o b l u - , |u, ω ] )} 
Sh l i Vi Vi 4-2 4-3 η Vi Vi 
* Prob [y. luj^  ]] . (3-11) 
η η 
The application of the model is now restricted to situations where 0 
chooses each action alternative with a fixed probability, non-
contingent with Subject's behavior. If we let ξ.,, be the probability 
of 0 choosing alternative y.,, (and remembering that m = (j-O'k+j'), 
we can write 
Prob [и. ω у у ] 
^кг I , Vi Vi 4-2 Ч-з 
η-1 Vi V2 з
 % У^_2 У^ 
Prob [ u . ω 1 у у ] 
V i V i 2 У з 
Prob [ω Ту у I 
Vi 6n-2 4-3 
РгоЬ[и. |у у ]»Prob[ü) |u, у у, 1 
=
 Vi Vz Уз Vi Vi 2 Уз 
Prob [ ω [у у j 
Vi У г У з 
Ζ · » ξ , , » q i i ζ . » q i , 1) 
3 ' gJ gJ 
Let E. be a diagonal matrix with the j - t h column of Q on the diagonal, 
and let H. be a diagonal matrix with the j - t h column of D on the 
1) Note t h a t : 
Frob [ω u. у у ] 0 C . , * Prob [ у. u. 1 
V.l Vi WW J Vil Vi 
and Prob [ω y y ] = ξ . , » Prob [ y. y y ] 
V114-24-3 J Jn-11 V2 З 
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diagonal. Then from (3 .3) , (3 .5) , (3 .7) , (3 .9) , (3.11) and (3.12) 
follows 
R = If 1 Ζ Ε. Τ О (3.13) 
m j j m ч l ' 
From (3.13) Τ can be estimated as 
1
 ' m 
Τ = ET1 Z _ 1 H. R Q"1 (3.14) 
m j j m ^  K ' 
Now a matrix Wis formed as 
к к 
W = Σ Γ. Σ ξ., τ , (3.1?) 
j=1 J j' = 1 J' m 
with m = (j-1) * к + у . 
W is the overall transition matrix, or the expectation of the 
transition matrix when the process is in equilibrium. 
Under the equilibrium assumption, ν can be estimated as 
v'W = ν' , (3.16) 
к 
and ν is estimable under" the restriction 2 v. = 1. 
i=1 1 
At this stage of the estimation process estimates for all parameters 
are given. 
The estimation of Ζ can now be improved. Let 
W. = F.. Σ ξ. Τ, (3.17) 
1 1
 j = 1 J 1 
with 1 = (j-1) * к + i, 
that is: W- is the expectation of the transition matrix when Subject 
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has made response y•. 
Then the i-th row of Ζ is computed as 
v'W.W. [v'lV.e. ] " 1, (3.13) 
where e. is the diagonal of E- written as a column vector. 
Given the new values for Ζ we can return to (3.10) for better 
estimates of Q, then of the Τ's and of v, and continue this procedure, 
iterativcly, until no further improvement occurs. Although no proof 
that the process will converge, can be given, when testing the 
algorithm with artificial data it always converged to the right 
solution within a small number of iterations (usually less than 5 
cycles). 
3.5. Experiment 
An experiment utilizing the PDG paradigm was run to test the 
adequacy of the model to describe data from a situation to which the 
theory would apply and to conpare the effects of three different 
levels of 'cooperativeness' of the other player on the parameters 
of the model. 
By fixing the probability of the Other choosing c, the theory 
can be applied to the Subject, when the game is iterated over a number 
of trials. 
It is assumed that on each trial the Subject is in one of bio 
value states: u.. is the Reciprocating State and ^ is the Rational 
State. In the Reciprocating State the Subject is motivated by norms 
as solidarity, cooperativeness, reciprocity, etc. In the Rational 
State motivations like individual rationality, self interest, and 
competitiveness guide Subject's behavior. 
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The response parameters are 
ρ = Prob [e
n
|u1 ] , ρ > .5 (3,19) 
η 
-г = Prob |d |u7 1 , г > .S (3.20) 
n
 ¿
n 
I.e. ρ is the probability of S (subject) choosing о on trial η when 
he is in the Reciprocating State on trial η and r is the probability 
of S choosing d on trial η when he is in the Rational State on trial η 
(see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.I Matrix, Q, of response probabilities 
!J1 
u 2 
с 
ρ 
Ί-ν 
d 
1-p 
r 
Transition Ρ 3 ™ Έ Ο Ϊ Ο Γ 3 are represented as a and b : 
a = Prob lu, |u ] , (3.21) 
n+1 η 
b = Prob [u |u2 ] . (3.22) 
n+1 η 
I.e. α is the probability of S being in the Rational State on 
trial n+1 after having been in the Reciprocating State on trial n, 
and h is the probability of S being in the Reciprocating State on 
trial n+1 after having been in the Rational State on trial n. 
The index parameters a . and b • (i = 1, .... 4) are outcome-specific 
transition parameters according to 
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ai = Prob [ u 2 | u 1 ші ] , 
n+1 η η 
(3.23) 
bi = Prob [u1 |u2 ць ] , 
n+1 η η 
(3.24) 
where the outcomes ω. (і=1, ..., 4) are defined as 
foc) ω 2 = (ed) ; 
ω 3 = (de) ω 4 = ídd) . C3.25) 
(In this notation Subject's choice is written first!) 
For each outcome of the game a matrix of transition probabilities 
between the value states is determined. These matrices are given in 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Summary of outcome-specific transition matrices 
Other 
о d 
с 
Subject 
d 
ω1 
ω2 
U1 
U2 
u1 
2-a2 
Ъ1 
U1 
U2 
U1 
7
-
a3 
bz 
U2 
a1 
i-b1 
u2 
а
г 
^з 
ω2 
ω4 
U1 
U2 
U1 
^ 2 
b2 
1 
U1 
U2 
U1 
i-«4 
b4 
U2 
a2 
^ 2 
U2 
a4 
і-ъ4 
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Table 3.3 Matrix of expected transition probabilities for the Prisoner's Dilemma when 0 chooses e with 
fixed probability ξ. 
( U j . C > 
id-a^p* 
( 1 - ξ ) ( ί - α 2 ) ρ 
íU-a3)p+ 
(\-Ои-а4)р 
Çb2p+ 
( l - O b g P 
ï b 3 p + 
о-оъ4р 
< u 1 , d > 
ς ( 7 - α ; ) ( ί - ρ ) + 
( l - ç ) ( i - a 2 ) ( i - p ) 
Ç ( I - a 3 ) ( i - p ) + 
( 1 - С ) ( 2 - а 4 ) ( і - р ) 
Ç b 2 ( î - p ) + 
( Ι - ξ ) 6 2 ( 2 - ρ ) 
Çb 3 (2-p) + 
( l - Ç ) b 4 ( i - p ) 
( u 2 , c ) 
ξ α ; ( 2 - Γ ) + 
( i - C ) e 2 ( í - r ) 
Ç a 3 ( J - r ) + 
( l - Ç ) a 4 ( J - i · ) 
C ( I - b 2 ) ( i - r ) + 
( l - Ç ) ( 2 - b 2 ) U - r ) 
CCJ-bgXI- r · )* 
( І - с ) ( 2 - ^ ) ( і - г ) 
< u 2 , d ) 
Ça^r* 
( Ι - ξ ) α 2 ι · 
ζ α 3 Γ + 
( 1 - ξ ) α 4 Ρ 
а7-ь 3 )г+ 
( l - C ) ( J - b 2 ) r 
Ç(2-b 3 ) r+ 
( l - C ) ( 2 - b 4 ) r 
о 
ы 
Table 3.3 shows the transition matrix for the combinations of 
latent states and manifest choices, when 0 chooses о with fixed 
probability ς. 
There were three experimental conditions. In condition [90] the 
Other chose the cooperative alternative (a) with a probability of .90; 
in condition [ 801 this probability was .80 and in condition [60] this 
probability was .60. 
3.5.1 Svbjeats 
36 undergraduate students in Psychology participated in the 
experiment. They were assigned randomly to the experimental conditions, 
12 in each. 
3.5.2 Procedure 
In each experimental session 6 subjects were run at a time. They 
sat in a room separated from each other by screens. In front of each 
subject was a monitor and a panel with pushbuttons. Also in front of 
each subject was a sheet of paper displaying the payoff matrix of 
Table 3.4. Subjects were told that the numbers represented monetary 
amounts in Dutch cents. 
Table 3.4 Payoff matrix for the experiment; the cell entries indicate 
amounts in Dutch cents. 
Other 
a d 
3 , 3 
5 , - 1 
- 1 , 5 
1 , 1 
After the subjects were seated they were told that they were 
participating in an experiment on decision making and that they must 
make a series of choices, the outcome of each choice depending on 
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their own choice as well as on the choice of one of the other 
participating subjects. The six subjects were then divided up into 
three dyads, pairs of players in a game, but they were told on each 
trial these pairs would be different, the assmgment of the pairs 
being performed randomly by the computer, that also recorded subjects' 
behavior and controled the monitors. 
The switching of partner on each trial provided for the non-
contingency of other's behavior on subject's behavior. 
Subjects were told that within each block of ten trials each 
subject was paired with each subject exactly twice. For the rest, 
the trials were finished off in one run. The subjects did not know the 
number of trials (the number was in fact 120). 
Each new trial was announced through the message "Beginning of a 
new round. Please make your choices" appearing on the monitor. Then 
subjects must make their choice of an alternative in the game of 
Table 3.4 within 7 seconds and also predict which choice the other was 
going to make on that trial. Subjects were required to state their 
prédit ions about Other's choice to enable the experimenter to find 
out whether the subjects learned, after a while, to expect Other's 
cooperative choice with the correct probability. 
When all subjects had indicated their choice and prediction (by 
pushing the proper button on the panel), feedback about the outcome on 
that trial was given through a message on the monitor which displayed: 
1) Subject's choice, 2) Other's choice, 4) Subject's payoff, and 
4) Other's payoff. This feedback was displayed for 7 seconds. After 
that the next trial was announced through a message on the monitor. 
Each subject's earnings were recorded and added, and at the end of the 
experimental session subjects were payed according to the total amount 
won. 
The subjects were actually playing against a preprogrammed compu-
ter that "chose" each alternative of the PDG with a fixed probability. 
3.5.3 Results 
The subjects played for 120 trials. The first 20 trials were 
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regarded as learning trials during which the subject could learn to 
expect the other's cooperative choice O ) with the correct probability. 
The patterns of the subject's predictions showed that this number was 
sufficient. Two subjects had to be dropped from the analysis, one 
subject in [ 80 ] and one in [ 60 ], since they could not be regarded as 
completely "naive". 
Table 3.5 shows the mean and variance of the number of о 
responses over the last 100 trials. 
Table 3.5 Mean and Variance of number of a responses over 100 trials. 
Condition 
[90] 
[ 80] 
[60] 
Mean 
54.42 
42.73 
43.27 
Variance 
642.58 
979.47 
1101.65 
Number of subjects 
12 
11 
11 
It is not surprising that the mean number of a responses is greatest in 
[ 90] , but these gross results do not show differences between [ 80] and 
I 60] . Each subject's choices on the last 100 trials were used to 
estimate the parameters of the latent Markov model. The protocols of 
subjects in the same experimental condition were pooled. ') 
The results of the estimation process for each experimental 
condition are given in Table 3.6. 
1) The pooling of data from different subjects can be criticized, as 
it implies the unwarranted assumption that the same parameters hold 
for different subjects. On the other hand, analysis of individual 
data would have suffered seriously from unreliability of data on 
higher order dependencies. It was therefore decided to pool data, 
and hoped that individual differences would not seriously affect 
the results. The outcome appeared favorable. 
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Table 3.6 Parameter Estimates from Iterative Procedures. 
Condition ρ r a, b, a„ b a, b_ a. Ь. и 1 1 2 2 3 S 4 4 1_ 
[90] .81 .83 .00 .72 .38 .78 .34 .00 .80 .16 .57 
[80] .73 .85 .00 .78 .00 .83 .54 .00 .29 .00 .47 
[60] .84 .87 .00 .62 .08 .42 .71 .00 .76 .11 .43 
3.5.4. Discussion 
A value state is a non-observable state reflecting a person's 
motivational orientation towards an interaction with another person. 
Value states influence behavior and a person may change his value 
state after an inconsistent outcome. The mathematical model based on 
the theory was applied to data from an experiment in which the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game paradigm was used. 
The response parameters ρ and r indicate the influence the value 
state has on behavior. In the experiments by Meeker (1971), О acted 
always cooperatively. Meeker found that r changed with changes in the 
cost of cooperative behavior and with the experimental instructions. 
The value of r was smallest when a group orientation was induced through 
the instruction. If no group orientation was induced, r was greatest 
when there was a (monetary) cost attached to the cooperative act. In 
all these cases ρ remained about the same. These results made Meeker 
conclude (1971, p. 399), that in the Rational State Subject is more 
oriented to himself and that in the Reciprocating State Subject is 
primarily oriented to the Other. Meeker then hypothesized that ρ will 
change with changes in O's behavior. In the experiment reported here 
ρ did not vary substantially although O's behavior was different in 
the three experimental conditions. It should be investigated whether ρ 
changes, if the behavior of a responsive Other changes. O's changing 
probability of cooperative bahvior had no effect upon r. This 
supports the interpretation of the Rational State as self-oriented 
and unaffected by (changes in) O's behavior. 
The parameters a and b are measures for the effect of outcomes of 
the interaction on the value states. The solutions for a and b, 
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confirm our assumption formulated in hxior* 3.3 that subjects do not 
change their value state after a consistenL outcome. 
In effect, (ec) is a satisfying, equilibrium outcome when S is 
inclined to be cooperative and 0 generally responds likewise, and so 
there is no motivation for S to change his value state. Likewise, with 
(dd) coming up, the Subject being in an egotistic state, and the 
Other generally being cooperative, there is no motivation for S to 
change his value state. 
The Subject faces, however, an inner conflict or problem when his 
behavior is inconsistent with his value state. We reason that this 
conflict is stronger when the behavior of Other and the actual outcome 
provide less justification for (occasionally) being untrue to oncscit. 
Thus, if (ec) comes up while S is in the Rational, egotistic 
state, and the Other is highly cooperative, the outcome would motivate 
the Subject to change his value orientation. Tf, however, the Other 
is only moderately cooperative (i.e. in [60], the {cci) outcome may be 
looked upon more easily as a chance effect and would less motivate a 
change of value orientation. This is expressed in the lower values 
for bj in [ 60] as conpared to [ 80] and [ 90 ]. 
The probability of changing from the Reciprocating State to the 
Rational State after unilateral defection by the other (indicated by 
a„) is zero and almost zero in [ 80 ] and [ 60 ]. This could be explained 
as follows: when the probability of cooperative behavior by the Other 
is considerably smaller than 1, the Subject takes a risk by choosing 
e, that is the risk of getting the least preferred payoff. It seems 
that a Subject in the Reciprocating State takes into account a 
'disappointment', when the risk is considerable and consequently 
outcome (ed) is not (very) conflicting for him. 
The situation is different for a Subject in the Rational State 
when confronted with (ed). For a Subj ect in the Rational State the 
probability of (cd) is relatively small in [ 90 ] and [ 80]. It may 
look to him that he missed the point completely, and he should change 
his value orientation (expressed in b.). In [60], (cd) though in-
consistent with an S' egotistic inclination, is nevertheless 
consistent with his interpretation of the game, and vould therefor 
less motivate a change of value orientation (b9 = .42 in [60]). 
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For a Subject in the Reciprocating State the outcome (dc) means 
having made an inconsistent response while the Other has made a 
cooperative response. In all three conditions this poses the Subject 
in serious conflict judging from the values of a, which are all 
clearly different from zero, a is lowest in [90] and highest in [ 60 ] 
suggesting that it is easier to change from the Reciprocating State 
when the expectations of Other's cooperativeness are relatively low. 
It is not surprising to find that a, is greater than b,, however 
it is not clear why a, in [80] is so much smaller than a, in [90] and 
[60]. For the moment no explanation can be given for this result. 
Table 3.7 Some Observed and Predicted Conditional Response 
Probabilities 
Condition 
[90] 
[80] 
[60] 
Prob [e|(ce) ] 
Observed 
.79 
.68 
.81 
Predicted 
.78 
.71 
.79 
Prob И (cd) ] 
Observed 
.56 
.70 
.67 
Predicted 
.58 
.72 
.72 
Condition 
[90] 
[SO] 
[60] 
Prob \ a\ída) ] 
Observed 
.27 
.23 
.15 
Predicted 
.27 
.21 
.15 
Prob [e| {dd) } 
Observed 
.31 
.24 
.24 
Predicted 
.28 
.24 
.22 
The fit of the parameter estimates on the data was investigated 
by comparing some observed response probabilities, which were not used 
in the estimation procedure, with their predictions from the estimated 
parameters. As can be seen from Table 3.7 the predictions fitted the 
data pretty well. The average discrepancy with observed and predicted 
probabilities was less than .02 with the maximum discrepancy being .05. 
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The experiment described in this chapter is a logical extension 
of the experiments by Meeker (1971) and Van der Sanden (1978; chapter 
2): the introduction in the social exchange situation of an "other", 
who is not always helpful or cooperative. 
The next step would be to replace the unresponsive Other by a 
responsive one, changing the situation into a real interaction 
situation. 
However, a model which captures the full complexity of the 
dynamics in a conflict between competition and cooperation may require 
some major modification of the present model. 
For example, in experiments on PDG with two real players it is 
sometimes found that after a while players end up in some equilibrium 
state (Rapoport and Chanmah, 1965). A Markov chain type model that can 
accomodate such an empirical finding must have absorbing states, the 
number of them being equal to the number of different alternative 
equilibrium states. This brings up the fundamental question of how 
possible equilibrium states can be distinguished beforehand. 
Since some of these "equilibria" cannot be derived from the 
principle of rational behavior, classical game theory will not be of 
great help. Recently (1971) Nigel Howard has developed a theory of 
metagames based on the assumption that people choose conditional 
strategies (metastrategies) when playing experimental games. The 
theory enables one to derive from each game those outcomes which can 
be stable. The theory is predictive rather then normative and seems 
to be a promising development toward a better understanding of 
behavior in conflict situations with uncertain outcomes contingent 
upon Other's behavior. 
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Chapter 4. Stability in the prisoner's dilemma an experimental test 
M t h general metagames 
4.1. Hatboral аесгвгоп and дате-ріаугпд Ъвка гог 
The theory of choice and decision making as a branche of pure 
mathematics is a theory based on axioms of consistent or rational 
behavior. A different word of rational behavior is optimzmg 
behavior. A "rational decision" can be defined as follows 
"Let D = dj , d k be a set of alternative decisions one 
of wich a subject can choose and let R = r,, ...., r k be a 
set of outcomes such that γ e Ρ IS the foreseeable result 
from decision d, ε D. Then d^ e Ό is a rational decision if 
there is no r e R (j = i, k) which is preferred by 
the subject to the result Ϊ^ of the decision d^. r>1 is 
called a rational outcome." 
Classical game theory (see for example Von Neumann dua Morgen­
stern, 1944, Luce and Raiffa, 1957) is a normative theory with this 
Principle of Rationality as the central idea. However, particularly 
in the case of nonzero-sum games this principle of rationality not al­
ways results in an optimal outcome for all participants (players) in 
the game (chapter 1). 
This problem is known as the Paradox of Rationality. 
The untenability of the principle of rationality was already 
demonstrated in chapter 1. With respect to the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 
for which frequently great discrepancies are found between the results 
of nomative game theory and actual behavior of the players, a number 
of researchers has tried to solve this paradox by referring to 
"extra-theoretical" concepts as trust, solidarity, cooperation 
etcetera (Morehous, 1977, Messick and Thomgate, 1967; Messick and 
McClintock, 1968; Griesinger and Livingston, 1973; Friedland, Arnold 
and Thibaut, 1974). This indicates that we must at least reconsider 
the usefulness of experimental games and game theory for the study of 
human interaction in conflict situations. Classical, normative game 
theory only applies to games where the interests of the ріауегь are 
diametrically opposed. But theories about real human conflicts have 
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to start at the very point where theories of zero-sum games stop. 
As such, nonzero-sum games are much more interesting to the 
behavioral scientist. As early as I960 Schelling (1960) realized the 
limitations of the zero-sum game as a paradigm for human conflicts. 
Rapoport (1966) has suggested two kinds of rationality: indivi­
dual rationality and collective rationality. Individual rationality 
results in the non-optimal outcome for all players in a non -
cooperative game and collective rationality prescribes the choice of 
the alternative which leads to the optimal outcome for all players. 
According to Krivohlavy (1974) the Rationality Paradox can be solved 
if the transition from individual rationality to collective 
rationality can be solved (p.596). A theory about conflict situations 
such as experimental games in which these meta-rational concepts are 
formalized and which is descriptive rather than normative is the 
Theory of Metagames developed by Howard (1966a, 1971). 
4.2. Meta-Games and Meta-Rationality 
The theory of metagames is based on an extension of the theore­
tical framework in which "rationality" is defined. As such it is a 
logical step in the development of theories on choice behavior from 
simple choice paradigms to the more complicated nonzero-sum games. 
This was clearly indicated by Rapoport (1967) in his popular article 
in Scientific American. 
Howard's metagame concept which bears the "solution" to non -
cooperative games such as Prisoner's Dilemma and the Game of Chicken 
(for a description of both games, see chapter 1) is inspired by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's idea of majorant and minorant games for 
zero-sum games. 
Let Γ be a two-person zero-sum game. The players are labeled 
S. and S,. The problem in analyzing a game Γ is that each player in 
choosing his strategy does not know what the other player is going to 
'choose. Let Γ be a game which is identical with г except that S, has 
to make his choice of a strategy before S 7, and that S, chooses his 
strategy in full knowledge of the choice by S.. Clearly in this game 
S. is at a disadvantage as compared to Г. 
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Let Г. be a game which is identical whith Γ except that now S 
has to make his choice of a strategy before s,, and that S, chooses 
his strategy in full knowledge of the choice by S 2. Now, in this game, 
S 1 is at an advantage as conpared to r. 
Γ. is called the minorane game of Γ and Г. is called the mac'orant 
game of Γ (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
What do Von Neumann and Morgenstern say about how these games, 
Γ and Г., develop? "It ought to be evident by connron sense - ... -
that for г , г the 'best way of playing' - i.e. the concept of ratio­
nal behavior - has a clear meaning". 
Let A . and A . be the sets of strategies for s. and s, resp. By 
definition a single play of the game consists of each player S. 
(i=l, 2) selecting a strategy a. from his strategy set Α.. The result 
is an outcome a = (a , a.). A specific element from the strategy set 
/. is indicated as a., a specific outcome is indicated as 
a = (a] , a 2). 
V. and :/ are functions which attach a value to each pair of 
strategies (a , a.) for S and S resp. 
In the minorant game S. chooses his strategy first, say a . Now 
S makes his choice in full knowledge of the value of a.. It is S's 
desire to minimize 'Λ (a. . a 7) (remember that Γ is a zero-sum game). 
Thus, when S chooses a strategy a., S. can forsee with certainy what 
the value of У Λα. , α.) is going to be, But let us see what Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern have to say further. 
The value of i' (a. , a2) which S. can forsee is Min α 2 [ 1^(5,, aj)! 
Since S. wishes to maximize Γ.(α., a 2) and since (in Γj) v\ta\ > ατ) 
is a function of a, alone (a2 is by the principle of rationality fully 
determined), S. will choose a. so as to maximize Min α2\'->\(<ι, , U 2 ) ] . 
This brings the value of '.' (α , a.) to 
Мах
т
 Min { Ла , a,)] . 
How do they proceed with the majorant game? We shall omit a detailed 
derivation here, since т. differs from r. in that the roles of S. and 
S. are reversed, albeit that S. still wants to maximize 'ЛСа, , α.) 
117 
and that S 2 still wants to minimize Ла, . До^· ^  ^
0
^ РІ
а
У
е г 5
 S. 
and S 7 play the majorant game well (i.e. according to the rationality 
principle), than the value of V(a , a.) will equal 
№ n
a 2 ^ a ,
 [ I
'l ( a. ' ' V 1 · 
Unless Мах^ Min
a
 [У, (я, , ^ ) ] = Міп^ Мах^, ^ і(-а] > я 2 ^ 
(i.e. when the game has a saddle point), it is impossible for both 
players to be (objectively) rational in Г. This is called by Howard 
(1971, p. 10) "the first breakdown of rationality". At this point Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern stopped their argument, but Howard elaborated 
their minorant and majorant games and called them metagames. A meta-
game is the game that would exist if one of the players chose his 
strategy after the other(s) in knowledge of his (their) choice(s). 
The metagame idea was also applied to other games than zero-sum games. 
Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Table 4.1). There is only 
one rational choice for each player: a ("defect"). It is the rational 
decision, whichever strategy the opponent chooses or is expected to 
choose. If the opponent is going to defect, rationally one should 
defect. If the opponent is going to choose cooperatively, again one 
should defect. The rational choice in a PDG always pays better than the 
irrational choice. However, if both players make the irrational choice, 
they will be better off then if they both choose rationally. 
Howard (1971, p. 48) calls this the "second breakdown of rationality". 
Table 4.1 Prisoner's Dilenuna Game (PDG). 
Ordinal preferences for- each cell are shown by the 
number pairs. The first number in each cell shows 
S.'s preferences (higher numbers being more 
preferred) and the second number S 's preferences. 
Player S 
e d 
3,3 1,4 
4,1 2,2 
Player Sj 
d 
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The minimax strategy fails in the PDG, because the "rational" choice 
does not yield a jointly optimal outcome. Also, a mixed strategy is 
not appropriate, since each player has a dominant strategy. 
If G is a game in normal form, and if к is a player in G, the 
fe-metagame of G is the normal-form game that would exist if player к 
chose his strategy in G in knowledge of the other players' strategies 
(Howard, 1974). 
The 2-metagame from the PDG is given in Table 4.2. Here player S, has 
now 4 conditional strategies, called metastrategies. 
Table 4.2. 2-Metagame from Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Rational outcomes for S. have a dot on the left, 
rational outcomes for S- have a dot on the right. 
The outcome ('-•,£-·). which is yielded by (c, aid) is 
metarational for S. from the 2-metagame. The 
equilibrium, which is a rational outcome for each 
player, is underlined. 
S„ 
-Is did -'Id die 
3,3 1,4. .3,3 1,4 
4.1 .2.2. 2.2. .4.1 
These 4 metastrategies are: 
1. ii/f : play alternative J regardless of S.'s choice, 
2. did : play alternative d regardless of S.'s choice 
3. a/d : play alternative a or d, resp., if you think S. will play 
j or d, resp., 
4. d/a : play alternative <i or a, resp., if you think S. will play 
d or c, resp., 
In the 2-metagame of Table 4.2 the outcome (d, did) is the only equili-
brium. It yields the basic outcome (d,d). S-'s rational choice is did 
and S,'s rational choice is still a. If S . would know that S, plays 
a/d, his best strategy is to choose c, but in that case S. would 
switch to d/d immediately. We see that (e, aid) is rational for S, in 
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the 2-metagame. Hence it is said, that the basic outcome in PDG 
corresponding to (.?, a/d), namely (c,¿·), is metarational from the 
2-metagame for S . However, in the 2-metagame (á, did) is the only 
equilibrium and the dilemma still remains. 
From the 2-metagame the 1,2-mctagame is constructed. The 1,2-
metagame is found from the 2-metagame as the 2-metagame was formed 
from the basic game. Thus, player I's strategies in the 2-metagame 
are replaced in the 1,2-metagame by 24 = 16 metastrategies. S. has now 
24 metastrategies as an answer to S 's 4 metastrategies (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 The 1,2-metaganie from Prisoner's Dilemma. The strategy 
"w/x/y/z" indicates the policy "ω against π/α, χ 
against did, y against aid, ζ against d/n'. Rational 
outcomes for S. have a dot on the left, rational out­
comes for S- have a dot on the right. Equilibria are 
underlined. 
Sl 
ale 
3,3 
3,3 
3,3 
3,3 
.4 ,1 
3,3 
3,3 
.4 ,1 
3,3 
.4 ,1 
.4 ,1 
3 , 3 . 
.4 ,1 
.4 ,1 
.4 ,1 
.4 ,1 
d/d 
1,4. 
1,4. 
1,4. 
• 2,2 
1,4. 
1,4. 
. 2 , 2 
1,4. 
. 2 , 2 
1,4. 
. 2 , 2 
.2 ,2 
1,4. 
. 2 , 2 
.2 ,2 
. 2 , 2 . 
eld 
. 3 , 3 
. 3 , 3 
2,2 
. 3 , 3 
. 3 , 3 
2,2 
. 3 , 3 . 
. 3 , 3 
2,2 
2,2 
. 3 , 3 
2,2 
2,2 
. 3 , 3 . 
2,2 
2 , 2 . 
dia 
1,4. 
.4 ,1 
1,4. 
1,4. 
1,4. 
• 4,1 
.4,1 
.4 ,1 
1,4. 
1,4. 
1,4. 
• 4,1 
.4 ,1 
.4 ,1 
1,4. 
.4 ,1 
а/а/а/в 
c/a/c/d 
a/c/d/c· 
a/d/a/a 
d/a/a/a 
a/a/d/d 
o/d/a/d 
Sj d/c/o/d 
o/d/d/o 
d/o/d/a 
d/d/a/c 
o/d/d/d 
d/a/d/d 
d/d/c/d 
d/d/d/a 
d/d/d/d 
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Besides the equilibrium (af,<î) from the basic game (and the 2-meta-
game) the 1,2-metagame contains still other equilibria. It can be scon 
in Table 4.3 that in the 1,2-metagame (a,a) is a stable outcome in the 
sense that no player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing 
his strategy. 
Instead of the 1,2-metagame one could have taken the 2,1-meta-
game. This would have yielded the same equilibria. Still higher-level 
motagames can be derived, but Howard (1966b) has proved that the 
equilibria in every complete prime metagame (that is a metagame in 
which each player is named in the title exactly once) are the only 
equilibria in all higher-level metagames based on it. 
Metastrategies are conditional strategies, with which a model can 
be build for the interaction between subjects in game-like conflict-
situations. Metastrategies are no real choice-alternatives and the 
subjects in the game not even need to be aware of using them. 
Metastrategies such as "choose с regardless of what the other 
does" and "choose a or d, if you think the other chooses с or d, 
resp. "reflect a player's orientation toward the interaction (and 
consequently toward the other player) and the social context in which 
the actual behavior takes place. Hence, it is Howard's merit that 
with the introduction of the concept of "metastrategies" it becomes 
possible to incorporate player's social orientations or motivations into 
a formal theory on game-playing behavior. Metagame theory is based on 
preference orders over the outcomes rather than the basic numerical 
utilities. According to the theory of metagames individual choices 
in a game arc not based on some rationality principle, as for instance 
minimax (see chapter 1.), which involves a complex aggregation of 
utilities of different players. In other words, metagame theory avoids 
the alleged interpersonal incomparability of utility (see for example 
Arrow, 1963 and Bezembinder and Van Acker, 1979). It is a descriptive 
(and predictive) rather than a normative theory, since it tells us 
which outcomes will be stable. It does not tell us which of the stable 
outcomes will actually occur, but it indicates which outcomes of a 
game can be possibly stable (and which cannot), that is the stable 
outcomes in the metagames based on the basic game. 
121 
4.3. Basic concepts from Metagame Theory (Special Metagames) 
In this section a brief overview of the basic ideas of metagame 
theory is given for the two-person case. For more details and the 
η-person case the reader is referred to Howard (1971). 
Let G =<A,, &7; ''"',, Уj) be a two-person game in normal form, where 
Α., is the set of strategies with elements оj for player S and А* is 
his preference function defined on the prodect-set A = Α χ A 
An outcome α e Л of the game is defined as the joint strategy-
choice α =(σ a ) of S and S«. 
For simplicity we shall indicate player S. as i. 
M. : Л-•В(Л) is a set-valued function (where В(Л) is the set of all 
subsets of A), which represents i's preference as follows: 
"a e M. Ъ" (where a,b с A) is read "a is not preferred by i to i>". 
This general form of a preference function covers the case of 
numerical utilities as well as other possibilities (Howard, 1974). It 
is assumed that M. is reflexive, that is a e M.a for all a e Л. 
ι г 
According to the definitions of a rational decision in Section 4.1 
an outcome α e Л is rational for player 1 if and only if for all 
a i e V 
(aj, 5 2) e м 1 S 
In other words, an outcome is rational for S , if he, S , cannot 
improve it by choosing a different strategy, given S.'s strategy 
choice. 
^(C) = { 5 | V aj : (a
r
 ^ ) ε М^ a } 
RAG) and RAG) are non-empty for finite ordinal games (i.e. •*'. and Л 
finite and Mj and M 2 ordinal) (Howard, 1970b, p. 214). 
In the PDG of Table 4.1 Д, = { ( * ) , (drf)} and Р
г
 = {(cd), (da)}. 
An equilibrium is an outcome which is rational for both players. The 
set of equilibria in G is thus: 
¿(G) =• R^G) η Д2(';). 
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For the PDG of Table 4.1 this yields: 
L· = {(¿d)}. 
In experiments on gante-playing behavior it is frequently observed that 
players attempt to predict which strategy the other player will choose. 
Of course, they do this in order to plan their own strategies. Player 
2 choosing his strategy as if he knows what the other player is going 
to do or already has done, chooses (wittingly or unwittingly) from a 
number of conditional strategies. Such a conditional strategy or meta-
strategy is a complete action-plan contingent upon the behavior of the 
other player. A formalized model of this situation is the special meta-
game 2C. 
In the special metagame 2G the strategy set A ^ is replaced by the 
set Γ of all fuctions ƒ: Л •* A . An outcome in 2G corresponds to 
an outcome {α ,/'Ο])) in 0. 
If G is the Prisoner's Dilenma Game (Table 4.1), then in the meta­
game 2G the outcome (d, d/d) is the only equilibrium (Tabic 4.2). Thus 
(dd), the basic outcome in G which corresponds to (d, d/d) in 2G, is 
still the only equilibrium of the game. We say, that (dd) is the only 
metaequilibrium from 2G. Metaequilibria are outcomes in the basic game 
which can be derived from equilibria in some metagame from G. 
The metaequilibrium from 2Í1 has added nothing new to what was 
already derived from the basic game. Nothing is gained because, of 
course, player's preferences for metagame outcomes are the same as for 
the corresponding outcomes in the basic game G. 
However, something is gained in terms of rational outcomes. 
A meta-rational outcome for i from 2^ is an outcome yielded by a 
rational outcome for i in the metagame 2C. 
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From Table 4.2 we see that 
Л2(2С) = {(a, did), (e, dio), (d, die), (d, eld)) 
« {(ed), (dd), (oc)} = R2 (G) 
but 
R^ttG) = {(d, ale), (d, did), (a, dd), (d, dia)} 
~ {(da), (dd), (oa)} D R^(0) 
It is found that (cc) is metarational for player 1 from the 
2-metagame. If player 2 plays "tit-for-tat", i.e. c/d, a is the best 
choice for player 1. Unfortunately, there is no reason for player 2 
to play "tit-for-tat". 
To solve this problem Howard proposed to look at the (special) 
metagame 1,26" (Table 4.3). In 1,26 each mctastrategy for player 1 
is a function h from all ƒ с F of player 2 in 26 to A . An outcome 
in 1,26 is a (h,f) and the basic outcome yielded by it is obtained as 
(h, f) · №(ƒ), f) {hiT), ДМЛ)) 
In the 1,2-nietagame of Prisoner's Dilemma it is found (see 
Table 4.3) that 
/7(1,26) = {(dld/d/d, did), (d/d/a/d, a Id), (c/d/c/d, c/d)} 
which yields for the basic game: {(dd), (aa)} 
Thus, we see that (dd) and (ca) are metaequilibria from 1,26 ' 
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For example, the outcome (c/d/o/d, e/d), which is an equilibrium 
yielding (cc), involves the policy for player 1 to play с if player 2 
plays e regardless or "tit-for-tat" and to play d otherwise. 
Player 2 plays "tit-for-tat", so player I's strategy is a. The result 
is (oa). 
In this way metagame theory can predict stable outcomes in 
experimental games; not in the sense of a normative theory, but in the 
sense of a descriptive theory: indicating the possible stable outcomes. 
Stable outcomes are defined here as outcomes resulting from each 
player choosing his strategy on the assumption that the other player 
will choose the strategy he (S.) expects him (S2) to choose CHoward, 
1971, p. 50-51). 
4.4. Geneval Metagames 
The metagame has been received very positively by some authors 
(Rapoport, 1967; Bums and Meeker, 1973). Even in the applied field it 
has already been proven to be a useful tool (De Beus, 1978a, 1978b; 
Bain, Howard and Saaty, 1971; Howard, 1968, 1972). However, others have 
shown themselves reserved (Shubik, 1970), or have even rejected the 
theory (Robinson, 1975). 
Anyhow, Howard's theory has called for a number of questions as 
is shown for instance by the discussions in Psychological Reports 
(Harris, 1969a, 1969b, 1970; Rapoport, 1969, 1970; Howard, 1969, 1970a). 
The main criticisms concern the asymmetric form of metagames, 
that is players are not treated "equally" in a metagame, and, secondly, 
that the prediction of the other's behavior, although one of the basic 
assumptions of the theory, is not provided for. Howard (1974, 1975) 
has solved these problems by extending the metagame concept to "general" 
metagames. 
Let P. and P. be partitions of ^  and ¿ , respectively, in non-
empty subsets indicated as P. and P., such that УР. = A . and Vp2 = A . 
and ? = ( Pj, Ρ ). 
Notice that ^ p and Ί?, are not necessarily empty. If пр. = 0 
than P. is called a strict partition. 
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The game PG is played as follows: 
1. Stage I : each player i (i = 1, 2) chooses a coranitment ; . e Ρ., 
2. Stage II: each player i (i = 1,2), having been informed of the other 
player's choice at Stage I, chooses a strategy policy 
a. e p., 
(i.e. from the set p. he himself chose at Stage I), 
in response to the other player's commitment ρ.. 
By this generalization a metagame can be represented as a symmetric 
game in normal form and I's (2's) choice of a strategy α (α ) is now 
through the choice of a ρ. (p.) in Stage I at least partially 
predictable. If p. = a , then a is entirely predictable. At the other 
extreme, if P. = {p.} = { A }, a is entirely unpredictable. 
The special metagame 2C from (?, discussed before turns out to be 
a special case. In 2G player 2 is assigned the partition containing, as 
its sole element, his total strategy-set. To player 1 is assigned the 
strict partition consisting of the set of all singleton sets, each of 
which contains just one of his strategies. In Stage II, player 2 is 
informed of 1's strategy, while his (2's) behavior is entirely 
unpredictable. This is exactly the situation that we have in the special 
metagame 2G. A general metagame represents the capability of each 
player of predicting and enabling himself to be predicted (Howard, 
1975, p.45). The subsets ρ. and F 2 which are chosen by player 1 and 
player 2, resp., at Stage I, are called aornmitments. 
A particular general metagame is the full metagame. In the full 
metagame based on G the partition of each player's strategy set 
consists of the total set of (non-empty) subsets of his strategy-set. 
(If A. contains m elements, this partition of Λ has 2m-1 elements! ) 
In the full metagame each player can make any conrnitment. 
As an example of a full metagame Table 4.4 gives the full meta­
game based on the Prisoner's Dileima in partition form. In this game 
the rows and columns of the original game are repeated enough times to 
represent the subsets belonging to each player's partition of his 
strategy-set. 
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Table 4.4 Full metagame of Prisoner's Dilemma in partition form. 
Each player first chooses a commitment. Then, within 
his commitment, each player chooses a metastrategy 
such that 
J. exactly one strategy is chosen to each commitment of 
the other player, 
2. all strategies chosen belong to a single commitment. 
Examples of metastrategies are indicated: 
circled cells show a metastrategy of player 1 and 
squared cells show a metastrategy of player 2. 
Player 1's 
commitments 
Player 2's commitments. 
e d a d 
о 3,3 
d 4,1 
. 0 
d 4,1 
1,4 
2,2 
1,4 
Θ 
ИЗ 1,4 
4,1 |2,2| 
з^ з 1м| 
A complete metastrategy for player 1 is a pair (p , ƒ.), where ρ is 
players 1's commitment and f^ is a function from P, to ρ . This func­
tion ƒ , is called by Howard (1974) a policy. 'Ibis is made clear in 
Table 4.5, where the full metagame in normal form is shown and where 
each metastrategy is given as a (commitment, policy)-pair. 
As appears from table 4.5 only (dd) is a metaequilibrium from the full 
metagame and (cc) is not. However, under the metastrategy of player 
2 indicated by the squared cells in Table 4.5, (ее) is rational for 
player 1. Similarly, (oc) is rational for player 2 under the meta­
strategy of player 1 indicated by the circled cells in Table 4.5, be 
it in a different place. 
The full full metagame is the full metagame of the full metagame. 
In stage 1 of the full full metagame each player chooses a metaconmit-
ment, which is a subset of his set of metastrategies in the full meta­
game. 
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Table 4.5 Full metagame of Prisoner's Dilemma in normal form. 
Each row and each column is a complete metastrategy 
consisting of a commitment (the letter(s) between 
braces) and a policy (the triple of letters) . The 
circled and squared cells correspond to the same 
metastrategies as those indicated in Table 4.4. 
Equilibria are underlined. 
{a} 
to 
.2 id} 
0) 
•U 
ΠΙ 
-u 
σι 
-u 
tí 
lb dì 
и 
ω 
.-Η 
Pu 
oca 
ddd 
COC 
ood 
oda 
doo 
add 
dad 
ddo 
ddd 
{о) 
с 
о 
а 
3,3 
4,1 
3,3 
3,3 
3,3 
Ы) 
d 
d 
d 
M 
2,2 
1,4 
1,4 
2,2 
Player 2 ' s m e t a s t r a t e g i e s 
{a d} 
o a o d a d d d 
o c d c d o d d 
o d o o d d a d 
3,3 3,3 3,3 1,4 3 , 3 | 1,4 1,4 1,4 
4,1 4,1 2,2 4,1 | 2 , 2 | 4,1 2,2 2,2 
3,3 1,4 3,3 3,3 | 1 , 4 1,4 3,3 1,4 
4,1 2,2 4,1 4,1 | 2 , 2 | 2,2 4,1 2,2 
3,3 1,4 3,3 3,3 | 1 , 4 | 1,4 3,3 1,4 
4,1 1,4 3,3 1,4 3,3 3,3 | l , 4 | 1,4 3,3 1,4 
и ©© 
4,1 1,4 4,1 2,2 4,1 4,1 | 2 , 2 | 2,2 4,1 2,2 
4,1 
4,1 
2,2 
2,2 
3,3 1,4 3,3 3,3 | 1 , 4 | 1,4 3,3 1,4 
4,1 2,2 4,1 4,1 | 2 , 2 | 2,2 4,1 2,2 
A metacommitment of player 1 can be seen as a constraint of his own 
choice of (p , ƒ ). This "constraint" can be made clear through a 
statement in situations of open bargaining or through a player's beha­
vior on previous trials in games with repeated plays. Metacommitments 
represent a higher level of predictability than commitments. 
In Stage Π of the full full metagame player 1, having been 
informed of the "constraint" (metacommitment) chosen by player 2 in 
Stage I, chooses a (p ,ƒ ) from within the constraint he himself 
chose in Stage 1. Similarly, in Stage Π player 2, having been 
informed of the metacommitment chosen by player 1, chooses a (p., ƒ"») 
from his metacommitment. 
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Even for a 2 χ 2-game the full full metagame in partition form 
contains too many rows and columns to show in a figure. If H is a 
two-person (meta)-game with m elements in each player's (meta-· 
strategy set, the number of coranitments in the full metagame based 
on H is 
m 
Σ 
k=1 
φ = 2m-1, (к is the size of the commitment) 
(m-1) 
which can be represented in Σ (') » к = m » 2 rows (columns) 
k=1 x 
in the full metagame in partition form. 
The number of metastrategies in the full metagame, based on и is 
m 
Σ 
k-1 
φ .k^-1\ 
since ω| i/J z\ .^_. can be filled in in к different ways. 
Table 4.6 shows how these numbers "explode" as m increases. 
Table 4.6 Table representing the number of (meta)commitments, the 
number of rows (column) in partition form and the num­
ber of meta-(meta)strategies of the full metagame based 
on two-person (meta) games with different numbers of 
elements in the (meta)strategy sets of each player. 
m = number of 
(meta)strategies in Π 
2 Ш -1 = number of 
(meta)commitments 
m » 2 = number of 
(columns) in 
partition form 
Σ (°) k ( 2 "'^ number of 
k=l k 
meta-(meta)strategies 
2 
3 
4 
10 
3 
7 
21 
2574 
4 
15 
32 
1,131 
• · 
334,064 .. 
10 
1023 
5120 
**** 
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Ал important theorem concerning the identification of meta-
equilibria in any game is proved in Howard (1975). Since this theorem 
is of central inportance in the experiments reported hereafter, a 
brief overview of the derivation will he given for the two-person case. 
Let the full metagame of a given two-person game G be the full 
metagame of the full metagame of the ... full metagame of G, where the 
word "full" occurs к times. Then the theorem says, that for any two-
person game G and any к > 2 the metaequilibria derived from the full 
metagame of G are the sanctionable outcomes of G. An outcome α in 5 is 
sanctianable, if for any (i.e. each) player there exists a strategy 
of the other player (a "sanction") that, if implemented, would 
guarantee that the former player could not do better than he does at α. 
In the PDG, (ее) is sanctionable. Each player has the strategy 
d as a sanction against the other. Also, (dei; is sanctionable, but no 
other outcome. If an outcome is not sanctionable in G, it is not an 
equilibrium in G. This is proved in the Appendix of this chapter. 
Before the proof of the identification theorem is given some 
definitions must be made. 
Definition 1 An i-commitment is a commitment of each player i 
(i = 1, 2) in the full metagame. A commitment p. of 
player i is a subset of his set of choice-alternatives 
in the basic game: ρ . с A .. The set of all ρ.'s is 
indicated as Ρ.. 
1 
Definition 2 An i-metastrategy is a strategy of each player i 
(i = 1, 2) in the full metagame; it is a pair (p. , ƒ ) 
where ρ. is an i-commitment and ƒ , called an i-policy, 
is a function from the set of the other player's 
possible commitments to the basic strategies of i 
belonging to his chosen commitment p. 
For example: ƒ : (p.) ->- α ε ρ . 
The set of all j V s for a given p. is indicated as p. (p^) 
The following definitions relate to the full full metagame, referred to 
as the full2 metagame. 
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Definition 3 An i-metacommitment p.(2) ís an i-commitment in the 
2 1 
full metagame: f. (2) ex. with 
^ = {(ρ. , .'.) \\ер\ ; ^ е л (p.)} 
2 
Definition 4 An i-metastrategy in the full metagame is a pair 
(p. ' . f. ') , where -. is a function from the 
set of the other player's possible metaconmitments to 
the metastrategies of i belonging to his chosen 
(2) 
metacommitpicnt ρ. . 
r
 1 
Figure 4.1 gives a tree diagram for the decision making process in 
7 
the full metagame and the full metagame. 
Figure 4.1 
1 , >- · 1 — " 1 a> 'Ί •?· -"• - a 
A
 2 Ρ2 ¿'"i a2 
b) y, ^ ^ P , ( 2 ) .Λ(-^  ^(P. ' -', >. 
ν _ (2) X- (2)
 ( . ~ . 
Λ2 ^ P 2 ~'2 ^^2· - 2 ) - 2 
Tree diagram for the decision making process in the full 
2 
metagame (a) and the full metagame (b). 
A metaequilibrium from a given metagame A is an outcome in the basic 
game, which is derived from an equilibrium in Η 
Let [ (p., .·•".) , (p., ƒ.)] be an equilibrium of the full metagame, 
and let ?1(p2) = äj and / 2 (p ) = σ 2 . Then à = (а^, а^) is a 
metaequilibrium from the full metagame. 
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The following lemma is proved in Howard (1974). 
Lemma 1. If a = (a , a.) is a metaequilibrium from a metagame Η , 
it is a metaequilibrium from every further metagame based on 
H . 
Another important Іеішіа is proved in Howard (1975). 
Lemma 2. If is not sanctionable in G, no metagame-outcome 
t (p, ?i)i (p,· ?2^ ^ а 1 УІ 0!^ 3 a i-s sanctionable in the 
full metagame of a. 
Since "not sanctionable" implies "not an equilibrium", this lemma 
says that only the sanctionable outcomes can be metaequilibria from 
2 
the full metagame. 
For the special metagames it was demonstrated (Howard, 1971) that the 
sanctionable outcomes of any game a are the symmetric equilibria of C, 
that is outcomes that are metarational for all players in some derived 
metagame from any metagame based on G. 
After lenrnas 1 and 2 the identification of metaequilibria can be 
solved, if it is proved that all sanctionable outcomes in the basic 
game arc metaequilibria frem the full metagame. This proof is given 
in Howard (1975). 
Theorem If a - (a , a.) is sanctionable in G, a is a metaequilibrium 
2 
from the full metagame of G. 
To prove this theorem Howard (1975, p. 19) introduced the α-enforcing 
2 
i-metacranmitment in the full metagame: 
{p., ƒ. I P. = {a. } or Α.; but if p. =A., f. (р.)=а., ri J ι ' 'ι ι ι 'ι ι Ji j^ i* 
when ρ . •= {a.} 
132 
Under the a-enforcing i-comitment, i's commitment is either {5. } 
or Л.; if i makes the latter commitment, at least he makes the 1
 _ 
constraint policy to choose a., if the other player coimits himself to 
Í5. ). 
The α-enforcing i-commitment models a choice behavior with the 
following features: 
1. if player j makes the c-enforcing j-metaconmitment, i makes the 
commitment ία.) ; 
2. if player j does not make the α-enforcing j-metacoimd.tment, 
i makes the commitment A. and chooses within this the strategy 
a. which results in an outcome a that is less preferred by j than 
a, that is a'e M.a . 
J 
This latter policy is called an a-enforcing i-metapolicy. 
Now it follows that if each player i chooses a metastrategy 
(2) (2) (2} 
(p. 'f: ' ) , where p. is the a-enforcing i-metacommitment and 
(2) 
f. is an α-enforcing i-metapolicy, the result is an equilibrium 1
 2 
of the full metagame that yields a. 
4.5. A test of Howard's Theory. 
Experimental tests on the theory of "special games" have 
already been performed by a number of researchers. See for example 
Howard (1970), Thomas (1973, 1974) and Hildebrand (1973). 
A detailed description on how to design and conduct (special) 
metagame-experiments is given by Thomas (1974). All of these 
experiments apply to two person gaines where the strategy of the 
opponent is fully predictable. So far no experiments on general meta-
games are known. 
The theory of metagames is a theory on stable outcomes in 
games. It is based on some assumptions about the decision-making 
process which precedes the actual choices of the players in the 
game. A stable outcome is an outcome anticipated by each player, 
i.e. an outcome that is determined by each player's individual 
choice and each player's individual prediction. 
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Io test the theory on general netagames an "extended" Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game (bPDG) was constructed. ІЪіз 4*4-game is identical to a 
usual PDG except that the basic outcomes of PDG are replaced with 2*2-
sub-garacs (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 
S2 
« . ,— 
(l4,14) 
пз. іо) 
Θ 
16,1 
(Jo, i s 
Θ 
Θ 
12,3 
Θ 
Θ 
Θ 
3,2 
1,16 
3,12 
2,8 
© 
"Extended" Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The number pairs in 
each cell indicate ordinal preferences - higher 'pay-offs' 
being more preferred. 
Each player's strategy set in this game consists of four elements, 
w, x , y , and -, with у and ζ dominant over ь and x , respectively. 
In the "rational" quadrant, which is formed by the strategies у and 
ζ of both players, each outcome is less preferred than any outcome 
in the "cooperative" quadrant, ivhich is formed by the strategies 
ω and χ of both players. Each subgame, in which j or ¿ is chosen by 
at least one player, is a usual PDG. 
If the game is played as a 4*4-game (i.e. each player chooses 
one strategy directly from his strategy set), there are 10 sanctionablc 
outcomes (the circled outcomes m Table 4.7). Hoi ever, if the game 
is played in two stages (i.e. first choose a subgame and then choose 
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a strategy in this subgame), the picture changes. 
The major problem in designing an experiment on general metagames 
is to determine empirically the (non-observable) metastrategies of the 
players. "Choosing" a policy from a one-element commitment in the full 
metagame of PDG may seem absurd, when doing it consciously. However, 
choosing a policy from a two-element commitment is not. Playing EPDG 
as described in the last paragraph is similar to playing in the full 
metagame of PDG, when J is replaced with w and z, and d is replaced 
with y and г (Table 4.7). Considering the EPDG as a PDG with subgames 
as the basic outcomes, it is seen that the "rational" quadrant is an 
equilibrium subgame and the "cooperative" quadrant is a sanctionable 
subgame. Through the EPDG we are able to have subjects play the full 
metagame of the PDG without them being aware of it. 
4.5.1. hypotheses. 
1. According to Howard the stable outcomes, that is the outcomes 
the players will agree upon, are sanctionable outcomes. 
For the PDG this means, that (ce) and (dd) are possible 
stable outcomes. 
2. A sanctionable outcome a is attained by each player i choosing 
an element from the â-enforcing i-netacommitment. In the PDC the 
(i^)-enforcing i-metacommitment consists of the following 
metastrategies: 
- {^}, ¿/-A* 
- {· , J), '/αΛ> 
- {о , i), .-/a/d 
In the latter two metastrategies player i chooses a if the other 
player commits himself to { ^  } and i chooses d if the other player 
commits himself to { d } . Thus, when player i makes the "empty" 
commitment, i.e. { c,d }, he promises to use his sanction against the 
other player j for not making the (v)-enforcing j-metaconmitment. 
By the same line of reasoning we find that the (dd)-enforcing 
i-metaconmitment consists of the metastrategies: 
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-id), dl did 
- U , d), dldle 
- {e , d}, d/d/d. 
4.5.2. Experimental procedure 
The theory of metagames asserts that a certain prediction will be 
confirmed in all cases: a single substantiated counterexample suffices 
to overthrow the theory (Thomas, 1974, p. 75). As a consequence, 
mctagame experiments are completely deterministic in nature. By this 
we mean that the aim of metagame experiments is to obtain a falsifica­
tion of the theory, if such falsification can be found. In contrast, 
probabilistic or statistical experiments are concerned with seeking 
probabilistic estimates of the validity of a theory. One of the main 
principles in designing deterministic experiments is to find a proce­
dure that evokes the behavior about which assertions are being made. 
Seven groups of 4 subject in each participated in the experiment. 
These 28 subjects were all undergraduate university students. 
The four subjects in each c r o uP a r e denoted I, J, K, and M. 
First instructions were given to I and J by one experimenter and to К 
and M by a second experimenter. During the instruction I and J were 
kept separated from К and M. 
To ensure that the subjects understood the game they played a 
practice game against each other (i.e. I against J, and К against Μ ) , 
till both they and the experimenter were satisfied on that count. Du­
ring practising the players could communicate freely with the experi­
menter about the rules of the game. 
The practice game as well as the actual game were similar to the 
game shown in Table 4.7 in that the outcomes were assigned monetary 
payoffs in the same order of magnitude as the numbers in the EPDG of 
Table 4.7. This was to make sure that the players had the same prefe­
rences as assigned to the outcomes in the EPDG. The monetary payoffs 
differed for the practice game and the actual game. The payoff matrix 
of the actual game is displayed in Table 4.8. 
After instruction the actual game was played against a different sub­
ject, that is I played against К and J played against M. Opponents in 
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the actual game did not know each other. They were kept separated from 
each other and were not allowed to coimunicate with each other. They 
were told that theip· objective should be to make money for themselves. 
Earnings from the actual game would be payed. 
Table 4.8 Payoff matrix of the experiment. The payoffs are in Dutch 
Guilders and cents. 
The players of the game were indicated as "Red" and "Blue". 
Blue 
W Χ Υ Ζ 
A procedure was set up to evoke the behavior about which 
assertions are made in the theory of general metagames and which were 
to be tested. As outlined above the EPDG of Table 4.8 was played such 
as to make possible an experimental determination of the meta-
strategies of the players. 
The game was played in two stages: 
1. choose a subset from the set of choice alternative, 
2. select from this subset a strategy to each possible subset of 
the other player. 
The following instruction was given to the subjects. 
"To help you in making your choioe of an alternative 
we shall proceed in tuo steps. Your choice will be 
determined by answering two questions. 
Although you can make a choioe from 4 alterna­
tives, w, χ, y and 3j it may be possible, that you 
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exalude one or two аііетагг ео in advanee. 
Question 1. From uhioh alternatives are you 
going to choose a strategy? 
| | from w and χ only 
| | from y and ζ only 
| | from w, x, y and ζ. 
Answer question ?, only, after you answered question 1! 
Question 2. From the alternatives indicated under question 1 
I choose 
if the other subject chooses a strategy from 
w and χ only 
if the other subjeot chooses a strategy from 
y and ζ only 
if the other subject chooses a strategy from 
ω, χ, y and ζ. 
The answer to question 1 determines a commitment, and the answer to 
question 2 is a policy. The (commitment, policy) pairs, or meta-
strategies, of both players yield together an outcome of the game. 
Subjects wrote down their answers, that is their metastrategies, 
without knowing wath the other player had chosen or was going to 
choose. 
After the experimenter had received the notes containing each 
player's metastrategy he announced the commitments made, that is the 
subsets chosen under question 1, and the outcome resulting from the 
(coranitment, policy) pairs of the players. The experimenter then 
asked each player to indicate in writing whether he (i.e. the player) 
would like to end the game and being paid according to the payoff of 
the last outcome or whether he would like to continue the game and try 
to inprove his payoff. As long as at least one player wanted to 
continue the game the whole procedure as described above was repeated. 
When both players decided to end the game, they were paid accor­
ding to the payoff of the last outcome. 
4.S.3. Results 
Table 4.9 shows the "raw" stable outcomes of 26 subjects, that is 
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the outcomes in the EPDG which were attained when both players decided 
to end the game. The results of one pair of subjects are omitted, 
because they did not adhere to the instructions of the experimenter 
and communicated with each other. 
Table 4.9 Stable outcomes in the Extended Prisoner's Dilemma Game for 
13 pairs of subjects, "dlzlui" means: choose ώ when the 
other player makes the commitment {¿..r}, choose ζ when the 
other player makes the commitment {i/,.i}, and choose J when 
the other player makes the commitment {У,.Е,!/,Я}. 
p a i r of 
s u b j e c t s 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Red's m e t a s t r a t e g y 
commitment 
{u,x,i/,z} 
{u.a·} 
{ω,ж} 
t u , χ } 
{ω,χ,!/,г) 
{ω,χ} 
{ω,χ} 
{ω,χ,у,ζ) 
{u,x,y,z} 
{ω,χ} 
{ω,χ} 
{ы,х,у,г} 
{w,x,y,z} 
p o l i c y 
wlzlw 
χ / χ / χ 
w /χ /w 
w/w/w 
x/z/u 
ω/χ/ω 
ω/χ/ω 
ζ/ζ/ω 
wlylw 
w/xlw 
ω/χ/ω 
wlz/x 
wlzlw 
B l u e ' s m e t a s t r a t e g y 
commitment 
{ω,χ} 
{w,x,y,z} 
{w,x,y,zì 
{w,x,y,z} 
{ω,χ} 
ω , χ } 
{w,x,y,z} 
ih. 2} 
ί ω , χ } 
[u,x,y,z} 
{w,x,y,z} 
{u,x} 
{w,x} 
p o l i c y 
ω/ω/ω 
x/zlz 
wly/w 
x/z/z 
ω/χ/ω 
w/xlw 
wlylw 
ylzlz 
w /χ/ω 
w/zlw 
wlzlw 
ω/χ/ω 
w/xlw 
Outcome 
(wu) 
(XX) 
(wu) 
(их) 
(χω) 
(¡Λ)) 
(ωω) 
( ζ ζ ) 
(ωω) 
(ωω) 
(ωω) 
(ωω) 
(ωω) 
It was found that 12 out of 13 pairs of players "settled" in the 
"cooperative" quadrant. 
The coranitments the players could make were {и, x}, {y, z) and 
ίω, χ, у, ζ). These are not all possible commitments in a full meta-
game. However, if we "lump" ω and .r to a, and у and ζ to d, we have 
all commitments in the full metagame of a Prisoner's Dilemna Game: 
{<-}, {<!}, {c,d). 
Table 4.10 shows the experimental results after this lumping. 
From Table 4.10 it can be seen, that (ce) and (dd), the sanctionable 
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outcomes in PDG, are the stable outcomes in the game. 
Table 4.10 Stable outcomes with the Extended PDG after "lumping" 
¡j and χ into c, and y and ζ into d. 
Pair of 
subjects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Red's metastrategy 
commitment policy 
icd) 
ic] 
{c} 
ic] 
{o,d} 
{c} 
{e} 
{c,d} 
{cyd) 
{ci 
{с} 
{c,d} 
{c,d) 
a/d/a 
c/o/c 
a/e/o 
o/c/c 
c/d/c 
ala/a 
alala 
dldla 
aldla 
ala/a 
alalo 
aid/a 
aldla 
Blue's raetastrategy 
commitment policy 
{e} 
{c,d} 
{α,άλ 
íc.d} 
Ы 
{c} 
{e,d} 
id} 
{c} 
{o,d} 
{c,d} 
ic} 
{
c
} 
alala 
aldld 
ald/a 
ald/d 
a/ola 
a/ala 
a/did 
dld/d 
alalo 
o/dia 
aldla 
а/а/а 
ala/a 
Outcome 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
idd) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ice) 
ico) 
It is interesting to see under which metastrategies subjects 
arrived at (cc) and then decided to end the game, that is under which 
metastrategies stability was attained at ( c ) . 
In Table 4.11 a simmary of the metastrategies which were chosen when 
stability was attained at ice), is given. 
Table 4.11 Summary of the metastrategies under the (cc)-enforcing 
metacommitments when stability was reached. 
commitment 
{e} 
{e,d} 
{e,d} 
policy 
c/c/c 
a/d/a 
c/d/d 
frequency 
13 
9 
2 
n=24 
It appears that all subjects, when reaching stability at ice), had 
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chosen an element from the OeJ-enforcing i-metacommitment, although 
there are more metastrategies which can yield (ce) (see Table 4.5). 
One pair of subjects settled at (dd). They continued the game 
for ten trials before both players decided to end the game (the 
average number of trials for the other pairs of subjects was 3.25). 
"Red" set out with the (coimiitment, policy)-pair [ {a, d], cildh] and 
"Blue" with [ {a, d), d/d/di . This yielded (ed). Then, seven trials 
followed where Red continously chose [ {«}, cla/o] and Blue chose 
[ id), d/d/d] or [ {a, d}, d/d/d] . So, all the the time the outcome of 
the game was (ed), which was unsatisfying to Red, who was choosing an 
element from the (ac)-enforcing metacommitment, while Blue persisted 
in obviously the (dd)-enforcing metacoimitment. 
On the nineth trial Blue switched to [ {ad}, a/d/d], and since 
Red still chose [{a}, a/c/e], this yielded (ca). 
This outcome satisfied Red, but now it was Blue, who did not want to 
end the game. On the tenth trial Blue returned to the "rational" 
metastrategy [{d}, d/d/d) and Red, clearly getting annoyed, chose 
[ (c, d}, d/d/a] . Then both players decided to end the game. 
4.6 Discussion 
The theory of metagames is a theory about stable outcomes. The 
predictions made by general metagame theory were not falsified in our 
experiment. First, all pairs of subjects, reached stability at a 
sanctionable outcome and, second, sanctionable outcomes a were 
attained by each player i choosing an element from the ä-enforcing 
i-metacommitment. 
It is not very surprising that most pairs of subjects settled at 
(aa), since the game was continued until both subjects were satisfied. 
As such, these "games with certainty" were not very informative. 
More important are the metastrategies through which stability was 
attained, that is through the subjects choosing elements from the 
(aa)-enforcing metacoimitment and the (dd)-enforcing metacommitment 
respectively 
The significance of metagame theory does not lie in its power 
to predict the stable outcomes, but in the way the decision making 
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process in modelled as a cognitive process of beliefs [predictions) 
and choosing policies. 
Discrepancies which are so often found in nonzero-sum games, like 
PDG, between actual behavior and the prescriptions of classical game 
theory, are deviations from rational behavior, i.e. by introducing 
metarationality, Howard has formalized these kinds of "deviant" 
behavior, which are often labeled with attitudinal epithets as 
cooperation, altruism, competitiveness, etcetera. Cooperative behavior 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is no longer irrational behavior. 
In iterated plays of a game stability of behavior is often found 
when subjects absorb or "lock-in" at certain outcomes. In iterated 
plays of PDG it is found (see for example Rapoport and Chammah, 196S) 
that most pairs of players lock-in at (Jd) or (cc). Thus, in PDG 
subjects' behavior stabilizes or absorbs into sanctionable outcomes or 
metaequilibria of the game. 
The experiment reported in this paper was an attempt to test some 
predictions of general metagame theory and to have the players made 
explicit their commitments and policies. So far no other experimental 
tests on general metagame theory are known to the author. Although 
the approach seems useful to determine empirically the metastrategies 
of the players, if has to be developed further. For example, one might 
wish to extend this approach to multi-person games, or to games with 
uncertainty to see how metastrategies, that is beliefs and policies, 
change in the course of interaction under risk. 
Another major question concerns the exact nature of commitments 
and metacoimitments. Although theoretically the number of metastrate-
gies is large (see Table 4.6), it might be that the number of meta-
strategies actually chosen in a game, is restricted and that these 
metastrategies can be arranged in classes reflecting certain social 
orientations between the players. A similar idea was already launched 
by Bums and Meeker (1973), who assume that "... sooial orientations 
operate as metaproaesses to tran form preferences, decision procedures, 
and interaction patterns" (p. 159). 
A final note concerns the method of experimentation. The 
validity of the experimental results and their interpretation stands 
or falls with the way the game is perceived by the players. That is, 
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do the players understand the game and do they have the preferences 
that the experimenter wishes them to have? 
Understanding the game means knowing the rules of the game and 
knowing what each player's possible choices of strategies are. 
To accomplish this the practice game was introduced, which was similar 
to the actual game in all respects but for the monetary payoff 
magnitudes. 
Players' preferences can be contaminated in many ways. Several 
steps were taken to exclude this source of experimental error. 
First, to prevent contamination due to effects of learning and 
experience, players never practised with anyone who was also an 
opponent in the actual game. Second, to prevent contamination due to 
altruism, players in the actual game were isolated from each other 
throughout the experiment. Third, as already mentioned, outcomes were 
assigned monetary payoffs in the same order of magnitude as the order 
of preferences assigned by the experimenter. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of payoffs were chosen such as to yield 
differences meaningful to the subjects. 
The results of Table 4.10 could be criticized as the result of 
still another kind of preference contamination. With respect to the 
occurrence of (<з<0 i n 12 out of 13 cases it could be argued that all 
pairs of players except one had interpreted the task as a zero-sum 
game with the pair of subjects as one player and the experimenter as 
the opponent. The objective would have been to naxinize to joint gain. 
Two arguments can be brought in against such a critisisn. First, in the 
instruction subjects were told to choose such as to make money for 
themselves. Second, from Table 4.11 it appears that about half of the 
subjects had chosen a metastrategy under the (cv)~enforcing meta-
commitment with a policy in wich d is chosen when the opponent does 
not make the {rO-commitment. This is non-optimal when both players 
try to maximize their joint payoff. This result does not support the 
hypothesis of a "conspiracy against the experimenter". 
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Appendix 
We prove here, that a non-sanctionable outcome in G is not an 
equilibrium in ',. 
If M is the relation lot preferred by t , then Й is the rela­
tion preferred by i·. In any ordinal game the relation TA^ is transitive. 
(Howard, 1971, p. 71-72). 
1. If (a = (a., a.) is not an equilibrium in J, there exists for some 
player ι a strategy a ', with a ' f 'ι , such that (a !, a ) is 
preferred by ι to л. : 
3 a^ : (a^, a ) e J?i a 
2. If a = (a., a.) is not sanctionable in ^, there exists for some 
player ι a strategy a', with σ' ?* ä , such that for any a the 
outcome (a', a ) is preferred by ι to a. 
3a' V a : (a', a ) e p a =*3a' = {a , a ) & M a 
3. brom CO and (2) it can be seen, that "not sanctionable" implies 
"not an equilibrium". Q.e.d. 
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Chapter 5: A dual Markov chain for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, with 
three latent states 
5.1. Introduction 
Although several authors have stressed the importance of players' 
motivational orientation toward the game situation as determinants of 
their (i.e. the players') behavior (Morehous, 1966; McClintock and 
McNeel, 1966; Messick and McClintock, 1968; Ofshe and Ofshe, 1970; 
Pruitt, 1970; Wyer, 1971; Bums and Meeker, 1973; Kuhlman and 
Marchello, 1975), this has not resulted yet in process models which 
describe the time course of interaction as a result of the relation 
between latent characteristics of the players and their manifest 
behavior. 
According to metagame theory (Howard, 1966, 1971) the 
sanctionable outcomes of a game can be stable (Howard, 1976). This 
was discussed in detail in the last chapter. Remember, that a 
sanctionable outcome in a two-person game is an outcome such that for 
any player there exists a strategy of the other player that, if imple-
mented, would quarantee that the former player could not do better 
than he does at this (sanctionable) outcome. In the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game (PDG) (see Table 2.1) the outcomes (ce) and (dd) are 
sanctionable. 
According to general metagame theory (Howard, 1976) stability 
is attained through subjects choosing metastrategies consisting of a 
(commitment, policy) pair. A commitment was defined in chapter 4 as 
a subset of a player's strategy set which he chooses himself as a 
constraint. A policy was defined as a function from the possible 
commitments of the other player to the strategies within the own 
coninitment. By means of the propositions of the theory of metagames 
possible equilibria, in the sense of stable outcomes, are derived for 
any game. This can also be applied to games with repeated plays. It 
has been pointed out already that the theory of metagames reached 
"solutions" which are not given by classical game theory. Experiments 
of Howard (1971), Thomas (1973, 1974), Hildebrand (1973) and Van der 
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Sonden (1979) (see also last chapter) have demonstrated that subjects 
in experimental games do behave according to the predictions of meta-
game theory. 
There is a similarity between Hcnvard's metastrategies and the 
concept of value states as applied by Meeker (1971), Leik and Meeker 
(1975, chapter 10) and Van der Sanden (1978; see also charter 2). 
A value state and a metastrategy both have to do with the subjective 
principle of justice (subjective rationality or metarationality m 
Howard's terms) of a player with regard to his most desirable behavior. 
Meeker's value conflict model has provided a way of analyzing the 
process of decision making of subjects m iterated plays of nonzero-
sum games such as Prisoner's Dilemma. Meeker's approach was concerned 
in the underlying structure of interaction in a conflict and the 
dynamic relation between the latent behavior (a subject's motivational 
orientation or his value state) and the manifest behavior, i.e. 
observable choice behavior. 
The experiments of Meeker and Van der Sanden both applied only 
to conflict situations, where the subject's opponent was a 
preprogrammed stooge. Before a "value state" model can be applied to 
a "free" interaction, the orginal model of Meeker should be revised. 
Meeker's latent Markov model will have to be expanded with absorbing 
states representing the states which the players occupy when their 
behavior becomes "absorbed" permanently, that is stabilizes, in a 
specific outcome of the game. The nature and the number of these 
states are derived from Howard's theory of metagames. 
Rapoport and Dale (1966) have evaluated five models for behavior 
in the PDG with respect to their efficiency to describe the observed 
time course of outcomes in this game over a great number of trials. 
Three of their models were Markov chain models for the observed out­
comes. It appeared that Markov chain models which are based 
exclusively on the observable behavior, showed the greatest 
discrepancies between predicted and observed time courses of their 
data. Rapoport and Dale gave as their comment. "... WP feel SnaL the 
[ ... ] ivo iels do not aitare the ^.упапгсь of Ine p^o^gos arci nust be 
disaar-dpc?' (1966, p. 285). 
The two models, which were satisfying, were a Markov chain model 
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with absorbing states, which shows great resemblance with Cohen's 
conflict model as applied in his conformity experiments (Cohen, 1963), 
and a stochastic learning model with linear operators according to 
Bush and Mosteller (1955) and Estes (1950) for the response parameter. 
The models of Rapoport and Dale were conpared on their 
descriptive power of observed behavior sequences of male and female 
pairs of players in the PDG. The latter two models suffered from the 
disadvantage that: 
1. the number of parameters were too large, and therefore 
2. a procedure for estimating the parameters was lacking. 
The parameters which fitted the data best, for the various models 
were found through a method of trial-and-error. 
The aim of this chapter is to present and to evaluate a 
mathematical model which describes the choice behavior of a subject 
in a PDG played over many plays in succession and which is based on 
theoretical concepts from Howard's theory of metagames and the "value 
state" approach proposed by Meeker. 
The main characteristics of this model are: 
1. the behavior of each player is described by a Markov model with 
states not observable over plays, a so-called latent Markov chain 
model, 
2. the two-player system is represented as a finite probabilistic 
automaton, 
3. the parameters of this automaton are estimated through a maximum 
likelihood procedure, 
4. with the parameters different unobservable quantities can be 
computed, such as the average number of trials to absorption, the 
variance of this variable, the probability distribution over the 
final states of the automaton. 
5.2. LAMARC, a latent Markov chain model 
'IVro subjects, S. and S 2, play the PDG a great number of times in 
succession. After each play the outcome is announced before the next 
play. It is assumed that on each play η (η = 1, 2, ...) of the game 
each subject is in exactly one of a set of latent states. Each latent 
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state is characterized by a subject's expectation of his own behavior 
and his expectation of the behavior of the other player. These latent 
states are called value states, since they represent the norms or 
values of the subject with regard to his most desirable behavior on 
te next play. A subject's responses or strategy-choices on each play are 
dependent upon the outcomes of the game on earlier plays and upon the 
value states. 
Definition 1: Let A. be the set of strategies for S. (i - 1, 2). In the 
PDG these strategies are denoted as a and d. 
(see Table 2.1): Thus, A. = {a, d} for each 
S. (i = 1, 2). 
Definition 2: Let A be the set of outcomes of the game. A is defined 
as the Cartesian product of the sets of strategies. 
Thus, A - A χ A1 = {(oc), (od), (do), (dd)}. 
Definition 3: Let V. be the set of value states for S.. It has three 
ι ι 
elements: 7. = [v\, i>2· УЗІ· 
A subject in state U] expects the other player to choose 
a and also himself to choose с on the next play. It is 
called the "cooperative state". 
A subject in state i>2 neither knows what to expect from 
the other player nor has conmitted himself to с or d for 
the next play. It is called the "transitional state". 
A subject in state vj expects the other player to choose 
d and also himself to choose d on the next play. It is 
called the "rational state". 
The above-mentioned definitions are the basis for the following 
response axioms. 
Response axioms 
Rl: When S. (1 = I, 2) is in state υ ι, he will choose с on the 
next play with probability 1. 
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R2: When S. (i = 1, 2) is in state г>2, he will choose a on the 
next play with probaliblity π.. 
R3: When S. (i = 1, 2) is in state v^, he will choose d on the 
next play with probability 1. 
The conditional choice probabilities which follow from these axioms 
are sumnarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Conditional choice-probabilities for one subject 
• 
υ
ι 
V2 
υ 3 
s t r a t 
a 
1. 
1 
0 . 
eg l e s 
d 
0. 
1-π. 
1 
1. 
value 
states 
A subject enters a value state as the result of his value state 
on the preceding play and the outcome of the preceding play. 
If a subject is in u. and the last outcome was asymmetric, i.e. 
(od) or (do), he will be in υ» on the next play as well. The transi­
tion from 1)2 to ν | is possible only inmediately after a double-
cooperating outcome, i.e. (cc). The transition from 1^2 to υ 3 is 
possible onlv ijranediately after a double-defecting outcome, i.e. (dd). 
If S. (i = l, 2) is in V p he will continue to be in Vj as long 
as (00) is chosen. Otherwise he will be in v. on the next play with 
probability ß. and in υ . with probability (I - β.). 
If S. (i = 1, 2) is in υ,, he will continue to be in У3 as long 
as (dd) is chosen. Otherwise he will be in υ2 on the next play with 
probability γ. and in υ» with probability (l - γ.)· 
One-step stransitions from υ to υ, and from υ, to ν are 
excluded. 
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Transition axioms (see Figure 5.1a): 
Tía: If S. (i = 1, 2) occupies v. on play η and both players 
choose с jn play n, S. will continue to be in ν on play 
η + 1 with probability 1. 
Tib: If S. (i = 1, 2) occupies v. on play η and the other player 
chooses d on play n, S. will be in v. with probability 8· 
and in ν with probability 1 - β on play η + 1. 
T2a: If S. (i = 1, 2) occupies v2 on play η and both players choose с 
on play n, S^ ^ will be in υ with probability a. and in υ with 
probability 1 - α. on play η + 1. 
T2b: If S. (i = 1, 2) occupies υ- on play η and the outcome on 
play η is (ad) or (do), S. will continue to be in v. on 
play η + 1 with probability I. 
T2c: If S. (i = ], 2) occupies v2 on play η and both players 
choose d on play n, S. will be in y. with probability S. and 
in v7 with probability 1 - S. on play η + 1. 
ТЗа: If S. (i = ι, 2) occupies У, on play η and both players 
choose d on play n, S. will continue to be in v, on play 
η + 1 with probability 1. 
T3b: If s. (i = 1, 2) occupies i»3 on play η and the other player 
chooses e on play n, S. will be in υ. with probability γ. 
and in v. with probability 1 - γ. on play η + 1. 
Briefly formulated, the parameters can be given the following 
meaning: 
a: the tendency to move into the cooperative state, у , after a 
cooperative reciprocation fron the other player. 
the tendency to move away from the cooperative sta 
after a defective response from the other player. 
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γ: the tendency to move away frem the rational state, υ., after 
a cooperative response from the other player. 
6: the tendency to move into the rational state, t>3, after a 
defective reciprocation from the other player. 
These transition axioms define for each individual player and for 
each outcome a matrix of transition probabilities between the value 
states. These matrices are indicated as Щос), ЩЫ), M(iic), and M(Jd). 
For example, M(^d) stands for the transition matrix for S., where S. 
had chosen с and the other player d. These transition matrices are 
given in Table 5.2. 
It is assumed that each subject begins the sequence of plays in 
г>-, the transitional state. According to this assumption and the 
above-mentioned response- and transition-axioms a subject playing in 
the PDG can be viewed as a probabilistic finite autonaton (Paz, 1971). 
That is, a subject S. in the PDG is defined as a system (J., A , M, 
(0, 1,0), {üj Vj}), where 
/. = the finite set of value states, 
ι ' 
A = the finite set of inputs, 
M = the set of transition matrices, 
(0,1,0) = the initial probability distribution of the value states, 
{v.,υ A = the set of final states. 
By the two players of the PDG acting as two automatons a two-
actor system is defined, which is an absorbing Markov chain on the 
ordered pairs of value states of the players. This model is called 
LAMARC. 
The states of LAMARC are elements from the product-set V χ V-. 
From the assumption that S and S. occupy y. on play 1 and from the 
axioms for the single automatoms it follows that LAMARC has 7 (not 9) 
states. The states are indicated as ordered pairs, where the first 
symbol represents S 's value state, and the second symbol S 's value 
state. 
The states (г>. ν J and < υ, υ > are excluded, since they can never be 
entered (as is easy to see). So, 7 latent states remain for LAMARC. 
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Table 5.2 Set of individual (conditional) transition matrices 
Strictly speaking, for each outcome transition proba­
bilities are defined for only two value states. That 
is, neither in MCcc) and M(od) transition probabili­
ties for υ, are defined, nor are transition 
probabilities defined for υ. in M(cfc) and M(dd). 
However, for practical reasons (for instance the 
pooling of outcome-specific transition matrices in 
order to compute the aver-all transition matrix) all 
value states are entered in each transition matrix. 
Since Prob (d|v.) = 0 and Prob (σ|υ,) - 0 the added 
rows and columns act as dummies. 
y i 
y 2 
"З 
υ
ι 
1. 
a i 
0. 
v2 
0. 
1
-°i 
0. 
y 3 
0. 
0. 
1. 
v ] 
v2 
u 3 
"1 
1-6, 
1 
0. 
0. 
v2 
^ 1 
1. 
0. 
y 3 
0 
0. 
1. 
1) M(cc) 2) M(cd) 
υ
ι 
V2 
У 3 
У ] 
1. 
0. 
0. 
v2 
0. 
1. 
Y i 
υ 3 
0. 
0. 
I-Vi 
v\ 
v2 
v3 
"1 
1. 
0. 
0. 
v2 
0. 
і -в і 
0. 
" 3 
0. 
&. 
1 
1. 
3) M(dc) 4) M(dd) 
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Table 5.3 shows the conditional outcome probabilities for LAMARC 
Table 5.3. Conditional outcome probabilities 
(г,, ν, > 
< ¿J| D 2 > 
< V2 vl ) 
< i>2 U j > 
( „ 2 из > 
( »3 U2 > 
< H3 ^ з > 
(ее) 
1 
π
 2 
" Ι 
" ι " ζ 
0 
0 
0 
(ad) 
0 
(1 - π2) 
0 
"1(1 - Tl) 
" I 
0 
0 
(de) 
0 
0 
(i -
(1 -
0 
π ? 
0 
πι) 
пЬг 
(¿О 
0 
0 
0 
(1 - * ι ) ( 1 • 
(1 - "1) 
(1 - π2) 
1 
- "2) 
Estimation of the parameters will be performed on massed data of 
a number of players (from a homogeneous population), Therefore, it is 
assumed that players have identical parameters.1) Figure S.la and 5.1b 
give transition diagrams of LAMARC after having dropped the subscripts 
1) Generally, this assumption is unwarranted (see chapter 3). If the 
data which are pooled are taken from a homogeneous population, this 
assumption is plausible. As a measure for the homogeneity of the 
population one can take the variance of the observed outcomes. 
As we shall see (section 5.3), the data used to evaluate LAMARC 
showed very small variances for the observed outcomes and there­
fore can be regarded as being taken from a homogeneous population. 
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<2f- Z3S> 
Figure 5.1a: Dual latent states (circles) and response outcomes (hexagons), with response-probabilities 
and transition probabilities. This figure illustrates tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Figure 5.lb 
is the condensation of this figure. 
тг(1-о) + (1-іг)(І-В) π(|-γ)+(1-π)(]-δ) 
τΓ(1-α) + (1-π)(Ι-β) 
π(Ι-γ)+(1-π)(1-6) 
Figure 5.Ib: Transition diagram for LAMARC. The final states, which are also 
absorbing are double-circled. 
Table 5.4 Matrix of expected transition probabilities for LAMARC 
" l " l > 
" l V 2 > 
V2V\> 
y2 V 
v2 ъ ) 
υ
ΐ
υ 2 } 
^ ^ 
< ν , „ , > 
1 
πα 
ira 
2 2 
0 
0 
0 
< " i V 
0 
ir(1-o) + 
( i -»)( i -ß) 
0 
7 Γ 2 ( 1 - ( χ ) α 
0 
0 
0 
< V2 
0 
0 
« C I -
CI-π 
*
2 ( 1 
0 
0 
0 
У 1 
α) + 
) ( ΐ -
) 
• β ) 
- α ) α 
< ν2 ν2 > 
0 
(1-Oe 
(1-Ое 
π
2 ( 1 - α ) 2 + 2 π ( 1 -
( ΐ -
π
) 2 ( ΐ - ί ) 2 
πγ 
πγ 
0 
- 0 + 
< υ 
0 
0 
0 
(1-7 
" ( 1 
г ъ 
0 2 ( 1 
- γ ) + 
(ΐ-τοα-
0 
0 
- 6 ) 5 
« 
< υ 3 " 2 > 
0 
0 
0 
( 1 - π ) 2 ( 1 - ί ) δ 
0 
( 1 - 0 ( 1 - 5 ) 
0 
< ϋ 3 " 3 > 
0 
0 
0 
( 1 - π ) 2 δ 2 
(1-π)δ 
(1-π)6 
1 
A subj eet enters a value state, υ., as the result of his value 
state, v.,, on the preceding play and the input, α ε A, i.e. the 
outcome of the game, on the preceding play: v. « £(^.,,3). A similar 
rule holds for the two-player system LAMARC. The expectation of the 
transition probabilities as indicated in Figure 5.1b are weighted 
sums (weighted by the conditional outcome probabilities) of the 
outcome-specific transition probabilities. In Table 5.4 the 
expectations of the transition probabilities from Figure 5.1b are 
repeated in matrix form. 
If solutions for the parameters of LAMARC are known, expected 
values can be computed for several non-observable quantities, such as 
the mean number of plays until absorption is reached in one of the 
final states, i.e. the mean number of plays until stability is reached, 
the probability distribution of the absorbing states, etc. The deri­
vation of these statistics is adopted from Snell (1965). 
After rearranging the states in Table 5.4 the transition matrix 
of LAMARC is put in the form. 
absorbing states 
W = 
transient states R 
(5.1) 
The entries of the matrix R give the probabilities of moving from 
the transient states into the absorbing states in one step. The 
entries of Q give the probabilities of moving in one step from a 
transient state to the other transient states. The matrix I is the 
identity matrix of dimension equal to the number of absorbing states, 
and 0 is the matrix of all O's with the number of rows equal to the 
number of absorbing states and the number of columns equal to the 
number of transient states. 
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The n-th power of W has the form: 
(5.2) 
,(n) 
The ij-th entry of Ъ^п' gives the probability that starting in 
the transient state i the process is absorbed in state j during the 
first η plays. These probabilities are nonincreasing and hence tend to 
a limiting value which is indicated as b.. (b.. J 0). 
The ij-th entry of Q n gives the probability that starting in 
the transient state i the chain is in the transient state j after η 
plays. Since the process is eventually absorbed, these probabilities 
must tend to 0. Thus matrix W" approaches a limiting matrix w of the 
form 
W* 
0 
0 
(5.3) 
The components of W n approach the corresponding components of w . 
B ^ can be written in the form 
B ^ = (I + Q + Q 2 + ... + QI1)R (5.4) 
A number of descriptive quantities for absorbing Markov chains 
is obtained by matrix operations on the so called fundamental matrix 
(Kemeny and Shell, 1960, p. 46). This is the matrix, where 
N I + Q + Q ¿ + 
k=0 
(5.5) 
that is, N is the matrix when the game is played an infinite number 
of times. 
It can be proved (see for example Kemeny and Shell, 1960), that 
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for η -» » 
В = NR (5.6) 
The entry b.. of В is the probability that starting in state i 
the process is eventually absorbed in state j. 
N is also the inverse of I - Q, that is 
N(I - Q) = (I - Q) N = I (5.7) 
The ij-th entry of N is the mean number of times that the process 
is ever in (the transient) state j (counting the initial state) when 
it is started in i. 
Let t be the number of plays to absorption, that is on the t-th 
play S. and S. arrive in ( ν v. > or in < υ. υ, ) . The distribution 
and moments of t, being a random variable, depend upon the starting 
state. The expected value of t when the process is started in state i 
is indicated as g. ' = E.[ t \. The vector g} -' gives the mean number 
of steps to absorption for each transient state as starting state. 
Thus q} ' gives the k-th moment for these numbers. This implies that 
£ ( υ = М, (5.8) 
where J_ is a column vector tfith all antries 1. 'Ilie element a- ' is 
the sum of the components of the i-th row of N. The k-th moment of t 
for starting state i is computed as 
0 0 = =• г ^ к і = s w. . E.\ ( t + 1 ) k ] 
j t rans ient ^ J j absorbing 1 J 
gW  Z [ t K ] = Σ w E.Ut * 1) K ]
 + Σ w 
^ i І-ТЯПЧІРТ Г 1 J J " ' ' • l l 
к , 
Σ w. . E.[ Σ (K)¿ml + Σ W. . 
j t rans ient 1 J J m=0 n l j absorbing ^ 
, k-1 . 
Σ ω.. E[ 1 + t + Σ ( K ) t m ] + Σ w. . 
j t rans ient 1 J m=1 m j absorbing 1 J 
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ι k
"
1
 ν 
= 1 + Σ ¿..E[t]+ Σ ω. . Σ C) E.ltm] i l i i πι i j transient J j transient J m=1 •' 
This can be wri t ten in vector form as 
£« = i + ^ +
 kz Ò Qe™ 
m-l 
(I - Q)^ = 1 + Σ ¿ ) Q7M 
m=1 
Since (I - Q)"1 = N, 
£ W = κ ( 1 + Σ ¿ ) (^ CmJ, (5>gD 
m=1 
This recursive equation has the following solution (Snell, 1965, 
p . 445). Let 
Cik.m) = Σ (-1) h + m Ö hk 
h=1 ]1 
Then 
, 0 0 = Σ (-1) k + m CCk.m) N " 1 ! (5.10) 
m=1 
It appears frcm (5.10) that all the moments of t can be found 
164 
through arithmetic operations on N. 
For example, it is found that 
£ ( 2 ) = N[2N - I] 1 (5.11) 
^ = i\[6N'2 - 6N + 1] 1 (5.12) 
¿^ = X[24N3 - 36N2 + 14N - I] 1 (5.13) 
The variance of t for initial state i is computed as 
(2)
 r (ікг gì -lel'] . 
The probability that t = η (η = 1, 2, ...) for the various 
transient states as starting states is given by the components of the 
vector 
Q11"1 R1_. (5.14) 
It was already mentioned that cumulative probabilities are given 
by B ^ (equation 5.4). 
5.3. A Test of LAMARC 
The model was evaluated with respect to the data reported in 
Rapoport and Dale (1966). Since no numerical data were reported , 
but only graphs of observed time courses, the 'Ïest-fitting" para-
meters for LAMARC were estimated by trial and error. Data for two 
populations, males and females, were reported and the aim of this 
evaluation was to see how adequate LAMARC was in describing the 
characteristic features of the data for both populations. Another 
question was how differences between the male and female populations 
were reflected in the "solutions" for the parameters of LAMARC and 
whether these differences were psychologically meaningful 
1) Inquiries about the raw data were made, but they were not available 
any more. 
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The data consisted of the protocols for 49 male pairs and 63 
female pairs of players drawn from games which were all of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma type but with different numerical payoffs. However, 
payoff matrices differed only by a multiplicative constant. Data from 
different games were combined, since otherwise the number of pairs 
from each population would have been too small to yield sufficiently 
stable data. Time courses over 300 plays were reported of c-choices, 
(co)-outcomes, and (cd + de)-outcomes. Also, the variances of the 
types of outcomes of the game were given. 
From the graphs reported in Rapoport and Dale (1966, p.279) 
numerical values of the data were estimated by eye. Then parameters 
for LAMARC were chosen to give a "best fit" in the sense that there 
was a minimum discrepancy between simulated time courses and the data. 
It was observed by Rapoport and Dale that for both populations 
a and d were chosen with equal frequencies on the first play. Therefore, 
as a first step in estimating the parameters, for both populations 
π was set at .5. In Table 5.5 the "solutions" of the parameters are 
given. 
Table 5.5. Estimates of the Parameters for the Rapoport-and-Dale 
Data 
men 
women 
π 
.5 
.5 
α 
.075 
.040 
0 
.950 
.950 
ϊ 
.900 
.940 
S 
.020 
.050 
Figures 5.2 - 5.7 show comparisons between observed time courses 
from the Rapoport-and-Dale study and those obtained from simulations 
of LAMARC with the parameters from Table 5.5. 
In general, the agreement between observed and simulated curves 
is fair. Comparisons for women are better, i.e. have a closer over -
all agreement between data and simulations, then for men. The 
simulated o-curve and (ed + do)-curve for men is too high. 
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of 49 male pairs and 49 pairs of simulated 
players for the time course of percentages of с 
choices per block of 15 successive plays. Dashed 
line: simulation; continuous line: data. 
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Figure 5.3. Comparisons of 49 male pairs and 49 pairs of 
simulated players for the time course of percentages 
of (ao) outcomes per block of 15 successive plays. 
Dashed line: simulation: continuous line: data. 
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of 49 male pairs and 49 pairs of 
simulated players for the time course of percentages 
of (cd + de) outcomes per block of 15 successive 
plays. Dashed line: simulation; continuous line: 
data. 
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Figure 5.5. Comparisons of 63 female pairs and 63 pairs 
simulated players for the time course of 
percentages of с choices per block of 15 successive 
plays. Dashed line: simulation; continuous line: 
data. 
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Figure 5.6. Comparisons of 63 female pairs and 63 pairs of 
simulated players for the time course of percentages 
of (ce) outcomes per block of 15 successive plays. 
Dashed line: simulation; continuous line: data. 
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Figure 5.7. Comparison of 63 female pairs and 63 pairs of 
simulated players for the time course of percentages 
of (ad + dc) outcomes per block on 15 successive 
plays. Dashed line: simulation; continuous line: 
data. 
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In Table 5.6a comparison is made between reported variances of 
the outcomes for both populations and the simulated players. It is 
found that there is a good agreement between observed and simulated 
variances with the comparisons for men having an advantage over those 
for women. 
Table 5.6. Comparison of variances from observed and simulated 
data for male and female pairs 
Men 
Women 
Observed 
Simulated 
Observed 
Simulated 
(ce) 
.110 
.080 
.071 
.070 
(ed) 
.007 
.008 
.009 
.010 
(de) 
.008 
.008 
.010 
.008 
(dd) 
.056 
.029 
.056 
.102 
From the observed time courses it is seen that women cooperate 
considerably less than men. How are these differences "explained" by 
parameters of LAMARC? 
Table 5.5 shows that the differences in behavior are reflected 
in different values for, a, y, and δ, while g is the same in men and 
women. 
It turns out that these differences range from .00 to .04. An 
explanation of these differences on statistical grounds cannot be 
given, since there is neither a measure of the goodness of fit, nor a 
measure of the significance for the differences found. Therefore, the 
following explanation does not claim any conclusive force, but instead 
is very tentative and is given by way of illustration. 
The "solutions" suggest that 
1. α, > a
s
: men decide more easily too cooperate after a double-
cooperating outcome, i.e. change more easily to the 
cooperative state; 
2. &„ > &.: women are more prone to defect after a double-defecting 
outcome, i.e. change more easily to the rational state; 
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3. Yo > y¿ '· women are more sensitive to unilateral cooperation by the 
other player, i.e. leave more easily the rational state. 
In general, all subjects tend strongly to move back from either 
of the "extreme" states (v. and lO into the "uncertain" state (w.) 
after an asymmetric outcome. From this it follows that 
- women are more likely to attain stability in (.dd) and less likely 
to attain stability in (ec) than men, 
- it takes more time (that is a greater number of plays) for women 
to attain stability than it takes for men. 
4. Since α > 6 for men and δ > α for women and η is equal for men and 
women, men will stabilize in (co) with probability greater than .5 
and women will stabilize in (dd) with probability greater than .5. 
The interpretation of the solutions for the parameters of LAMARC 
is illustrated with the descriptive quantities derived in the last 
section. With the solutions for the parameters expected transition 
matrices can be computed for men and wonen according to the formulas 
in Table 5.4. These matrices are given in Table 5.7. 
Rearrangement of the states in the expected transition matrices 
yield W according to equation (5.1). From W the submatrix Q is taken 
and the fundamental matrix N is computed as the inverse matrix of I-Q 
The fundamental matrices for male and female pairs are given in Table 
5.8. (The symmetries in N follow, of course, from the symietry of the 
two players). 
Women occupy the uncertein state < ν , ν J much more often than 
men, and are also more often in ( υ», υ, > or < y,, y» > than men are, 
which, of course, follows from the fact that the women change more 
easily between υ. and v. than the men do, whereas the men move more 
easily into υ.. 
According to the model the process will eventually absorb in one 
of the two final states, < υ v. > and < υ, υ. > . For the observable 
behavior this means that eventually the frequencies of (ed)- and (dc)-
174 
Table 5.7 Expected transition matrices of LAMARC for male and 
female pairs 
a) Men 
<>, V 
Ч 
Ч 
Ч 
Ч 
< , 3 , 2 > 
<*! V 
1. 
.0375 
.0375 
.0014 
.0 
.0 
.0 
< U
.
 υ 2 > 
.0 
.4875 
.0 
.0173 
.0 
.0 
.0 
(v2v[ 
.0 
.0 
.4875 
.0173 
.0 
.0 
.0 
<v2 V 
.0 
.4750 
.4750 
.9540 
.4500 
.4500 
.0 
< v 2 V 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0049 
.5400 
.0 
.0 
< уэ 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0049 
.0 
.5400 
.0 
<y3 V 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0001 
.0100 
.0100 
.1 
b) Women 
<υ
. V 
(ν, V 
iv2 V 
( , 2 , 2 > 
< У 2 3 ) 
< ϋ 3 υ 2 > 
<
" з з
> 
< » , „ , 
1. 
.0200 
.0200 
.0004 
.0 
.0 
.0 
< « I Ü 2 > 
.0 
.5050 
.0 
.0096 
.0 
.0 
.0 
<
 2 ] 
.0 
.0 
.5050 
.0096 
.0 
.0 
.0 
( v2 v2 > 
.0 
.4750 
.4750 
.9560 
.4700 
.4700 
.0 
<v2 V 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0119 
.5050 
.0 
.0 
<v¡v2> 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0119 
.0 
.5050 
.0 
^з 
.0 
.0 
.0 
.0006 
.0250 
.0250 
1. 
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outcomes will extinguish and that for massed data the proportions of 
(co) and (dd) will reach asymptotic values which equal the 
probabilities that the process is absorbed in ( и v. > and ( у у > . 
Table 5.8 Fundamental matrices of LAMARC for male and female 
pairs 
|< Vl U2> < V2 Vl> < V2 V2> < г>2 У·;) < ^з v¿ 
< v i υ?) 
< V2 Vl> 
< VZ V2> 
< V2 V3> 
< Ü 3 ,J2> 
9.318 
7.367 
7.949 
7.776 
7.776 
7.367 
9.318 
7.949 
7.776 
7.776 
217.694 
217.694 
234.880 
229.774 
229.774 
2.319 
2.319 
2.502 
4.622 
2.448 
2.319 
2.319 
2.502 
2.448 
4.622 
b) Women 
<W1 
< V 2 
<V2 
<V2 
<vs 
V2> 
vi> 
V2> 
y3> 
и2> 
< υ ι υ?> 
8.270 
6.250 
6.513 
6.184 
6.184 
< υ2 υ ι> 
6.250 
8.270 
6.513 
6.184 
6.184 
< ν2 
322.252 
322.252 
335.821 
318.860 
318.860 
< υ2 з> 
7.747 
7.747 
8.073 
9.686 
7.666 
< ν3 υ2> 
7.747 
7.747 
8.073 
7.666 
9.686 
This probability distribution over the absorbing states is found from 
the product В = MR (see equation 5.5). In В the probability 
distributions are given for all transient states as starting states. 
Since it is assumed that the process is started in < v. i>2 > , only the 
third row of В is relevant. The probability distributions of the final 
states of LAMARC for male and female pairs are given in Table 5.9. 
From Table 5.9 it appears that men are more likely to absorb in 
<u. υ. > (and consequently to "lock-in" at ec), and that women are 
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Table 5.9. Probability distributions of the final states of 
LAMARC for male and female pairs, when the process 
is started in ( υ„ v. > 
Men 
Women 
< „ , „ , > 
.926 
.395 
<»з 
.074 
.605 
more likely to absorb in (v~ w, ) (and consequently to "lock-in" at 
dd). 
The expected number of plays to absorption can be found with 
equation 5.8. Again only the third element of the vector g}- ' is 
relevant. It was found, that the expected number of plays to 
absorption was 256 for male pairs and 365 for female pairs. The 
standard deviations were aproximately 254 and 363 for male and female 
pairs respectively. 
5.4. An estimation proaedure for LAMARC 
Probably the estimates of the parameters could have been better 
(in the sense of yielding a better agreement between simulated and 
observed behavior sequences), if numerical data would have been 
available. Also, one must rçmember that estimating was performed by 
trial and error. However, now it has been shown that the model can 
rather accurately describe the observed time courses and since it is 
psychologically meaningful, it makes sense to think of a better 
estimation procedure. 
As a first step the response parameter π· is estimated. For this 
one needs to known when a player in in v., the transitional state. 
This problem is related to the identifiability problem. See for 
example Greeno and Steiner (1964) and Nahinsky (1973). 
Greeno and Steiner (1964) suggest to search for sequences of out­
comes which have the effect of resetting the system (recurrent events). 
That is, if a sequence of outcomes on play j, j+1, ..., j+k 
(j, к = 1, 2, ...) is a recurrent event, anything which happens 
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before play j+k can be ignored when questions are considered about 
what happens after play j+k. 
Since it is assumed that every player begins the sequence of 
plays in ν and according to axiom T2b, it follows that the players 
occupy < υ. v. > at least until the first (<?<?) or (dd) outcome has been 
chosen. For these plays state < г>2 υ- > is fully identifiable, until 
after the first (ее) or (dd) response. 
Let m be the number of plays that the players are indentified to 
occupy < υ2 v2 ) . 
Let m. be the number of (ее) outcomes of these m plays, and let 
m. be the total number of (ed) and (dc) outcomes of these m plays, 
then a maximum likelihood estimate for π is: 
2m. + ш» 
ff = (5.15) 
2m 
Suppose, on play j (j = 1, 2, ...) the (dd) outcome is chosen. 
If on play j+k (k = 1, 2, ...) outcome (ее) is chosen for the first 
time since play j, it follows that on play j+k the pair of players occupies 
occupies < υ. υ, > . Similarly, if (dd) is chosen for the first time on 
play j+k, after (ее) was chosen on play j the players must occupy 
< v- i>2 > on play j+k (cf. Figure 5.1a). 
If outcome (ее) is chosen on play η (η = 1, 2, ...) for the first 
time since the beginning of the sequence of plays or if (ее) is chosen 
on play j+k (j, к = 1, 2, ...) for the first time since (dd) has been 
chosen on play j, one knows for certain that the pair of players 
occupies ( и. v.) on play η or play j+k respectively. Similarly, if 
(dd) is chosen on play η for the first time since the beginning of the 
sequence of plays or if (dd) is chosen on play j+k for the first time 
since (oc) has been chosen on play j, one knows for certain that the 
pair of players occupies < v. v.) on play η or play j+k respectively. 
Solving for a and 5 is suggested by Nahinsky (1973), who solves 
for the latent distribution in an outcome-contingent model on trial η 
by assuming a fixed starting state assuming that solutions are known 
for trial n-1 for a fixed observable outcome (p. 306-310). 
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Figure 5.1a can be helpful to see the logic of the following 
derivations. 
Let X, -.. be the event that (<?c) has been chosen on play j and 
that the pair of players occupies < г>2 г>2 > on play j. Then 
Prob [ О с ) .
 + 1|Х г., ] = α 2 + 2ir(1 - α)α + π 2 (1 - α ) 2 = [ (1 - π)ο + π] 2 
Prob [ ( « 0 j + 1 | x t j ) 
Prob [ ( d c . ) j + 1 | X ü ) ] 
Prob [ № ) j + 1 | X ü ) ] 
- π)(1 - α)α + π(1 - я)(1 - α)' 
- τ) CI - <*) ICI - ff)a + "I 
- ff)(1 - α)α + ir(1 - ff)(1 - a)' 
- ff)(1 - a) [(1 - ")<* + "I 
- ff)2C1 - a ) 2 
(5.16) 
Let m be the number of (ce) outcomes on play j+1 summed over 
all j, (j = 1, 2, . . . ) , m the number of («£) outcomes on play j + 1, m, 
the number of (ά?) outcomes on play j+1, and m - m. - m. - m, the 
number of Cád) outcomes on play j+1. Then the likelihood of these data 
is expressed as 
L = I (1 - ff)a + π] г т ^ + т з ^ . ^Тш-Щ-щ-т^^ _
 a)2m-2mrm2-m3 
CS. 17) 
The logarithm of this likelihood function is equal to 
Log L = (Znij + m 2 + m3)log[(1 - ff)a + JT] + 
C2m - 2m - m - m3)logC1 - π) + 
(2m - 2m! - m 2 - m3)logC1 - a) 
(5.18) 
Taking the partial derivative to α and setting it equal to zero yields 
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3_Log L 
(_2т] + m + m )(1 - я) 2m - 2m - m - m, 
(1 - π)α + ÎT 1 - α 
(2m] + m2 + m )(1 - π)(1 - a) - (2m - 2m] - m2 - m,) [(1 - π)α + τι] 
=
 [(1 - Jr)a + π] (1 - a) 
(5.19) 
The solution for a becomes 
2m. + m. + m. - 2nnr 
ЩТ^Т) ί5·2 0^ 
Let Y,, -, be the event, that (ad) has been chosen on play к and that 
the pair of players occupies < υ. у» > on play k. Then 
(k)1 
(Ю1 
Prob [ ( ^ ) k + 1 | Y M ] =" 2(i - s ) 2 
Prob [(^) k + 1|Y ( k ]] - »(1 - о« + »О - »)(i - s) 2 
(5.21) 
= 7г(1 - δ)[πδ + (1 - π)] 
Prob [ № ) k + 1 | Y ( k ) ] = »(1 - δ)δ + π(1 - π)(1 - δ ) 2 
= 7г(1 - δ)[πδ + (1 - 7г)1 
Prob [ ( ^ k + ^ Y ^ l = « 2 + 2(1 - >r)(1 - δ)δ + (1 - *)2(1 - δ) 2 
= [*6 + (1 - *)] 2 
Let how m be the number of (ce) outcomes on play k+1 summed over 
all к (к = 1, 2, . . . ) , m. the number of (ad) outcomes on play k + 1 , 
m. the number of (do) outcomes on play k+1, and m - m. - m. - m, the 
number of (dd) outcomes on play k+1. Then the likelihood of these data 
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2m-2m.-m.-m, 2m +m +m, 2m1+m-+m, 
L = [π6 + (1 - π)] ' ¿ \ π ' L \ (1 - δ) ' ¿ J 
(5.22) 
The logarithm of this likelohood fuction is equal to 
Log L = (2m - 2m - m2 - m ) log M + (1 - " )] + 
(2m, + m 2 + m3) log (π) + (5.23) 
(2m + m + m )log(1 - δ) 
Taking the partial derivative to 6 and setting it equal to zero yields 
Э Log L 
θδ 
(2m - 2m - m - m )π(1 - 6)-(2m. + m + ΐϊΐ,Ηττδ + (1 - я)] 
[πδ + (1 - π) (1 - δ)] = 0 
(5.24) 
The solution for δ becomes 
2m я - 2m. - m. - m, 
t = = (5.25) 
2m)r v J 
According to axioms Tía and Tib transition from υ to y. is only-
possible after unilateral defection by the other player. This 
transition probability is indicated as β. 
Unlike with υ. one never knows for certain when a player is in υ.. 
Transition from υ. to υ. is possible after a [ac) outcome. 
When a sequence of (cc) outcomes is observed, it can never be 
determined wether υ has been entered by any player. However, some­
times one can tell that v. has not been entered yet; 
Let X,.-. be an outcome as defined before and let (cd).
 + ] be the 
asymmetrical outcome on play j+1, where S. has chosen c. 
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Let С: + y be S.' s choice of a on play j+2. U'e estimate β as follows: 
Let f. be the number of [^ """.(ed)1] sequences on plays j+2 and j+1, and 
let f. be the number of Id1, (ad)1] sequences om plays j+2 and j+1. Be 
F = f. + ί? the number of (ed) outcomes on play j+1. Then (cf. Figure 
5.1a): 
Prob[aj
+2, М)] + 1|Х и )] 
= α(1 - α)(1 - π)[βπ + (1 - β) ] + (1 - α)2π2(1 - π). 
(5.26) 
= (1 - α)(1 - π) [α - α(1 - π)β + (1 - α)ττ2] 
Prob[dj
+2, Μ ) ! + 1 | Χ α ) ] = α(1 - α)(1 - τι^β + (1 - α)2π(1 - π ) 2 
= (1 - α)(1 - π)2[αβ + (1 - α)ιτ] 
(5.27) 
The likelihood function is 
L = (1 - cOF»(1 - 7f)F+f2*ia - a(1 - π) β + 
(1 - α ) π 2 ] £ ι * [ α β + (1 - ο)π] Í2 (5.28) 
а l o g L _ -fM\- *) £2a _ 
3β а - a ( 1 - π)β + (1 - α ) π 2 aß + (1 - α)π 
Solving for β yie lds (assuming α ^ 0) 
f 2 [α - α ( 1 - π)β + ( 1 - α ) * 2 ] - ^ ( 1 - π) [αβ + (1 - α) π ] = 0 
α ( 1 - π)Ρβ = f ζ α + (1 - α ) τ Γ 2 ί 2 - (1 - α ) π ( 1 - π ) ^ 
(1 - α)π(ιτΡ - f ] ) + a f 2 
β =
 α ( 1 - π)F 
(5.29) 
( 5 . 3 0 ) 
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Next, let Y,, -. be as defined before, and let now f be the number of 
[c , (de)1] sequences on plays k+2 and k+1 and let f, be the number of 
[d1, (de)1] sequences on plays k+2 and k+1. Be F = f + f the number 
of (de) outcomes on play k+1. Then (cf. Figure 5.1a): 
(5.31) 
Proble1^, (de)£
+1|Y(k)] = 5(1 - «)π2γ + (1 - δ)2π2(1-Γ) 
= (1 - ο)π2[6γ + (1 - δ)(1 - π)] 
Prob[dj
+2, №)Ì + 1|Y ( k )] 
= 6(1 - 6)π[γ(1 - π) + (1 - γ)] + (1 - δ)2 π(1 - π ) ? 
= (1 - δ)π[δ - ττδγ + (1 - δ)(1 - τ)2] (5.32) 
The likelihood function is 
L = (1 - 6)F*TrF+f2*[ÄY + (1 - δ)(1 - π)]£ι*[δ - ττδγ + 
(1 - δ)(1 - π ) 2 ] £ 2 
log L = F l o g (1 - δ) + (F + f ? ) log тт + fj l o g [ 6 Y + (1 - δ) (1 - π) ] 
+ Ϊ2 logli - πδγ + (1 - δ)(1 - π ) 2 ] 
Д log L _ ' ¿ - η r s 33Ì 
δγ δγ + (1 - δ ) ( 1 - ττ) δ - πδγ + (1 - δ) (1 - ir)^ ϋ (Ь'Х 
Solv ing f o r γ y i e l d s (assuming δ ^ 0 ) : 
^ [ δ - πδγ + (1 - 6 ) ( 1 - τ τ ) 2 ] - £ 2 π [ δ γ + (1 - δ ) ( 1 - Tt) ] = 0 
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τιδΡγ = £,6 + (1 - 6 ) 0 - •"j2îi - (1 - δΧΙ - τ)£2 
Λ
 0 - δ) (I - π) (f! - rF) + äfj 
Y 
πόΡ 
This concludes the estimation process 
(5.34) 
An alternative estimation of β is possible, using (5.26) only, by 
equating the right member of (5.26) with f , i.e. the frequency of 
[ (з|
+
2,(еа)^
+1] sequences, given X-. Then: 
fi 
(1 - a)0 - π)[α3(7τ - 1) + α + (1 - α)π2] (5.35a) 
and so 
_ (1 - a)p - it) [q »(1 - α)ΐΓ2] * M - fi 
S = *-' " aj}ì ~ "(Г* (\1 "-'M ' " " Χ1 , (5.35b) 
α(1 - α) (1 - ιτ)/ * Μ ' ν 
where Μ is the number of events X on play j. 
Similarly, γ can be estimated by equating £(, i.e. the frequency of 
'^ + 2 ' k^k+l ' gi v c r l ^v w l t^ t·'16 right menber of (5.32). Then, 
f 2 
— - (1 - 6)4« -6γπ+ (1 - fi)(1 - π)2] (5.36a) 
and so 
(1 - δ Μ δ + (1 - 6)0 - π7] * M - f η 
γ
 6(1 - д » ' M — ( 5 · 3 6 Ъ ) 
(In these equations, f- is defined in the same way as in the 
derivation of (5.34) and M stands for the number of events Y on play 
Ю. 
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We want to make a note on the proposed estimation procedure. At the 
outset of this chapter the estimation procedure was already announced 
as one having maximum likelihood properties. The reader will have 
noticed that our estimations of the model's parameters are not 
based on all the information in the data due to the fact that the 
states of LAMARC are not completely identifiable. Therefore, in 
general our estimates will not be sufficient, and sufficiency is one 
of the properties of maximum likelihood estimators. Ό Since maximum 
likelihood properties cannot be denied in our estimation procedure, 
it could be labeled 'incomplete maximum likelihood' or 'quasi 
maximum likelihood'. 
5.5. Discussion 
The analysis of sequences of behavior in iterated plays of non­
zero-sum games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, calls for dynamic 
decision models which describe the latent processes of prediction, 
commitment and choice. By applying concepts from Howard's theory of 
metagames the value-state model, which was originally developed in the 
context of a 100Ό cooperative and unresponsive opponent (Meeker, 
1971], could be expanded to a general model of dynamic decision 
making in the PDG. 
Although the model presented here seems to make sense when 
applied to the observed time courses in the PDG, the model should be 
applied to better (and more) data to see how well the proposed 
estimation procedure works and whether the model could be refined. 
When estimating the parameters of LAMARC for the Rapoport-and-
Dale data, a test was done with the introduction of a linear operator 
for π according to the Bush and Mosteller learning model. The results 
were negative. However, this could be caused by the lack of accurate 
data. 
England (1973, 1975), who applied successfully similar models to 
1) More specifically, if parameLers have sufficient estimators, then 
the maximum likelihood estimate will be a sufficient estimate. 
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two-party-negotiations, suggests to explore other learning models such 
as Luce's nonlinear ß-model (1959) or Restle's hypothesis testing 
model (1961) for the response parameter. 
A mathematically interesting aspect of LAMARC is that the number 
of latent states (7) exceeds the number of observable states (4). 
This challanges Nahinsky's (1973) thesis that these numbers have to 
be equal in order for a unique underlying structure in the data to be 
identified. 
As is usual when a new model is developed, more questions are 
raised than answered. For example, can the value-state model be use-
fully applied to other nonzero-sun games? How can the model be 
expanded or revised to be applicable to η-person dileimias? Are the 
parameters of LAMARC related to the payoffs of the PDG or to 
personality variables of the players in a systematic way? The 
tentative results with LAMARC may provide an argument to continue 
research in this erea. 
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bPILOGUl 
Game theory is part of the theory of decision making, fhe task 
of the mathematician is to prescribe 'optimal' choices or strategies 
according to the principle of rationality, the task of the ps>chologist 
is to study the process of decision making i*hich precedes actual 
behavior. In this dissertation an attempt is made to understand gaming 
behavior in terms of the cognitive operations performed on prediction 
and expectation about own and other's behaiior in the domain of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
The relevance of prediction and expectation for a psychological 
theory of the decision making process in gaming situations has already 
been stressed by several authors (see for example Pruitt and Kimme1, 
1977, Schulz and Hesse, 1978), but methodological problems of how to 
penetrate into the processes underlying overt choices have not been 
solved beyond the determination of response- and state-conditioned 
propensities. 
The value state theory presented in this dissertation provides 
a way to test hypotheses about the dynamics of the (latent) decision 
making process of subjects involved m gaming situations In chapter 2 
it was found that the value state model of Meeker is consistent with 
Coombs' parameterization of the PDG, in which the game is reformulated 
as an approach-avoidance conflict with no prescribed solution. The 
results of chapter 2 also present"1 some support for the approach 
taken to study the latent behavior. In this context the following 
anecdote is interesting. 
On the European Mathematical Psychology Group Meeting of September 
1975 a paper reporting on the results of chapter I, was given by the 
author. The peculiar finding that analysis of variance on the data of 
these experiments did not yield any significant effect (see Table 
2.11), raised some scepticism in some of the participants with regard 
to the validity of these results. Remember that the analysis of variance 
was performed on choice proportions,which in our view do not permit 
a proper analysis of the decision making process. In a recent study 
by Γοχ and Guyer (19"8) on repeated trials of a four-person Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, subjects, males and females, made choices under two 
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information conditions: in one condition the choices were stated 
publicly, in the other condition the number of subjects choosing 
'cooperatively' and 'competitively' was known to each player but the 
choice made by each particular player was not known by the other 
players. Analysis of variance on choice proportions yielded 6 non-
significant P-ratios (for the main effects and interaction effects 
for Conditions, Sex and Trials) and only 1 moderately significant 
(even 5 F-ratios were smaller than 1.0) ... . Yet, effects were found 
through profile analysis on choice-conditioned propensities! 
Much is written about the relation between attitude and decision 
(see for example Upshaw, 1975). In this dissertation an integration 
between attitude and (meta-)rational choice in the context of the 
decision making process in gaming behavior is developed. Value states 
represent attitudinal orientations of people toward their environment. 
These orientations incorporate beliefs about the environment and 
valued goals. In gaining situations these beliefs are equivalent to 
a player's predictions about his opponent's choices plus own 
commitments, while valued goals determine policies. The theory of 
(general) metagames is a static theory which yields equilibrium 
solutions for games, which can be regarded as the possible end results 
of the dynamic decision making process. These equilibrium solutions 
are attained through the players' choosing metastrategies consisting 
of (conmitment, policy)-pairs. 
The equilibrium solutions of a game, derived from metagame theory, 
are the sanctionable outcomes of the game. In LAMARC the number of 
absorbing states equals the number of sanctionable outcomes in the 
PDG. It would be interesting to investigate whether the theory 
developed in this dissertation could be applied to other two-person 
nonzero-sum games. For instance, in the Game of Chicken (see Figure 
1.10, page 24) there are three sanctionable outcomes, namely (FLC,), 
(lUC.) and also (RX-) (the latter outcome is not an equilibrium of 
the basic game). A model, similar to LAMARC, for the behavior in 
repeated plays of the game, would require three absorbing states 
(according to the sanctionable outcomes of the game) and at least 
one transient state. 
2 
Considering the number of metastrategies in the (full) meta-
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game and in view of the correspondence between value states and meta-
strategieSjWe see that the theory of metagames suggests the existence 
of more value states in the PDG than the number which was distinguished 
in LAMARC. Introducing a refinement of the value state theory in terms 
of increasing the number of value states in LAMARC would consist in an 
unraveling of the transitional state. The experimental method utilized 
in chapter 4 could be adapted to make (at least partially) identifiable 
these value states (casu quo metastrategies). A similar technique as 
the one proposed in chapter 3 could be applied to analyze data on 
repeated trials, when metastrategies are made visible, for the case 
of an unresponsive, preprogrammed opponent. 
Studies on the PDG and similar paradigms have been criticized for 
their lack of correspondence with real life situations. Although we 
take the position that (two-person) games should be viewed primarily 
as decision models in stead of paradigms for social interaction (for a 
discussion on this topic see Ncmeth, 1972), we agree that n-person 
dilemmas (Hardin, 1968; Hamburger, 1973; Dawes, 1975) are more 
appealing as analogies of real life than the two-person equivalents. 
Introducing more than two players, even if each player has only two 
choice alternatives, could make a possible value state model terribly 
complicated and/or could create enormous analytical problems. As a 
first step we could restrict ourselves to those η-person games for 
which there is a simple correspondence with two-person games. In the 
same way as Coombs' parameterization of the PDG was developed for the 
class of separable games, we could start with games which can be 
conceived of as the sum of a number of two-person games. 
In an η-person dilemma where each of η persons has two choices, 
a and d, let ö(m) be the player's payoff for a d choice when m players 
choose с and let C(m) be the player's payoff for a a choice when m 
players choose c. Then, Hamburger (1973) has demonstrated that if a 
game is characterized by a graph in which C'(m) and ^(m) are linear 
functions (of m ) , the game corresponds to n-1 simultaneous PDG's in 
which each of the η players plays against each of the n-1 others. 
Perhaps the research suggested can shed more light on the dynamics 
of the decision makinp process preceding overt behavior in dilemma 
type conflict situations. 
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SUr MARY 
This dissertation is concerned with the decision making process 
of subjects in social conflicts of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game type. 
The approach taken focuses on the role of value states, that is 
representations of principles of social or socially just behavior, 
as determinants of the decision making behavior. A mathematical model 
is developed, which describes the role of these value states by means 
of a latent Markov chain. 
Already for quite a time competition and cooperation in situations 
where the interests of interacting people are completely or partly 
opposed, have been major themes of interest for psychologists and 
other social scientists. In particular, research on this topic has 
been inspired by mathematical game theory. 
Chapter 1 is devoted to an evaluation of the relevance of game 
theory for the study of behavior in social conflicts. Unequivocal 
prescriptions with respect to the optimal behavior in experimental 
games are derived from the principle of rationality as long as 
strictly competitive games are concerned. However, the principle of 
rationality breaks down when nonzero-sum games are involved. It appears 
that in games as Prisoner's Dileima, Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, 
etcetera, optimal strategy choices in the sense of minimax or sure-
thing principle cither do not exist or do not yield optimal outcomes. 
Besides, specific strategy choices in nonzero-sum games sometimes can 
be given psychological connotations such as individualism, cooperation, 
competition, altruism, etcetera. Game theory clearly is successful 
for psychology as soon as it fails as a normative theory. 
Several attempts have been made to develop descriptive or 
explanatory models for human behavior in experimental games, but 
were all aimed at the observable behavior. A major thesis of this 
dissertation is that these, so called, traditional approaches have 
been unsuccessful because they fail to penetrate into the unobservable, 
latent process of dynamic decision making in the course of interaction. 
Variables such as subjects' strategies or their motivational 
orientations which determine their strategy choices, are inferred at 
best a posteriori from the course of the manifest behavior. 
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Chapter 2 reports on an experiment on iterated plays of the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game where a subject's opponent is non-responsive 
and ΙΟΟΌ cooperative. A theory for the decision making process in this 
conflict situation is discussed, which distinguishes between the manifest 
behavior and the latent behavior of the decision making subjects 
involved. Here the concept of 'value states' is introduced. The 
mathematical model derived from this theory is a latent Markov chain 
model with the following features: 
1. if a person's behavior satisfies a latent Markov chain, his 
manifest behavior is not a Markov chain; 
2. assumptions about the effect of the manifest behavior (both of the 
subject and of his opponent) on the value state the subject holds, 
are reflected in the parameters of the latent Markov chain model 
and in the parameters for the relationships between the latent 
states and the manifest behavior. 
Examination of the relationships between the model's parameters 
and a recent parametrization of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game enabled us 
to attach a clear psychological interpretation of the parameters of 
the model. 
Another major finding of the experiment discussed in chapter 2, 
was that analysis of variance on choice percentages for different 
treatment conditions, did not reveal any significant effect,while 
analysis of the same data according to the value state model yielded 
different parameter values for different treatment conditions. 
In chapter 3 the value state model of the preceding chapter is 
extended to decision making under uncertainty. Still the opponent is 
unresponsive to the subject's behavior. The model is also reformu­
lated for the case of к > 2 latent states. 
A special section in this chapter is devoted to problems relating 
the estimability of the model proposed. It appears that the conventional 
methods of parameter estimation are not suitable here. 
The extended model was subjected to an experimental test. Subjects 
played the Prisoner's Dileimia Game (for 120 trials in succession) 
against a preprogrammed, probabilistically playing, and non-responsive 
stooge. 
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The experimental results were not in contradiction with the results 
found in chapter 2. Further it turned out, that the conditional response 
probabilities of the latent Markov chain model are insensible to 
variations in the response probabilities of the 'opponent'. 
Further extension of the value state theory towards an open game 
playing situation with all real players required a solution of the 
paradox of rationality (for nonzero-sum games). This is accomplished 
in Howard's theory of metagames, in which rationality is reformulated 
and the concept of 'meta-rationality' is introduced. This theory is 
described in chapter 4. Metagamc theory is a descriptive theory on 
stable outcomes in experimental games. 
The theory of metagames shows how certain outcomes of a game, 
which are not an equilibrium according to normative game theory, can 
be stable. Stability is achieved by the players choosing (non-
observable) metastrategies. Metastrategies are conditional strategies 
which a player chooses wittingly or unwittingly and which reflect his 
expectations and predictions with respect to his opponent's behavior 
and with respect to his own behavior. 
In case of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game the double-cooperating 
outcome can be stable according to the theory of metagames. This 
means that the theory of metagames can explain an empirical finding 
which is in contradiction with classical, normative game theory. 
In the original formulation of the theory of metagames no justice 
was done to the symmetrical relations which exist in experimental games. 
This difficulty is met in Howard's theory of general metagames. The 
theory of general metagames too predicts that cooperation can be stable 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. » 
An experiment was designed to test the assertions of the theory 
with respect to the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and to determine empirically 
the metastrategies of the players involved. For that purpose a special 
form of the Prisoner's Dilemma, labelled the Extended Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, was used, with which metastrategies could be made manifest. 
So far this method has not been applied elsewhere. 
The experimental results shed more light on the conditions under 
which stability in the game is reached and suggested a relationship 
between the theory of value states and the theory of metagames: value 
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statcs reflect a subject's expectation of own and other's behavior, 
which is also expressed by metastratcgies. 
Through the application of concepts from metagame theory the 
'value state' model, originally developed in the context of a 100°Ô 
cooperative and unresponsive opponent, is expanded in chapter 5 to 
a general model of dynamic decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Game. 
The major features of this model, which describes the latent 
process of prediction, commitment and choice, are: 
1. each player's behavior is described as a probabilistic finite 
automaton with three latent states; 
2. both players involved in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, jointly 
behave like a system, which is represented by an absorbing Markov 
chain with seven latent states, of which two are absorbing; 
3. parameter estimation is accomplished through a quasi or incomplete 
maximum likelihood procedure; 
4. with the parameters estimated a number of non-observable 
quantities can be computed, which are very informative of the 
latent behavior of the players involved. 
The model, LAMARC, is evaluated with respect to its descriptive 
adequacy of the observed time courses of two sets of already existing 
data. It appeared that differences in the parameter values for two 
populations, male and female players, could be given a clear, 
psychologically meaningful interpretation in terms of the dynamics 
of the decision making process in the Prisoner's Dilenma Game. 
Finally, in an epilogue the preceding chapters arc synthesized 
and some lines are drawn, along which further research could proceed. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit proefschrift gaat over het besluitvormingsproces van personen 
in sociale conflictsituaties van het type Prisoner's Dilerana Game. 
De aanpak richt zich op de rol van waarde-inste Hingen (value states), 
dat wil zeggen uitgangspunten van sociaal of sociaal rechtvaardig 
gedrag, als determinanten van het besluitvormingsgedrag. Een mathema-
tisch model is ontwikkeld, dat de rol van deze waarde-instellingen 
beschrijft door middel van een latente Markov keten. 
Het thema competitie en samenwerking in situaties waarin de be-
langen van interacterende personen geheel of gedeeltelijk tegengesteld 
zijn, heeft reeds lange tijd de aandacht van psychologen en andere 
sociaal-wetenschappelijke onderzoekers. In het bijzonder is daarbij 
aansluiting gezocht bij de mathematische speltheorie. 
Hoofdstuk 1 is gewijd aan een evaluatie van het belang van de 
speltheorie voor de studie van gedrag in sociale conflictsituaties. 
Zolang het gaat om spelen met strikte competitie kan men ondubbel-
zinnige voorschriften met betrekking tot het optimaal gedrag in 
experimentele spelen afleiden vanuit het rationaliteitsbeginsel. Het 
rationaliteitsbeginsel schiet echter te kort, als het gaat om nietnul-
som spelen. Het blijkt, dat in spelen zoals het Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Chicken, de Battle of the Sexes, etcetera, optimale strategie-keuzen 
ofwel niet bestaan, ofwel niet leiden tot optimale uitkomsten. Daar-
naast kunnen aan bepaalde strategie-keuzen in nietnul-som spelen soms 
psychologische connotaties worden gegeven zoals individualisme, samen-
werking, competitie, altruisme, etcetera. Speltheorie kan blijkbaar 
met succes worden gebruikt in de psychologie zodra hij te kort schiet 
als een normatieve theorie. 
Er zijn verschillende pogingen ondernomen om descriptieve of 
verklarende modellen voor menselijk gedrag in experimentele spelen te 
ontwikkelen. Een belangrijke stelling van dit proefschrift is dat 
deze, zogenaamde, traditionele benaderingen geen succes hebben gehad, 
omdat zij verzuimen door te dringen in het niet-waameembare, latente 
dynamische besluitvormingsproces tijdens het verloop van de inter-
actie. Variabelen zoals de strategieën die subjecten volgen, of hun 
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motivationele instellingen die hun strategie-keuzen bepalen, zijn op 
zijn hoogst a posteriori uit het verloop van het manifeste gedrag af 
te lelden. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een verslag van een experiment met herhaalde 
spelen van het Prisoner's Dilemma,Game, waarin de tegenspeler van de 
proefpersoon met-beïnvloedbaar en 100Ό coöperatief is. Een theorie 
voor het besluitvormingsproces in deze conflictsituatie wordt bespro-
ken, die een onderscheid maakt tussen het manifeste gedrag en het 
latente gedrag van de proefpersonen die in deze besluitvorming zijn 
gebikkeld. Hier wordt het begrip 'value state' (waarde-instellingen) 
geïntroduceerd. Het mathematisch model dat uit deze theorie is af-
geleid, is een latente Markov keten model met de volgende kenmerken: 
1. als het gedrag van iemand beantwoordt aan een latente Markov 
keten, dan is zijn manifest gedrag geen Markov keten; 
2. veronderstellingen omtrent het effect van het manifest gedrag 
(zowel van het subject als zijn tegenspeler) op de 'waarde-
mstelling' (value state) van het subject worden weerspiegeld in 
de parameters van het latente Markov keten model en in de parame-
ters voor de relaties tussen de latente toestanden en het manifest 
gedrag. 
Onderzoek naar de relaties tussen de parameters van het model en 
een recente parametenzering van het Prisoner's Dilemma Game stelde 
ons in staat een duidelijke psychologische interpretatie te geven aan 
de parameters van het model. 
Een andere belangrijke bevinding van het experiment dat besproken 
is m hoofdstuk 2, was dat variantie analyse van keuze-percentages 
voor verschillende behandelingscondities, geen enkel significant re-
sultaat opleverde, terwijl analyse van dezelfde gegevens volgens het 
value state model verschillende parameterwaarden voor verschillende 
behandelingsconcities gaf. 
In hoofdstuk 3 is het value state model van het voorgaande hoofd-
stuk uitgebreid voor besluitvorming in onzekerheid. Nog steeds 
reageert de tegenspeler niet op het gedrag van het subject. Het model 
is tevens geherformuleerd voor het geval er twee of meer latente 
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toestanden zijn. 
Een speciale paragraaf m dit hoofdstuk is gewijd aan schattings-
problemen met betrekking tot het voorgestelde model. Het blijkt dat 
de gebruikelijke methoden voor parameterschatting hier niet geschikt 
zijn. 
Het uitgebreide model werd onderworpen aan een experimentele test. 
Proefpersonen speelden het Prisoner's Dilemma Game (120 trials achter 
elkaar) tegen een voorgeprogrammeerde, volgens het toeval spelende, 
en met-beïnvloedbare dummy-speler. 
De experimentele resultaten waren m e t in strijd met de resul-
taten die gevonden waren in hoofdstuk 2. Verder bleek, dat de voor-
waardelijke response waarschijnlijkheden van het latente Markov keten 
model ongevoelig zijn voor variaties in de response waarschijnlijk-
heden van de 'tegenspeler'. 
Verdere uitbreiding van de value state theorie naar een open 
spelsituatie met volledig echte spelers, vereiste een oplossing voor 
de rationaliteitsparadox (voor metnul-som spelen). Dit wordt bereikt 
in Howard's theorie van de metaspelen, in welke theorie rationaliteit 
is geherformuleerd en het begrip 'meta-rationaliteit' wordt ingevoerd. 
Deze theorie wordt beschreven m hoofdstuk 4. De theorie van de meta-
spelen is een descriptieve theorie over stabiele uitkomsten m experi-
mentele spelen. 
De theorie van de metaspelen laat zien hoe bepaalde uitkomsten 
van een spel, die geen evenwichtspunten zijn volgens de normatieve 
speltheorie, toch stabiel kunnen zijn. Stabilitiet wordt bereikt 
doordat spelers (met-waarneembare) metastrategieen kiezen. Metastra-
tegieen zijn voorwaardelijke strategieën die een speler bewust of 
onbewust kiest en die zijn verwachtingen en voorspellingen weerspie-
gelen met betrekking tot het gedrag van zijn tegenspeler en met 
betrekking tot zijn eigen gedrag. 
In het geval van het Prisoner's Dilemma Game kan de dubbel-
cooperatievc uitkomst stabiel zijn volgens de theorie van de meta-
spelen. Dit betekent dat de theorie van de metaspelen een empirisch 
resultaat dat in tegenspraak is met de klassieke, normatieve spel-
theorie, kan verklaren. 
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In de oorspronkelijke formulering van de theorie van de meta-
spclen werd geen recht gedaan aan de symmetrische relaties in expe-
rimentele spelen. Deze moeilijkheid ivordt opgelost m Howard's 
theorie van de algemene mctaspelen. De theory van de algemene 
metaspelen voospelt oûk, dat coöperatie stabiel kan zijn m het 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
Een experiment werd opgezet om de uitspraken van de theorie met 
betrekking tot het Prisoner's Dilemma Game te toetsen en om empirisch 
de metdstrategieen vast te stellen van de betrokken spelers. Voor dat 
doel werd een speciale vorm van het Prisoner's Dilemma, aangeduid als 
het Uitgebreide Prisoner's Оііетшіа Game, gebruikt, waarmee meta-
strategieen zichtbaar konden worden gemaakt. Deze methode is tot nu 
toe niet elders toegepast. 
De experimentele resultaten wierpen meer licht op de condities 
waaronder stabiliteit in het spel wordt bereikt, en gaven een aanwij­
zing voor een relatie tussen de value state theory en de theorie van 
de metaspelen: value states (waarde-instellingen) weerspiegelen 
iemands verwachting van zijn eigen gedrag en dat van de ander, het­
geen ook wordt uitgedrukt door metastrategieen. 
Itoor toepassing van begrippen uit de theorie van de metaspelen 
is het value state model, dat oorspronkelijk ontwikkeld werd in samen­
hang met een 100Ό coöperatieve en met-beïnvloedbare tegenspeler, in 
hoofdstuk 5 uitgebreid naar een algemeen model voor dynamische 
besluitvorming in het Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
De voornaamste kenmerken van dit model dat het latente proces van 
predictie, commitment en keuze beschrijft, zijn: 
1. het gedrag van elke speler wordt beschreven als een probabilis-
tische eindige automaat met drie latente toestanden; 
2. beide spelers in het Prisoner's Dileima Game gedragen zich samen 
als een systeem dat weergegeven wordt door een absorberende Markov 
keten met zeven latente toestanden, waarvan twee absorberend zijn; 
3. parameter schatting verloopt via een quasi of incomplete maximum 
likelihood procedure; 
4. met behulp van de geschatte parameters kan een aantal niet-
waameembare grootheden worden berekend, die zeer informatief zijn 
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met betrekking tot het latente gedrag van de betrokken spelers. 
Het model, lAMARC, is geëvalueerd op zijn beschrijvende adequaat-
heid voor het geobserveerde verloop in de tijd van twee sets reeds 
bestaande data. Het bleek dat verschillen in de paranoierwaarden 
voor twee populaties, mannelijke en vrouwelijke spelers, een duidelij-
ke, psychologisch zinvolle, interpretatie kon worden gegeven in termen 
van de dynamiek van het besluitvormingsproces in het Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game. 
Ten slotte worden in een epiloog de voorafgaande hoofdstukken 
samengevat en worden enkele lijnen uitgezet, waarlangs verder onder-
zoek zich zou kunnen voltrekken. 
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S Τ Γ 1, I, I N G L \ 
1. ben niet-bdnctioneerbdrc uitkomst in een ordinaal spel G is geen 
evenwichtspunt van 6'. (Dtt proefschrift) 
2 . Indien een stochastisch proces zich gedraagt volgens een latente 
Markov keten, dan gedraagt de observeerbare output van dit proces 
zich niet volgens een observeerbare Markov keten. 
3. De bevvering van Dawes (1975), dat het noodzakelijk is om bij de 
grafische weergave van een N-persoons sociacl dilcmna een metriek 
te specificeren is onjuist. 
Dauon, R.M. Formal models of dilemmas in social decision making. 
In: M.F. Kaplan and S. Schwartz (Eds.), Human Judgpmpnt and Decision 
Processes. New York: Acadevibc Press, 79/5. 
4. Guttman's eendimensionale scalogramanalysc is ongeschikt om de 
cognitieve ontwikkeling volgens de Piagetiaanse stadia te beschrijven. 
Daarentegen is een meerdimensionale analyse volgens het conjunctieve, 
c.q. disjunctieve model van Coombs wel bruikbaar. 
Van der Sauden, A.L. Th" Conjunctive Model as a Means to Measure 
Developmental Structures. Research Report 7.5 MA 11. Nijmegen: 
Psychologisch ¡аЪсгаЬогъит der Katholieke Universiteit, 1975. 
5. Omdat de iteratieve schattingsprocedure in de multidimensionale 
schaalanalyse volgens het IVDSCAL-model gevoelig is voor locale 
minima, verdient het aanbeveling om vooraf een globaal idee te hebben 
over de configuratie van de "object-space", en deze te verwerken in 
de uitgangsconfiguratie voor de INDSCAI.-analyse. 
Carroll, tl.D. and Wijh, M. Models and methods for three-way multi­
dimensional scaling. In: Ü.H. Krantz, R.C. Atkinson, R.D. Luce, and 
P. Supves (bds.). Contemporary Developments in Mathematical 
Psychology (Vol. II). San Francisco: Freeman and Co., 1974. 
6. De stelling van Van Uden (1977), dat de ritmische organisatie van 
gesproken taal van belang is voor het taalverwervingsproces, is in 
overeenstenming met Raaijmakers' (1979) algemene theorie voor het 
ophalen van informatie uit het lange-termijn geheugen. De bevindingen 
dat (geschreven) zinnen beter worden onthouden door dove kinderen die 
zijn opgevoed volgens de gespreksmethode, dan door dove kinderen die 
zijn opgevoed in gebarentaal of vingerspelling, kunnen worden verklaard 
als het in staat zijn van de eerste groep, c.q. het niet in staat zijn 
van de tweede groep, gebruik te maken van гъШъгк als vptrteml cue 
Raaijmakers, ¡f.G. Retrieval from long-t(rm store a general theory ana 
mathematical models. Nijmegen, 1979. ( doctoral dissertation, 
University of Nijmegen) 
Van Uden, A. A world of language for deaf children. Part I Basic 
principles. (Third revised edition). Amsterdam Swets & 7eitlinger, 
197/. 
7. Gezien het toenemend belang van formele theorieën en het gebruik van 
mathematische modellen in de hedendaagse psychologie, wordt in de 
pre-kandidaatsopleiding psychologie in het kader van het vak Statistiek 
ten onrechte meer aandacht besteed aan de toetsingstheorie dan aan de 
schattingstheorie. 
8. Wanneer de verhoudingen van de marginale totalen voor een classifica-
tievariabcle in een contingentietabel niet representatief zijn voor 
de verhoudingen in de populatie, bestaat het gevaar voor vertekening 
in een analyse volgens een additief model (bijv. regressie-analyse). 
In dat geval verdient een analyse volgens een multiplicatief model, 
zoals het log-lincaire model van Goodman, de voorkeur. 
Lindsay, J.K. A comparison of additive and multiplicative models for 
qualitative data Quality and Quartity, 197^, 9, 4ISO. 
9. Bij de bestrijding van dopinggebruik in de sport zou een zelfde 
gedragslijn moeten worden gevolgd als bij de bestrijding van 
druggebruik: niet de gebruiker dient gestraft te worden, maar 
degene die de doping verstrekt of voor het gebruik ervan verant-
woordelijk is. 
10. Gelet op de toenemende werkeloosheid onder academici en gezien het 
vaak zeer specialistische karakter van academische proefschriften, 
Staat tegenwoordig het schrijven van een dissertatie niet zelden 
gelijk aan het "zichzelf wegpromoveren uit de arbeidsmarkt". 
Nijmegen, 15 november 1979 A.L.M, van der Banden 



